

## NOTAS PARA AS AULAS SOBRE EXPERIÊNCIA PRIVADA E DADOS DOS SENTIDOS

### Foreword

The bunch of texts we presently call “Notas para as Aulas sobre Experiência Privada e Dados dos Sentidos” (from now on, NSD) was originally a large set of reflections jotted down by Wittgenstein between 1934 and 1936 on a series of notebooks. They were supposed to be preparations for the discussions to come about in his lectures on those years in Cambridge. These notebooks became part of the collection nowadays denominated “Grosses Notizbuch” (Big Notebook), because of their size compared to others of his notebooks. According to Von Wright’s catalogue (1969, pp. 483-503) they were particularly denominated MSS 148, 149, and 151, or, respectively, the C4, C5, and C7 from the series of eight *Grosse Notizbücher*. From all of those big notebooks, three entertain specifically the theme of the privacy of sense data in a central role, but parallel and criss-cross considerations also appear among the observations, as well as other mathematical, and personal reflections, including several drawings to help or illustrate some of the thoughts. This is actually the usual way Wittgenstein writes and thinks on his other manuscripts. It is important to take this information into account, because, in spite of being different in purpose, NSD maintains the same philosophical style as any other writing. The remarks on these notebooks were mostly taken in English. Notwithstanding, not only reflections in German are widespread among the paragraphs, as it is always evident that the author is really thinking with his pen:

I really do think with my pen, because my head often knows nothing about what my hand is writing (*Culture and Value*, From now on, CV, p. 1; or MS 112, p. 58r).

These English and German original writings are placed here on the left side, while their Portuguese translation is on the right side. Obviously the potential English or German reader will prescind the Por-

tuguese portion, as well as the Portuguese reader who does not know English or German will do the same regarding the originals. But the intention of this translation is not simply to bring into Portuguese the Wittgensteinian text, but to tease the reader into the exegetical discussion in a way that this work should be of intellectual benefit to both the competent and non-competent readers of the three languages. The exclusive Portuguese reader with a minimum of English or German proficiency can have the chance to check how things go in the original manuscripts, as well as the English or German competent reader who knows Portuguese, comparing the languages, might have the chance to suggest better ways of conveying Wittgenstein's thinking into Portuguese. A better access to Wittgenstein’s writing means, as I am trying to suggest, better access to his thinking. And this is because, as we know, his thinking is typically hidden into his writing:

There is a great difference between the effects of a script that one can read easily and fluently, and one which one can write but not *easily* decipher. One locks one’s thoughts in it as though in a casket” (MS 157a, p. 59v).

This translation is engaged in the hard work of deciphering, rather than making things easier through keycodes on “how to read Wittgenstein”. The reader is thus invited to join us into dialogically thinking what is the case. For this reason, I have put, in addition, commented notes in the final part of the work, as a contribution to the continuous dialogue on Wittgenstein's philosophy.

In regard to the possibility of comparison between the original and the translation, as well as to render the texts as close as possible to the manuscripts, I have followed the same spatial order of Wittgenstein's notebooks, indentations including, and employed signs to indicate the different textual variations, as well as other kinds of authorial intervention on the text (as showed below). The suggestion to keep the spatial order of Wittgenstein’s paragraphs has to do not only with the fact

that pictures, gestures, and also extensions can count as part of language games, but mainly because this a philosophy of how we *see* things. So separations among paragraphs usually indicate a new thought around the same or different subject. Longer separations, unless otherwise indicated, signify a completely new thought and subject.

With such picture in mind, the left or original side is rendered as a diplomatic text, and the right or translated side is rendered as normalized text, as far as such adjectives can be used. For example, not always necessary commas or periods are added on the left side. The same for the way Wittgenstein use to write the conjunction “and/und”, which was left as an “&” only on the left side. Abbreviations were also left untouched on the left side, like, for example, “lang. games” or “pers. exp.”, and filled out on the right side with their correspondant sign indication (as showed below). Scratched words and expressions appear on both sides, when they seem to be a possible thinking variation according to the way Wittgenstein figure out for himself a philosophical problem. Accordingly, scratched expressions were omitted when they showed to be unquestionably errors and not a thinking variation.

As this editorial decision marks a limit to the work presented here, the reader should go to the original facsimiles to check them definitively out. All editorial arrangements being done, while the right or Portuguese side keeps the correct spatial distance between the paragraphs, the left or original side tries to follow as short as possible the right side order.

The reason to have put the commented notes in the final part of the work is to leave those not interested in the more scholarly discussion free to read Wittgenstein directly. But if, by any chance, things start to become difficult, the discussion in the notes can help to get the text clearer. So what can the reader find in the commented notes? First of all, she/he will find some explanation for the most difficult passages. Second, she/he will be eventually introduced to the contemporary debate between Wittgensteinian scholars about the point in question. Third, if it is the case, this point will be extended to what possibly analytical philosophy is debating about it, so the reader could have a better notion of Wittgenstein's relevance to present day discussions. Fourth, in doing

so, I expect to give a contribution to a more extended dialogism, of which Wittgenstein's manuscripts is so profuse, instead of trying to convince anyone of some purported new philosophical doctrine.

This translation, as I said, is a trial to be more close to the Wittgenstein's manuscripts. But what is really the point of trying to be so close to the manuscript text? I think that the first motivation to this procedure is to be found in the author's statements in the *Nachlass*. The first to be attended is an observation about publishing his thoughts:

I have no right to publish a book in which the difficulties that I felt were expressed and chewed through. For these difficulties are actually interesting for me, who got tangled with them, but not necessarily for the others. They are peculiarities of *my* thinking, due to the way that *I* took them. They belong, so to say, to a diary, not to a book. And even if this diary could be interesting to anyone, I cannot publish it. My stomach troubles are not interesting, but the measures – if any – that I have found against them. (MS 136, p. 144a)

Through this we learn, first, that his thoughts were dedicated to solve his own disturbances, and, second, that they were more appropriate to a diary than to a book. Of course, to publish them would be interesting to those who are trying to learn from his method. I.e, to those who will read the text paying attention more to the form rather than to the content. In other words, to those who want to see how he could got free from his own troubles through a diary, and not through a book.

This takes us to a second quotation in order to know in what sense Wittgenstein's thoughts belong to diary and not to a book. In the *Philosophical Investigations*' preface, he says “...this book is really only an album”. An album, according to the description given there, is a criss-croos arrangement of different themes, sometimes short paragraphs, sometimes fairly long chains, sudden changes, jumping from one topic to another, as it was an unsuccessful attempt to weld everything into a whole, but the final result was only a number of sketches of landscapes. The description given in PI (for *Philosophical Investigations*)'s preface is really from manuscript characteristics of a diary, not exactly from a book. So, the more close to the manuscript form, we can conclude, nearer we

are to the very nature of Wittgenstein's thought.

Contrarywise to Rush Rhees's doubts to publish NSD's manuscript notes because they are first handed and in any way intended to be an elaborated and fairly revised thinking (cf. Rhees 1968, pp. 271-275), something yet far from being a book, my intention here is to catch up Wittgenstein's thinking in the same manner as he described it in PI's preface:

The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. – And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation.

This “natural inclination” and “the nature of his investigations” can be easily found in the same environment that his philosophical method really works. It is in the diaries where the task of trying to get the formal connections of concepts in their use or application have its point, because we have there a context of discussion among different perspectives (usually represented by autonomous voices), there we witness the freedom to jump unsystematically from one theme to another, and eventually come back to some of them without previous notice, and it is there where any discussion is never put to an end. In the diaries thinking is really made through writing.

The material we are presenting here is a variety of thoughts around the so-called “private language argument”, written just before the beginning of PI's composition. But it is also a decisive conclusion of a conundrum left by the *Tractatus* (from now on TLP), the so called “color exclusion problem” (TLP § 6.3751), to which Wittgenstein returned in 1929 and began his research into a phenomenological language. This sole fact can show by itself the fundamental importance of this text for the study of the unity of Wittgenstein's thinking.

But even more that, what seems to be of crucial interest in NSD is that the several points and variations by which the philosophical concepts are grammatically scrutinized by Wittgenstein are plainly up-to-date problems in the philosophical contemporary agenda. One of the perspectives by which sensations and their relation to thinking is known

today can be found in the so-called “problem of qualia”. Hundreds of articles and books were published about qualia and related matters since Thomas Nagel (1974) revived the problem of “what is it like to be” argument in regard to consciousness (without actually mention the word “quale”). Many of them make distinct interpretations, and not necessarily concordant, of what possibly Wittgenstein has said about sense data.

Another source of the sense datum question and its relation to language is presented in the contemporary philosophy as the “color inverted spectrum” problem. This question is also found in the *Notes* with no actual use of such expression. The argument, apparently created by John Locke in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, was revived in the 30's by the logical empiricist discussion about the verification method as the criterion of the meaning of sentences. Qualia is also connected with color discussion in contemporary philosophy, and, again, Wittgenstein is frequently referred in a variety of not necessarily concordant interpretations.

How sense datum and privacy of sensations became so decisive for Wittgenstein? There are two interrelated questions to be clarified in regard to this point: the color exclusion problem as it was inherited from the TLP, and the new method Wittgenstein created for his philosophy.

With regard to TLP's inheritance, Wittgenstein had assumed that all *philosophical confusions* could be solved exclusively by the clarification of the logical form of the sentences, with no recourse whatsoever to the empirical world. The claim was that in order to avoid the sort of errors so frequent in philosophy, as well as in the ordinary language, the employment of the logical grammar was mandatory (TLP § 3.325). As language (and thinking) cannot be but logical (TLP § 3.03), the best philosophy should do was to reestablish the correct form of language, sometimes vested with confused names (TLP § 4.002).

According to the proposed logical parameters, a sentence could be meaningful (*sinnvoll*) or nonsense (*unsinn*), but the Tractarian *method of clarification* had the task to reveal what kind of statement a would-be proposition was. However, there was not only two, but three classes of propositions belonging to the symbolism: the third class were tautologies

and contradictions, as well as mathematical propositions, which could not be true nor false, and, for that reason, were a special case of propositions without sense (*sinnlos*) (TLP § 4.461). Tautologies and contradictions, being propositions without sense, set themselves up as limits beyond which any sentence was absurd (*unsinn*), and within which any sentence was meaningful (*sinnvoll*). That frontier, viewed from inside the world, was the logical form, or the limit of the world. So, the appeal to the logical form was the only resource a sentence could recur to be meaningful, as by the condition of this sole common denominator between language and reality, linguistic operators could be used.

The doctrine that language and world have the same logical form (TLP § 2.18), or the so-called “isomorphism”, guarantees that TLP can place itself solely as a critique of language, not as a theory of knowledge (TLP § 4.0031). Actually, in order to think of the sense of the proposition, we had to use the method of projection (§ 3.11), i.e., rules by which it is possible to picture with signs what is in the world. In this way, a proposition could represent or “picture” truly or falsely the reality. Consequently, we could know whether it is meaningful merely by the employment of mechanical means. The logical form was thus a sort of transcendental condition to the operations of picturing the world. Thanks to the logical structure of both the world and language, a sentence could be compared to reality through the method of projection. The bipolarity of the logical form enabled that propositions ranged within the limits of the truth conditions.

The Tractarian philosophy of logic, in conformity to the necessary assumptions to make the machinery work, is of a truth-functional credence. Accordingly, Wittgenstein in the TLP is a faithful partisan of logical atomism, a doctrine which precludes sentences to be meaningful unless their truth values are completely determined by possible combinations of the truth values of its component statements. So, a complex proposition is to be reduced to its elementary propositions, each of them correspondant to an atomic or elementary fact. Those facts should give to the elementary propositions their immediate truth values. All this means, of course, that meaningful complex propositions are sentences able to

be completely analyzed. But now we get to the color exclusion problem.

It is quite natural for a partisan of the logical atomism to conclude that there is a logical impossibility for two different colors to be in one place at the same time in the visual field (TLP § 6.3751). The elementary proposition “this is red” is truth-functionally incompatible with, say, “this is green”. As just one proposition is meaningful in such case, because of the prescriptions given in the rules of syntax in conjunction with the doctrine of isomorphism, the proposition should have the same logical multiplicity of the fact it describes in order to be true or false, or in order to be truth-functional. So color cases never forms contradictions in terms of a logical product ( $p \wedge q$ ). In a truth-functional proposition there is only one space to be filled in such cases, so  $p$  or  $q$ , not both. In this way, no logical product of colors is ever a contradiction, as red and green cannot be in the same place at the same time.

Eleven years after the supposed secure truth-functional method of TLP was established, Wittgenstein became aware that the logical atomism was of no help in the special cases of color, extension and tonality. This new conclusion came about in the article “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, written in 1929, when Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge, and to philosophy, trying to apply the previous results of his method of clarification into the empirical world. The problem was that the mentioned kinds of descriptions, which give account of, strictly speaking, *properties* and *relations*, not exactly *things*, admit gradations, a result plainly incompatible with the logical atomism. One cannot say “this is red” in an independent way of other possible colors, or shades of color, since, in doing this, one is referring to a spectrum rather than an isolated thing. As one cannot also say “This man is 6 feet tall” without presupposing the whole extension measured in foot, or “this is D minor” without comprehending the whole musical scale into the method of projection. If this is so, in opposition to TLP, numbers had to enter in an atomic proposition. But in such case, an analyzed proposition would not be atomic anymore. And, worse than that, the logical product ( $p \wedge q$ ) would completely lose its sense, because we had now to consider as valid a case where  $p$  and  $q$  were both true and their logical product false.

In order to save his method of clarification, Wittgenstein initially engaged in a research to create a syntax in which two contradictory propositions could be excluded with no losses to the logical language. To this aim, numbers, as already mentioned, should have to be admitted in the most basic level. Now in a projection a whole scale should be apposed to reality, not just an elementary proposition. Contradictory systems should apparently have to be syntactically excluded in this way (cf. *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, WVC, from now on, pp. 63-64).

The challenge consisted this time in the elaboration of a sense data language, or, as he often mentioned, a “primary” or “phenomenological” language (cf. *Philosophical Remarks* (PR) §§ 51, 70; *The Voices of Wittgenstein* (VW), p. 318; and WVC, p. 50). The primary language should describe the sense datum out of time and space, restricted solely to its “sensation” or “visual field”, and deprived of any hypothesis, to the difference of any ordinary and physical languages.

It should be noted that the term “sense data” was introduced into the academic vocabulary by, among few others, George Moore and Bertrand Russell, the two closest philosophers to Wittgenstein at the time. For the two of them the term “was intended only to denote that which we are directly aware of in perception.” (Huemer 2007). It is the same for Wittgenstein: the “phenomenon”, the “given”, the “immediate experience”, or the “sense datum”, were all synonyms in his manuscripts for an object relatively neutral regarding either to a realistic or to an internalist theory of perception. “Sense datum” pretended to be just a neutral material given to be described in a calculus or in a logical system, or, which is the same, the datum capable of verifying the proposition (MS 105, p. 114, MS 107, pp. 223-224). But, as I said, Wittgenstein was interested in a critique of language with no compromise whatsoever with a theory of knowledge, and that is a crucial difference of perspective between the Austrian philosopher and his British patrons and colleagues. If we take Moore, particularly, disturbed by the invincible vagueness of the term “sense datum” to cover all possible knowledge cases, decided that it was better to include almost any kind of sensation into the philosophical space. Calling them “sensibles”, opened also the door to

mental realm objects like hallucinations, after-images, and dreamy sensations (Moore 1913, p. 358). Wittgenstein, by his turn, remained restricted only to what could verify the proposition, the “materially given”, excluding psychology.

Another remarkable difference was methodology. While Moore and Russell were interested that all cases should fit their concepts of sense-data, maintaining an inductivistic approach to philosophy, Wittgenstein began to examine case by case, trying to see what was the logic involved in any particular novelty. So his rationale was clearly abductive, instead of the classical nomological-deductivism found in the scientific methodology. Such methodological differences are consequences of the relation they saw between science and philosophy. Philosophy was completely out of the scope of a scientific approach for Wittgenstein.

Consequent with his own views, Wittgenstein’s investigations were conducted in his manuscripts through the proposition of cases and analogies, trying then to solve them. But, in spite of this, he came soon to give up his phenomenological project. This was by the beginning of 1930, when he suddenly realized that the supposed primary language was always dependent on the very ordinary language that it had necessarily to eliminate in order to make descriptions of phenomena. So the primary language could not be free of theoretical assumptions, as was assumed in the early 1929 (MS 107, p. 205; PR § 1).

Nonetheless, two characteristics remained intact over that one and a half year. First, the objective of finally “throwing away the ladder” or “stop doing philosophy” (TLP § 6.54). Second, after have decided to experiment his views through empirical applications, Wittgenstein never ceased any more to conduct philosophical investigations through exemplary cases. These two characteristics developed soon into the new method for his philosophy, when he definitively assumed that a complete grammar is given in the ordinary language.

Related to the problema of color exclusion, how does this new method work? First, showing that it is useless trying to find a special language in which red and green could be efficiently separated. The reason is that color space is already given as discrete unities in ordinary

language, like in the color octahedron, which is a system of rules determining what is possible and not possible to do with regard to colors (PR § 1). Second, making us conscious that our previous concern in seeking for a special language was no more than a grammatical confusion, one that merge physical with logical impossibility, or mix a physical barrier with a rule of language (*The Blue and Brown Books* (BB), p. 56). Third, it is only going through concrete cases where we use color language that our confused concepts can be revealed as useless or not.

It is important to note that in the particular reading of Wittgenstein I am defending here he is not portrayed as a philosopher who created and defended concepts like, for example, “autonomy of grammar” and “meaning as use”. Rather than this, the reverse order is the key to the interpretations proposed in the commented notes: such concepts were “found” and “invented” (BB, p. 28) to make easier the application of the method of “perspicuous presentation” (IF § 122). That is why was so important for him to solve the problem of color exclusion: he did not want to make new theses about colors, but to get rid of philosophical problems. The method of perspicuous presentation, conceived in 1931 (MS 110, p. 257), is an intervention in the linguistic operators which unfolds a panoramic view of the conceptual connections involved in the employment of a word and its context of use. So, by its sole application, one can clearly see whether the use of a word in a determined context is confused or not, and take some decision about it.

Instead of a search for the language of sense-data, from then on what was in order was a grammar of sense-data (MS 147, p. 39r). It is in this perspective that this translation is being proposed for the philosophical discussions.

A lot of different questions can be arised here, but they would be infertile with no resorting to the text. So that is what we are doing. Only by reading Wittgenstein's manuscript's, or, as he once said, “I must plunge into the water of doubt again and again” (*Remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough*, (RFB), p. 119), can we start to have some basis to renew the thinking, not only about Wittgenstein's philosophy, but mainly

about old and traditional philosophical problems which are ever assuming new facets when the waves brake again onto the shore.

Regarding NSD it is also important to know that, to the several grammars of sense data, and particularly those of private language, psychology was integrated to the investigations. So Wittgenstein also extended, like Moore in 1913, his concept of sense datum to the mental realm, so-to-say, but, as always, without generalizing it.

It is also important to take into account in our discussions the other Wittgenstein's contemporary writings. Texts found in the wide context can explain much of the difficulties eventually found here. We know that *Blue Book* (Dictate 309), *Brown Book* (Dictate 310), MS 147 (C 3), MS 157a (Pocket Notebook), MS 140, and the recently found Francis Skinner's Archive are all from the same universe of concerns, in which it is not irrelevant to recognize a strong conviction to publish a new book. The new retirement in Norway in 1936, and the commencement of *Philosophical Investigations*' composition, precipitated everything into new directions. It is even curious how few from the vast material on private language produced at that time were recycled into PI. But this is another story.

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**Editorial marks:**

<u>Underline</u>	underlined text with one solid line
<u><u>Underline</u></u>	underlined text with two solid lines
<u>Underline</u>	underlined text with wavy line.
<del>Scratched</del>	text erased with a trace
<del>Scratched</del>	text erased with several scratches
//Insertion//	text separated by slashes
«Insertion»	inserted text above or under the line
«↓ Insertion»	insertion from above the line
[Note]	insertion in brackets
< insertion >	insertion in the line
<<clause>>	segment inserted below or above the paragraph
[[↓clause]]	segment moved from above the paragraph
[[↑clause]]	segment moved from below the paragraph
	double vertical trace placed on the left side of the paragraph
{ }	completion indicating author's abbreviation in the original
(   )	A vertical trace over the whole manuscript page
*	A vertical trace over the whole paragraph

MS 148

The experience of fright appears (when we philosophise) to be an amorphous experience behind the experience of starting.

All I want to say is that it is misleading to say that the word "fright" signifies something which goes along with the «↓experience of» expressing of fright.

There is here ~~as~~ «again» the queer case of a difference between what we say, when we actually try to see what happens, & what we say when we think about it (giving over the reins to language).

The 'far away' look, the dreamy voice, seem to be only means for conveying the real inner feeling.

"Therefore there must be something else" means nothing unless it expresses a resolution to use a certain mode of expression.

Suppose you tried to separate the feeling which music gives you from hearing music.

(MS 148, p. 1r)

A experiência de medo parece (quando filosofamos) ser uma experiência amorfa por trás da experiência de começar.

Tudo o que quero dizer é que é enganoso dizer que a palavra "medo" significa alguma coisa que acompanha a «↓experiência de» expressão de medo.

Existe aqui ~~como~~ «novamente» o estranho caso de uma diferença entre o que dizemos, quando realmente tentamos ver o que acontece, e o que dizemos quando pensamos sobre isso (dar rédeas soltas à linguagem).<sup>1</sup>

O olhar 'longínquo', a voz sonhadora, parecem ser somente meios de veicular o sentimento real interno.<sup>2</sup>

"Portanto, deve haver algo mais" nada quer dizer, a menos que expresse uma resolução de usar um certo modo de expressão.

Suponha que você se empenhe em separar o sentimento que a música lhe dá, da audição da música.<sup>3</sup>

(MS 148, p. 1r)

Say & mean "long, long ago —", "lang ist es her —", & now put

Diga e dê significado a "há muito, muito tempo —", "há muito

<p>instead of these words new ones with many more syllables &amp; try if you can put the same meaning into the words. Put instead of the copula a very long word, say "Kalamazoo".</p> <p>⟨Puella⟩, Poeta "'masculine' &amp; 'feminine' <u>feeling</u>" əf «'attached' to» a.</p> <p>Aren't there two (or more) ways to any event I might describe?</p> <p>We say "making this gesture isn't all". The first answer is: We are talking about the <u>experience</u> of making this gesture. Secondly: it is true that different experiences can be described by the same gesture; but not in the sense that one is the pure one &amp; the others consist ....</p> <p>Wie ist es wenn man einmal die besondere Klangfarbe eines Tones merkt «hört» ein andermal nur den Klang als solchen?</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 1v)</b></p>	<p>que —", e agora coloque no lugar dessas palavras outras novas com muito mais sílabas e veja se você pode colocar o mesmo significado nas palavras. Coloque, em vez da cópula, uma palavra muito longa, digamos "Calamazoo".<sup>4</sup></p> <p>⟨Puella⟩, Poeta "<u>sentimento</u> de 'masculino' e 'feminino'" əf «'vinculado' ao» a.<sup>5</sup></p> <p>Não há duas (ou mais) maneiras para cada evento que eu posso descrever?<sup>6</sup></p> <p>Nós dizemos "fazer este gesto não é tudo". A primeira resposta é: nós falamos sobre a <u>experiência</u> de fazer este gesto. A segunda: é verdade que experiências diferentes podem ser descritas pelo mesmo gesto; mas não no sentido de que um é puro e as outras consistem ....<sup>7</sup></p> <p>Como é notar «ouvir» uma vez o timbre especial de um tom, e na outra vez só o som como tal?<sup>8</sup></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 1v)</b></p>
<p>"Ich nenne diesen Eindruck 'blau'".</p> <p>Wie kann man denn die genaue Erfahrung in 'Poeta' etc. beschreiben?</p> <p>The philosophical problem is: "What is it that puzzles me ?" <u>about «in» this matter?</u></p> <p>To give names is to label things; but how does one label</p>	<p>"Chamo essa impressão de 'azul'".<sup>9</sup></p> <p>Como se poderia então descrever a experiência exata em 'Poeta' etc?<sup>10</sup></p> <p>O problema filosófico é: "O que é isto que me perturba ?" <u>sobre «nesta» esta questão?</u><sup>11</sup></p> <p>Dar nomes é rotular coisas; mas como se rotulam as</p>

impressions.

**A**  
**A** das auge & der wald

Das männliche a & das weibliche a.

Es läßt sich über die besondere «bestimmte» Erfahrung einiges sagen & außerdem scheint es etwas, & zwar das wesentlichste, zu geben was sich nicht beschreiben läßt.

Man sagt hier, daß ein bestimmter Eindruck benannt wird. Und darin liegt etwas seltsames & problematisches. Denn es ist als wäre der Eindruck

(MS 148, p. 2r)

etwas zu ätherisches um ihn zu benennen. (Den Reichtum einer Frau heiraten.)

Du sagst Du hast einem ungreifbaren Eindruck. «↓Ich bezweifle nicht, was Du sagst» Aber ich frage ob Du damit etwas gesagt hast. D.h. wozu hast Du diese Worte geäußert, in welchem Spiel.

It is as though, if «although» you can't tell me exactly what happens inside you, you can nevertheless tell me something general about it. By saying e.g. that you «are» having an impression which can't be further described.

As it were: There is something further about it, only you can't say

impressões?<sup>12</sup>

**A**  
**A** o olho e a floresta

O a masculino e o a feminino.<sup>13</sup>

É possível dizer alguma coisa sobre a experiência particular «determinada» e além disso parece haver algo, e precisamente o mais essencial, que não se deixa descrever.<sup>14</sup>

Dizemos que uma impressão particular é nomeada. E aqui há algo de estranho e problemático. Pois é como se a impressão fosse algo

(MS 148, p. 2r)

muito etéreo para ser nomeada. (Casar-se com a riqueza de uma mulher.)<sup>15</sup>

Você diz que tem uma impressão intangível. «↓Não duvido do que você diz» Mas me pergunto se você disse alguma coisa com isso. Quer dizer, para quê você expressou essas palavras, em que jogo?<sup>16</sup>

É como se «apesar de que», você não pudesse me dizer exatamente o que lhe ocorre por dentro, mas você poderia, no entanto, dizer-me algo em geral sobre isso. Dizendo, por exemplo, ter «que está tendo» uma impressão que não pode ser descrita além disso.

Seria como se houvesse algo a mais sobre isso, mas só que você

it; you can only make the general statement.

It is this idea «form of expression» which plays hell with us.

(MS 148, p. 2v)

não pode dizer; você só pode fazer o enunciado geral.<sup>17</sup>

É esta ideia «forma de expressão» que faz da nossa vida um inferno.<sup>18</sup>

(MS 148, p. 2v)

|| "There is not only the gesture but a particular feeling which I can't  
|| describe": instead of that you might have said: "I am trying to point out  
|| a feeling to you" which «this» would be a grammatical remark  
|| showing how my information is meant to be used. This is almost  
|| similar as though I said "This I call 'A' & I am pointing out a colour  
|| «to you» not a shape"

|| How can we point to the colour & not to the shape? Or to the  
|| feeling of toothache & not to the tooth, etc.?

What does one call "describing a feeling to someone"?

"Never mind the shape, — look at the colour!"

"Was there a feeling of pastness when you said you remembered  
...?" 'I know of none'.

How does one point to a number, draw attention to a number,  
mean a number?

How do I call a taste "lemontaste"?

(MS 148, p. 3r)

|| "Existe não somente o gesto, mas um sentimento particular que  
|| eu não posso descrever": em vez disso, você poderia ter dito: "Estou  
|| tentando apontar para o sentimento", o que «isto» seria uma  
|| observação gramatical mostrando como a minha informação pretende  
|| ser usada. Isto é quase como se eu houvesse dito "Isto eu chamo de  
|| 'A' e estou «lhe» apontando uma cor, não uma forma".<sup>19</sup>

|| Como podemos apontar para a cor e não para a forma? Ou para a  
|| sensação de dor de dente e não para o dente etc.?

O que se chama de "descrever um sentimento para alguém"?

"Não importa a forma, — olhe para a cor!"<sup>20</sup>

"Houve um sentimento de passado quando você disse que  
lembrava de ...?" 'Eu não sei de nada disso'.<sup>21</sup>

Como se aponta para um número, chama-se a atenção para um  
número, dá-se significado a um número?<sup>22</sup>

Como eu chamo um gosto de "gosto de limão"?

(MS 148, p. 3r)

Is it by having that taste & saying the words: "I call the taste ..."?

Seria por ter aquele gosto e dizer as palavras: "Chamo este gosto

<p>And can I give a name to my <u>own</u> taste experience without giving the taste a common name which is to be used in common language? — "I give my feeling a name, nobody else can know what the name means."</p> <p>A slave has to remind me of something &amp; isn't to know what he reminds me of.</p> <p>   I note down a word «↓in my diary» which serves to bring back a    taste.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 3v)</b></p>	<p>de..."?<sup>23</sup></p> <p>E eu posso dar um nome a minha <u>própria</u><sup>24</sup> experiência de gosto, sem dar ao gosto um nome comum para ser usado na linguagem comum? — "Dou à minha sensação um nome, e ninguém mais pode saber o que o nome quer dizer."<sup>25</sup></p> <p>Um escravo deve lembrar-me de algo e não deve saber aquilo de que me lembra.<sup>26</sup></p> <p>   Eu anoto uma palavra «↓em meu diário» que serve para recordar    um gosto.<sup>27</sup></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 3v)</b></p>
<p>"I use the name for the impression directly &amp; not in such a way that anyone else can understand it."</p> <p>Buying something from oneself. Going through the operations of buying.</p> <p>My right hand selling to my left hand.</p> <p>Gefühls-(Gedanken) Übertragung.</p> <p>Eine gute art eine Farbe zu benennen wäre, in einer entsprechend gefärbten Tinte den Namen schreiben.</p> <p>"I name the feeling"— I dont quite know how you do this, what use you are making of the word «↓name».</p> <p>"I'm giving the feeling, which I have «I'm having» just now a name".— I don't quite know what you are doing.</p>	<p>“Eu uso o nome para a impressão diretamente e não de tal modo que alguém possa entendê-lo.”<sup>28</sup></p> <p>Comprando alguma coisa para si. Fazendo as operações de compra.</p> <p>Minha mão direita vendendo para minha mão esquerda.<sup>29</sup></p> <p>Transferência da sensação – (pensamentos).<sup>30</sup></p> <p>Uma boa maneira de nomear uma cor seria escrever o seu nome com uma tinta de cor correspondente.<sup>31</sup></p> <p>“Dou nome a um sentimento” – Eu não sei como você faz isso, que uso você faz da palavra «↓nome».</p> <p>“Estou dando um nome para o sentimento que tenho agora” – Eu realmente não sei o que você está fazendo.<sup>32</sup></p>

<p>One might say: "What is the use of talking of our feeling at all. Let</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 5r)</b></p>	<p>Alguém poderia dizer: "Para que serve, na verdade, falar do nosso sentimento? Vamos</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 5r)</b></p>
<p>us devise a language which really only says what can be understood". Thus I am not to say "I have a feeling of pastness": But</p> <p>   "This pain I call 'toothache' &amp; I can never make him understand what    it means".</p> <p>   We are under the impression that we can point to the pain, as it    were unseen by the other person, &amp; name it.</p> <p>For what does it mean that this pain «feeling» is the meaning of this name? Or, that the pain is the bearer of the name? It is the substantive 'pain' which puzzles us. This substantive seems to produce an illusion. What would things look like if we expressed pains by moaning &amp; holding the painful spot? Or that we utter the word pain pointing to a spot. "But that the point is that we should</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 5v)</b></p>	<p>criar uma linguagem que só diga realmente o que pode ser compreendido". Assim, eu não poderia mais dizer "Eu tenho um sentimento de passado": Mas <sup>33</sup></p> <p>   "Esta dor que eu chamo de 'dor de dente' e que eu nunca consigo    fazê-lo compreender o que significa". <sup>34</sup></p> <p>   Nós estamos sob a impressão de que podemos apontar para a    dor, como se ela não fosse vista pela outra pessoa, e dar um nome para    ela.</p> <p>O que significa dizer que esta dor «sensação» é o significado do nome? Ou que a dor é a portadora do nome? <sup>35</sup> É o substantivo 'dor' que nos deixa embaralhados. Este substantivo parece produzir uma ilusão. Como seriam as coisas se nós expressássemos dores gemendo e segurando o local da dor? Ou que a gente profira a palavra dor apontando para uma marca? <sup>36</sup> "Mas o problema é que a gente deveria</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 5v)</b></p>
<p>say 'pain' when there really is pain." But how am I to know if there really is pain? If what I feel really is pain? Or, if I really have a feeling? —</p> <p>   Es ist sehr nützlich zu bedenken: Wie würde ich in einer    Gebärdensprache ausdrücken: "ich hatte keine Schmerzen, aber stellte    mich, als ob ich welche hatte"?</p>	<p>dizer 'dor' quando realmente há dor." <sup>37</sup> Mas como eu posso saber se realmente há dor? Se o que sinto é realmente dor? Ou se eu realmente tenho uma sensação? — <sup>38</sup></p> <p>   É bastante útil considerar: como eu expressaria numa linguagem de    gestos: "eu não estava com dores, mas eu estava fazendo de conta    que tinha"? <sup>39</sup></p>



"Surely it isn't enough that he moans; I must be able to describe the state when he moans & hasn't got pains"

"He has pains, says he has pains & saying 'pains' he means his pains." How does he mean his pains by the word 'pain' or 'toothache'?

"He says 'I see green' & means the colour he sees." — If asked afterwards what did you mean by 'green' he might answer 'I meant the colour', pointing to it.

(MS 148, p. 6r)



“Com certeza não é suficiente que ele produza gemidos; eu devo ser capaz de descrever o estado em que ele produz gemidos e não tem dores”<sup>40</sup>

“Ele tem dores, diz que tem dores, e, ao dizer ‘dor’, significa as suas dores.” Como ele significa as suas dores com a palavra ‘dor’ ou ‘dor de dente’?<sup>41</sup>

“Ele diz ‘eu vejo verde’ e dá significado à cor que ele vê.” – Se depois ele for perguntado o que ele quis dizer com ‘verde’, ele pode responder ‘Eu quis dizer a cor’, apontando para ela.<sup>42</sup>

(MS 148, p. 6r)

"In my own case I know that when I say 'I have pain' this utterance is accompanied by something; — but it is also accompanied by something in another man?"

In as much as his utterance needn't be accompanied by my pain, I may say that it isn't accompanied by anything.

"I know what I mean by 'toothache' but the other person can't know it."

Als Negation: "The deuce he is...."

Die Philosophie eines Stammes der als Negation «nur» den Ausdruck benützt «kennt»: "I'll be damned if...".

"Em meu próprio caso, eu sei que quando digo 'está doendo', este proferimento é acompanhado por algo; — mas é também acompanhado por alguma coisa em outro homem?"

Na medida em que seu proferimento não precisa ser acompanhado pela minha dor, posso dizer que ele não é acompanhado por nada.<sup>43</sup>

"Eu sei o que quero dizer com 'dor de dente', mas a outra pessoa não pode sabê-lo." <sup>44</sup>

Como negação: "Que diabo ele..."

A filosofia de uma tribo que como negação «só» utiliza «conhece» a expressão: "Vou me ferrar se...". <sup>45</sup>

<p>On a beau dire....</p> <p>"Man kann nie einen «↓ganzen» Körper sehen sondern nur «↓immer» einen Teil seiner Oberfläche."</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 6v)</b></p>	<p>Podemos dizer...<sup>46</sup></p> <p>"Não se pode ver um corpo «↓na sua totalidade», senão apenas «↓sempre» uma parte da sua superfície."<sup>47</sup></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 6v)</b><sup>48</sup></p>
<p>"Give the impression a name!" That seems to have sense. "It seems to me that I can mean the impression." It seems to me that I can will the table to approach.</p> <p>"Can one push air?"</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 8r)</b></p>	<p>“Dê um nome à impressão!” Isso parece ter sentido. “Parece-me que posso dar significado à impressão.” Parece-me que posso querer que a mesa se aproxime.<sup>49</sup></p> <p>“Alguém pode empurrar o ar?”<sup>50</sup></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 8r)</b><sup>51</sup></p>
<p>We look at a puzzle picture &amp; find a man in the foliage of a tree. Our visual impression changes. But can't «mustn't» we say that the new experience would have been impossible if the old one hadn't been what it was? Such that we seem bound to say the new exp. was already preformed in the old one. Or that I found something new which was already in the essence of the first picture.</p> <p>We seem to have demonstrated an internal property of the old picture. <b>(MS 148, p. 15v)</b></p>	<p>Nós olhamos para uma imagem enigmática e achamos um homem na folhagem de uma árvore. Nossa impressão visual se modifica. Não podemos «devemos» dizer que a nova experiência teria sido impossível se a antiga já não houvesse sido o que foi? De tal modo que parecemos propensos a dizer que a nova exp{eriência} já estava pré-formada na antiga. Ou que eu encontrei algo novo que já estava na essência da primeira imagem.</p> <p>Parece que demonstramos uma propriedade interna da antiga imagem.<sup>52</sup> <b>(MS 148, p. 15v)</b><sup>53</sup></p>
<p>  "Wouldn't one like to know with <u>real</u> certainty whether the other</p>	<p>  “Não gostaríamos de saber com <u>real</u> certeza se o outro teve</p>

| had «has» pains?”

Feeling of pastness. "The experiences bound up with the gesture, etc. aren't the experience of pastness, for they could be there without the feeling of pastness". — "But, on the other hand, would it be that experience of pastness without those experiences bound up with the gesture? — Why should we say that the characteristic //essential// part is the part outside those experiences? Isn't the experience at least partially described if I have described the gestures, etc?"

Auch so: Die Worte "lang ist es her—" rufen in mir manchmal ein bestimmtes Gefühl wach. Manchmal nicht. Aber wenn sie es wachrufen, so sind sie, ihr Ton, Teil der charakteristischen Erfahrung.

Sprechen mit Andern & mit mir selbst.

"Wenn ich eine gewisse Erfahrung habe, gebe ich «↓(mir)» das Zeichen ....«+»"

(MS 148, p. 31r) (|)

When one says "I talk to myself" one «↓generally» means just that one speaks & is the only person listening.

If I look at something red & say, to myself, this is red, am I giving myself an information? Am I communicating a personal experience to myself. Some «philosophising» people might be inclined to say that this is the only real case of communication of personal experience because only I know what I really mean by 'red'.

Remember in which special cases only it has sense to inform an «other» person that the colour he sees now is red.

| «tem» dores?”<sup>54</sup>

Sentimento de passado. “Experiências vinculadas com o gesto etc., não são experiência de passado, pois elas podem estar lá sem o sentimento de passado”. — “Mas, por outro lado, seria ela uma experiência de passado sem as experiências vinculadas com o gesto?”<sup>55</sup> — Por que diríamos que a parte característica //essencial// é a parte de fora dessas experiências? Não é a experiência pelo menos parcialmente descrita se eu descrevo os gestos etc.?<sup>56</sup>

E também: as palavras “há muito tempo —” evocam em mim algumas vezes um certo sentimento. Outras vezes, não. Mas quando elas o evocam, são, junto com o seu tom, parte da experiência característica.<sup>57</sup>

Falar com os outros e comigo mesmo.<sup>58</sup>

“Quando tenho uma certa experiência, dou «↓(para mim)» o sinal .... «+»”<sup>59</sup>

(MS 148, p. 31r) (|)

Quando alguém diz “eu falo comigo mesmo”, o que essa pessoa «↓geralmente» quer dizer é só que ela fala e é a única pessoa que escuta.<sup>60</sup>

Se eu olho para alguma coisa vermelha e digo, para mim mesmo, isto é vermelho, estou dando uma informação a mim mesmo? Estou comunicando uma experiência pessoal a mim mesmo? Algumas pessoas «filosofando» podem ficar propensas a dizer que este é o único caso real de comunicação pessoal de uma experiência, porque só eu sei o que eu realmente quis dizer com ‘vermelho’.<sup>61</sup>

Lembre-se em que casos especiais somente tem sentido informar a uma «outra» pessoa que a cor que ela agora vê é vermelho.<sup>62</sup>

<p>One doesn't say to oneself "This is a chair. — Oh, really?"</p> <p>Wie kann ich denn einer Erfahrung (z.B. etwa einem Schmerz) einen Namen geben? Ist es nicht als wollte ich ihm, etwa, einen Hut aufsetzen?</p> <p>Nehmen wir an man sagte: "Man kann</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 31v) ( )</b></p>	<p>Uma pessoa não diz para si mesma “Isto é uma cadeira. — Ah, é?”<sup>63</sup></p> <p>Então como poderia dar um nome a uma experiência (talvez uma dor, por exemplo)? Não é como se eu talvez quisesse pôr o chapéu nela?<sup>64</sup></p> <p>Concordemos que alguém diga: “Só se pode</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 31v) ( )</b></p>
<p>Ihm nur indirekt einen Hut aufsetzen” so würde ich fragen: Glaubst Du daß man je auf die Idee gekommen wäre davon zu reden wenn man nicht daran gedacht hätte daß man dem Menschen der Schmerzen hat einen Hut aufsetzen kann? Zu sagen man könne dem Schmerz nur indirekt einen Hut aufsetze macht es erscheinen als gäbe es dennoch einen direkter Weg der nur tatsächlich nicht gangbar sei.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">t t t t t</p> <p>The difficulty is that we feel that we have said something about the nature of pain when we say that one person can't have another person's pain. Perhaps we shouldn't be inclined to say that we had anything physiological or even psychological but something metapsychological, metaphysical. Something about the essence, nature, of pain as opposed to its causal connections to other phenomena.</p> <p>Es scheint uns etwa als wäre es zwar nicht falsch sondern unsinnig zu sagen “ich fühle seine Schmerzen”, aber als wäre dies so infolge der Natur</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 32r) ( )</b></p>	<p>pôr um chapéu nela indiretamente”, então eu perguntaria: Você acha que alguém teria tido a ideia de falar sobre isso se não tivesse pensado que se pode pôr um chapéu na pessoa com dor? Dizer que só se pode pôr indiretamente um chapéu na dor, faz parecer como se houvesse ainda um meio direto, que apenas não poderia ser realmente alcançado.<sup>65</sup></p> <p style="text-align: center;">t t t t t</p> <p>A dificuldade é que sentimos que dizemos alguma coisa sobre a natureza da dor, quando falamos que uma pessoa não pode ter a dor da outra. Talvez não estivéssemos inclinados a dizer que nós temos algo fisiológico, ou inclusive psicológico, mas alguma coisa metapsicológica, metafísica. Alguma coisa sobre a essência ou a natureza da dor, em oposição às suas conexões causais com outros fenômenos.<sup>66</sup></p> <p>Parece-nos, talvez, como se fosse não realmente falso, mas sem sentido dizer “eu sinto as suas dores”, como se isso fosse resultado da natureza</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 32r) ( )</b></p>

des Schmerzes, der Person etc.. Als wäre also jene Aussage letzten Endes doch eine Aussage über die Natur der Dinge.

Wir sprechen also etwa von einer Asymmetrie unserer Ausdrucksweise & fassen diese auf als ein Spiegelbild des Wesens der Dinge.

Intangibility of impressions. (Anguish) Some we should say were more tangible than others. Seeing more tangible than a faint pain; & this more tangible than a vague fear, longing, etc.

In what way are these intangible experiences less easy to communicate, to describe, than the ‘simpler’ ones?

In what way do we use the phrase: “This experience is difficult to describe.”

And can «↓it be even impossible to describe certain» experience(s)?

Was für einen Sinn hat es zu sagen diese Erfahrung ist nicht beschreibbar? Wir möchten sagen: sie ist zu complex, zu subtil.

”Diese Erfahrung ist nicht mitteilbar, aber ich kenne sie, — weil ich sie habe.”

(MS 148, p. 32v) ( | )

“Es gibt die Erfahrung, & die Beschreibung der Erfahrung. ” — Daher kann es nicht gleichgültig sein, ob der Andere die selbe Erfahrung hat, wie ich, oder nicht; — & daher ~~kann es~~ «muß es» wenn ich mit mir selbst rede auf diese «meine» Erfahrung ankommen. “Es muß dabei eine entscheidende Rolle spielen daß ich diese Erfahrung kenne (während ich mit der des Andern nicht direkt vertraut bin).”

Kann man sagen: “In dem «das» was ich über die Erfahrung des Andern sage, spielt seine Erfahrung (selbst) nicht hinein. In dem «das» was ich über meine Erfahrung sage spielt sie «diese Erfahrung» selbst

da dor, da pessoa etc. Como se esta sentença fosse, no fim das contas, uma sentença sobre a natureza das coisas.<sup>67</sup>

Nós falamos, assim, de uma assimetria do nosso modo de expressão e o interpretamos como uma imagem especular da essência da coisa.<sup>68</sup>

Intangibilidade das impressões. (Angústia) Algumas, diríamos, seriam mais tangíveis que outras. Parecendo mais tangíveis que uma dor fraca; e esta mais tangível do que um vago medo, nostalgia etc.

Em que medida estas experiências intangíveis são menos fáceis de comunicar, de descrever, do que as ‘mais simples’? <sup>69</sup>

De que maneira usamos a frase: “Esta experiência é difícil de descrever”? <sup>70</sup>

E pode «↓ ser até impossível descrever certas» experiência(s)? <sup>71</sup>

Que sentido tem dizer que esta experiência não é descritível? Gostaríamos de dizer: ela é muito complexa, muito sutil.<sup>72</sup>

“Esta experiência não é comunicável, mas eu a conheço, — porque a tenho.” <sup>73</sup>

(MS 148, p. 32v) ( | )

“Existe a experiência, e a descrição da experiência.” – Daí não pode ser indiferente se o outro tem a mesma experiência que eu ou não; – e daí, o que importa, quando falo comigo mesmo, ~~pode ser~~ «deve ser» esta «a minha» experiência. “Deve ter, portanto, um papel decisivo o fato de que eu conheço esta experiência (em contraposição ao fato de que eu não tenho contato direto com a do outro).” <sup>74</sup>

É possível dizer: “Naquilo que «no que» eu digo sobre a experiência do outro, a (própria) experiência dele não entra em jogo. Naquilo que «no que» digo sobre a minha experiência, ela «esta experiência» própria entra

<p>hinein.”?</p> <p>“Ich spreche über meine Erfahrung, sozusagen, in ihrer Anwesenheit” //<del>in ihrem Beisein</del>//.</p> <p>Wie wenn jem&amp; sagen würde: “Es gibt nicht nur die Beschreibung des Tisches sondern auch den Tisch.”</p> <p>“Es gibt nicht nur das Wort ‘Zahnschmerz’, es gibt auch «such a thing as» etwas wie den Zahnschmerz selbst.” //... es gibt auch Zahnschmerzen.”//</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 33r) ( )</b></p>	<p>em jogo”?</p> <p>“Eu falo sobre a minha experiência, por assim dizer, na sua presença” //<del>quando ela está ali</del>//.<sup>75</sup></p> <p>Como se alguém dissesse: “Não há somente a descrição da mesa, mas também a mesa.”<sup>76</sup></p> <p>“Não há somente a palavra ‘dor-de-dente’, há também «such a thing as» alguma coisa como a própria dor de dente.” //... há também dores de dente.”//<sup>77</sup></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 33r) ( )</b></p>
<p>Es scheint, daß, da ich etwa eine Erfahrung nicht beschreiben kann, sie aber habe, daß ich sie daher genauer <u>kennen</u> kann, als irgend ein Anderer. Aber was heißt, es die Erfahrung kennen, wenn es nicht heißt, sie beschreiben &amp; nicht «heißt», sie haben.</p> <p>Gibt es eine <u>Kenntnis</u> der Erfahrung, die wir nicht mitteilen können?</p> <p>Hat es Sinn zu sagen “ich kenne diese Erfahrung besser //genauer// als irgend ein Anderer sie kennen kann?”. Gibt es Erfahrungen die der Andere ebensogut kennen kann wie ich &amp; solche, die er nicht so gut kennen kann? Heißt das: er kann diese selbe «↓komplizierte» Erfahrung nicht haben? — Es heißt wohl: “Er kann sie haben, aber wir können nie «nicht» wissen, daß er gerade «genau» diese gehabt hat”. Z.B. scheint es als könnten wir sagen: “Wir können in einem Sinn wissen daß er gerade diese Einfärbige, glatte, Rote Fläche sieht, aber nicht, daß er genau dieses <u>Flimmern</u> sieht.” Weil sich das genaue Gesichtsbild beim «des» Flimmern«s» nicht beschreiben läßt.</p> <p>Es gibt ja auch den Fall, in dem wir ein Gesichtsbild genauer durch</p>	<p>Parece que quando não posso, por exemplo, descrever uma experiência, mas posso, no entanto, tê-la, segue-se que posso então <u>conhecê-la</u> com mais exatidão do que qualquer outro. Mas então o que quer dizer conhecer a experiência, se isso não quer dizer descrevê-la e «não quer dizer» tê-la?</p> <p>Existe algum <u>conhecimento</u> da experiência que eu não posso comunicar?<sup>78</sup></p> <p>Tem sentido dizer “eu conheço esta experiência melhor //mais exatamente// do que qualquer outro pode conhecê-la?” Existem experiências que o outro pode conhecer tanto quanto eu, e aquelas que ele pode não conhecer tão bem? Quer dizer: ele pode não ter essa mesma experiência «↓complicada»? – Quer dizer, talvez: “Ele pode tê-la, mas nós nem sequer «não» podemos saber se ele teve simplesmente «exatamente» esta.” Aparentemente, poderíamos, por exemplo, dizer: “Nós poderíamos, em um sentido, saber que ele vê simplesmente esta área de cor única, lisa e vermelha, mas não que ele vê exatamente esta <u>cintilação</u>.” Porque a imagem visual exata «da» cintilação não se consegue descrever.<sup>79</sup></p> <p>Dá-se também, claro, o caso no qual podemos descrever mais</p>

<p>ein gemaltes Bild als durch</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 33v) ( )</b></p>	<p>exatamente uma imagem visual mediante uma pintura do que</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 33v) ( )</b></p>
<p>Worte beschreiben können.</p> <p>Wie ist es damit: “Man kann eine Figur genauer mit Hilfe von Maßzahlen als ohne diese beschreiben”.</p> <p>Aber die Erfahrung, die ich <u>habe</u> scheint <del>«im gewissen Sinne»</del> eine Beschreibung dieser Erfahrung, <del>im gewissen Sinne</del>, zu ersetzen. “Sie ist ihre eigene Beschreibung”.</p> <p>Vermischen wir hier nicht zwei Dinge: die Zusammengesetztheit der Erfahrung &amp; was man ihren ursprünglichen <u>Geschmack</u> «<u>Ton</u> flavour» nennen könnte? Ihre eigentliche natürliche Farbe.</p> <p>Es ist die Auffassung, daß von der ursprünglichen Erfahrung nur ein Teil bei «in» der Mitteilung erhalten bleibt, &amp; etwas anderes «↓von ihr» verloren geht. Nämlich eben ‘ihr timbre’, oder wie man es nennen möchte. Es kommt Einem hier so vor als könnte man, sozusagen nur die «↓farblose» Zeichnung vermitteln &amp; der Andere setzte in sie <u>seine</u> Farben ein. Aber das ist natürlich (<u>eine</u>) Täuschung.</p> <p>Aber können wir nicht wirklich sagen, wir hätten in dem Andern durch unsere Beschreibung ein Bild hervorgebracht aber wir können nicht wissen ob dieses Bild nun</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 34r) ( )</b></p>	<p>por palavras.<sup>80</sup></p> <p>E que tal isto: “Pode-se descrever mais exatamente uma figura com o auxílio de números de medida do que sem isso”?<sup>81</sup></p> <p>Mas a experiência que eu <u>tenho</u> parece <del>«em certo sentido»</del> substituir <del>em certo sentido</del> uma descrição dessa experiência. “Ela é a sua própria descrição”.<sup>82</sup></p> <p>Não misturamos aqui duas coisas: a composição da experiência e aquilo que se poderia chamar de seu <u>sabor</u> «<u>tom</u> flavour» originário? A sua própria cor natural?<sup>83</sup></p> <p>A interpretação é a de que na comunicação da experiência originária só uma parte é preservada, e que talvez a outra se perca «↓dela». A saber, ‘o seu timbre’ ou qualquer coisa que o valha. Tudo se passa como se um só pudesse comunicar, por assim dizer, o desenho «↓sem cor» e o outro colocasse nele as <u>suas</u> cores. Mas isto, naturalmente, é (<u>um</u>) engodo.<sup>84</sup></p> <p>Mas não podemos realmente dizer que produzimos no outro, pela nossa descrição, uma imagem, só que não podemos saber agora se essa imagem</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 34r) ( )</b></p>
<p>genau das gleiche ist, wie das unsere? Denken wir hier an den Gebrauch des Wortes gleich in «↓solchen» Sätze wie: “Diese Kreise sind dem <u>Augenschein</u> nach ganz gleich.”</p> <p>Hierher gehört auch, daß wir gewöhnlich unser Gesichtsbild nicht als</p>	<p>é exatamente igual à nossa? Pense aqui no uso da palavra igual em enunciados «↓tais» como: “Estes círculos são, <u>em aparência</u>, completamente iguais.”<sup>85</sup></p> <p>É parte disso também que nós normalmente não sentimos nossa</p>

<p>etwas in uns empfinden wie etwa einen Schmerz im Auge, daß wir aber, wenn wir philosophieren, geneigt sind, diesem <del>Vergleich</del> Bild gemäß zu denken.</p> <p>“The ‘if-sensation’”. Compare with the ‘table-sensation’. There is the question “What is the table sensation like” &amp; the answer is a picture of a table. In what sense is the if-sensation analogous to the table sensation? Is there a description of this sensation &amp; <u>what do we call a description of it</u>. Putting the gestures instead of the sensation means <del>really</del> just giving the nearest rough description there is of <del>this</del> «the» experience.</p> <p>Example [“I have a peculiar feeling of pastness in my wrist”.]</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 34v) (   )</b></p>	<p>imagem visual como alguma coisa em nós, como talvez uma dor no olho, mas que nós, quando filosofamos, estamos inclinados a pensar <del>comparado</del> a de acordo com essa imagem.<sup>86</sup></p> <p>“A ‘sensação-de-se’”. Compare com a ‘sensação-de-mesa’. Existe a pergunta “Como é a sensação-de-mesa”, e a resposta é uma imagem da mesa. Em que sentido a ‘sensação-de-se’ é análoga à ‘sensação-de-mesa’? Existe uma descrição dessa sensação? E <u>o que nós chamamos de uma descrição dela</u>? Colocar gestos em vez da sensação significa <del>realmente</del> apenas dar a descrição grosseira mais próxima <del>dessa</del> «da» experiência.<sup>87</sup></p> <p>Exemplo [“Eu tenho um sentimento peculiar de passado no meu pulso”.]<sup>88</sup></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 34v) (   )</b></p>
<p>6) “We shall never know whether he meant this or that”. C died after the training in that room. We say: “Perhaps he would have reacted like B when taken into the daylight. But we shall never know.</p> <p>α) We should say this question was decided if he arose from his grave &amp; we then made the experiment with him. Or his ghost appeared to us in a spiritualist séance &amp; told us that he has a certain experience.</p> <p>β) We don’t accept any evidence. But what if we didn’t accept the evidence in 5 either &amp; said «(something like)» “We can’t be sure that he is the identical man who was trained in the room”, or: “he is the identical man but we can’t know whether he would have behaved like this in the past time when he was trained.</p> <p>7) We introduce a «↓new» notation for the expression: “If P happens then always (as a rule) Q happens. P didn’t happen this time &amp; so Q</p>	<p>6)<sup>89</sup> “Nós nunca saberemos se ele quis dizer isso ou aquilo”. C morreu depois do treino naquela sala. Nós diremos: “Talvez ele tivesse reagido como B, quando foi pego à luz do dia. Mas nunca saberemos.</p> <p>α) Nós podemos dizer que esta pergunta pode ser decidida se ele se levantar do seu túmulo e nós fizemos um experimento com ele. Ou o seu fantasma aparecesse para nós numa sessão espírita e nos contasse que ele tem uma certa experiência.</p> <p>β) Nós não aceitamos nenhuma evidência. Mas o que acontece se nós não aceitamos a evidência em 5 também e dizemos «(algo como)»: “Nós não podemos estar seguros de que ele é o mesmo homem que foi treinado na sala”, ou: “ele é o mesmo homem, mas não podemos saber se ele teria se comportado desse jeito no passado, quando ele foi treinado.”<sup>90</sup></p> <p>7) Nós introduzimos uma «↓nova» notação para a expressão: “Se P acontece, então sempre (como regra) Q acontece. P não aconteceu desta</p>

<p>didn't happen". We say instead: "If P had happened Q would have happened". E.g. "If the gunpowder is dry «↓under these circumstances» a spark of this strength explodes it. It wouldn't dry this time &amp; «under the same circumstances» didn't explode". We say instead "If the gunpowder had been dry this time it would have exploded". The point of this notation is that it nears the form of this proposition very much to the form: "The gunpowder</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 35r) (   )</b></p>	<p>vez e então Q não aconteceu". Em vez disso, nós dizemos: "Se P tivesse acontecido, Q teria acontecido. P. ex., "se a pólvora está seca «↓sob essas circunstâncias» uma faísca desta força a explodiria. Ela não está seca dessa vez e «sob as mesmas circunstâncias» não explode. Em vez disso, nós dizemos: "Se a pólvora estivesse seca dessa vez, ela teria explodido". O ponto desta notação é que ela aproxima muito a forma desta proposição à forma: "A pólvora</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 35r) (   )</b></p>
<p>was dry this time so it exploded". I mean the new form doesn't stress the fact that it did not explode but, we might say, paints a vivid picture of it exploding this time. We could imagine a «↓two forms of expression in a» picture language which was corresponding to the two kinds of notations in the word language. <del>The second notation would consist in actually painting a picture of the explosion.</del> The second notation will be particularly appropriate «↓e.g.» if we wish to give a person a shock by making him vividly imagine what «that which» would have happened, stressing only slightly that it didn't happen.</p> <p>8 Someone might say to us: "But are you sure that the second sentence means just what the first one means &amp; not just something similar or «↓that &amp;» something else as well? (Moore) I should say: I'm talking of the case where it means just this, <del>if it's used in</del> &amp; this seems to me an important case (which you concede by saying what you have said). But of course I don't say that it isn't used in other ways as well &amp; then we'll have to talk about these other cases separately.</p> <p>9 Someone says "lowering ones voice some</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 35v) (   )</b></p>	<p>estava seca dessa vez, e então ela explodiu". O que quero dizer é que a nova forma não enfatiza o fato de que ela não explodiu, mas, sim, pinta uma imagem vívida dela explodindo dessa vez. Nós poderíamos imaginar uma «↓duas formas de expressão numa» linguagem de figurações que correspondesse aos dois tipos de notações na linguagem de palavras. <del>A segunda notação consistiria em pintar realmente uma imagem da explosão.</del> A segunda notação será particularmente apropriada se nós quisermos, «↓p.ex.» dar um choque numa pessoa, fazendo-a imaginar vividamente o que «aquilo que» teria acontecido, enfatizando apenas ligeiramente que isso não aconteceu <sup>91</sup></p> <p>8 Alguém poderia nos dizer: "Você está certo de que a segunda sentença significa apenas o que a primeira significa e não somente alguma coisa similar, ou «↓aquilo e» alguma outra coisa também? (Moore). <sup>92</sup> Eu diria: Eu estou falando do caso em que isso significa apenas isto, <del>se isso é usado em</del>, e isto me parece um caso importante (o que você concede, ao dizer o que você disse). Naturalmente, porém, eu não digo que ele não é usado de outras maneiras também, e então nós teremos que falar sobre esses outros casos separadamente. <sup>93</sup></p> <p>9 Alguém diz "baixar a voz algumas</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 35v) (   )</b></p>
<p>times means [[↑that what you say is less important than the rest.]] In other cases you lower your voice to show [[↓that you wish to draw special attention to what you now say.]]"</p>	<p>vezes significa [[↑que aquilo que você diz é menos importante do que o resto.]] Em outros casos, você baixa a voz para mostrar [[↓que deseja chamar atenção especial para o que você está dizendo agora.]]"</p>

We «It» must be clear that our examples are not preparations to the analysis of the actual meaning of the expression so & so (Niquod) but giving them effects that “analysis”.

11 Have we now shown that to say «↓in 5» “We can't know whether he would have behaved ...” makes no sense? We should say the sentence «to say this sentence» under these circumstances «↓has» lost its «the» point which it would have had under other circumstances, but this doesn't mean that we can't give it another point.

10) We say “We don't «can» know whether this spark would have been sufficient to ignite that mixture; because we can't reproduce the exact mixture not having the exact ingredients or not having a balance to weigh them etc., etc.” But suppose we could reproduce all the circumstances & someone said “we can't know whether it would have exploded” «& being asked why he said “because» we can't know whether under these circumstances it would have exploded then.” This answer would set our head whirling. We should feel he wasn't playing the same game with that expression as we do. We should be

(MS 148, p. 36r) (|)

inclined to say “This makes no sense!” And this means that we are at a loss not knowing what reasoning, what actions go with this expression. Moreover we believe that he made up a sentence analogous to sentences used in certain language games not noticing that he took the point away.

In which case do we say that a sentence has point? That comes to asking in which case do we call something a language game. I can only answer: Look at the family of language games that will show you whatever can be shown about the matter.

~~12) “We can never know what he really sees, for he has his own visual image & I have mine” & we can't say~~

12) (The private visual image.) B is trained to describe his afterimage when he has looked, say, into a bright red light. He is made to look into the light, & then to shut his eyes & he is then asked “What do you see?” This question before was put to him only if he looked at physical objects. We suppose he reacts by a description of what he sees with closed

Devemos «Deve» ser claro(s) (em) que os nossos exemplos não são preparações para a análise do significado real da expressão “isso e aquilo” (Nicod), mas dar para elas efeitos que se “analisam”.<sup>94</sup>

11<sup>95</sup> Mostramos agora que dizer «↓como em 5» “Não sabemos se ele teria se comportado...” não faz sentido? Diríamos que a sentença «dizer esta sentença», sob estas circunstâncias, «↓perdeu» perde o seu «o» ponto, que ela teria sob outras circunstâncias, mas isso não significa que nós não podemos dar para ela outro ponto.<sup>96</sup>

10) Nós dizemos “Nós não «podemos» sabemos se esta faísca seria suficiente para incendiar a mistura; porque não podemos reproduzir a mistura exata, já que não temos os ingredientes exatos, ou não temos uma balança para pesá-los etc etc.” Mas vamos supor que nós pudéssemos reproduzir todas as circunstâncias, e alguém dissesse “nós não podemos saber se haveria explosão”, «e sendo perguntado por quê, ele dissesse: “porque» nós não podemos saber se, sob essas circunstâncias, ela a teria então explodido.” Esta resposta deixaria a nossa cabeça girando. Sentiríamos que ele não está jogando o mesmo jogo, com essa expressão, do que nós. Estaríamos

(MS 148, p. 36r) (|)

inclinados a dizer “Isto não faz nenhum sentido!”. E isto significa que estamos perdidos sem saber que raciocínio, que ações, estão relacionadas com a expressão. Mais ainda, acreditamos que ele formou uma sentença análoga a sentenças usadas em certos jogos de linguagem, não notando que ele levou o ponto para longe.<sup>97</sup>

Em que caso dizemos que uma sentença tem um ponto? Isso nos leva a perguntar em que caso nós chamamos alguma coisa de jogo de linguagem. Eu só posso responder: Olhe para a família de jogos de linguagem que lhe mostrarão o que pode ser mostrado sobre a questão.<sup>98</sup>

~~12) “Nunca podemos saber o que ele realmente vê, porque ele tem a sua própria imagem visual e eu tenho a minha, e nós não podemos dizer~~

12) (A imagem visual privada.) B é treinado para descrever sua imagem residual depois que ele olhou, digamos, para uma luz vermelha brilhante. Ele tem que olhar para a luz, fechar os olhos, e então lhe perguntam: “O que você está vendo?”. A pergunta acima foi formulada

<p>eyes.— But halt! This description of the training seems wrong for what if</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 36v) (   )</b></p>	<p>somente se ele olhou para objetos físicos. Nós supomos que ele reage pela descrição do que vê com os olhos fechados. – Mas atenção! Esta descrição do treinamento parece errada, pois o que aconteceria se</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 36v) (   )</b></p>
<p>I had had to describe my own, not B's, training. Would I then also have said: “I reacted to the question by ...” &amp; not rather: “When I had closed my eyes I saw an image &amp; described it”. If I say “I saw an image &amp; described it” I say this as opposed to the case where «in which» I gave a description without seeing an image. (I might have lied or <u>not</u>.)</p> <p>Now we could «↓of course» also distinguish these cases if B describes an afterimage. But we don't wish <del>to distinguish them but we only</del> «↓to» consider now cases in which the mechanism of lying plays any part. For if you say “I always know whether I am lying but not whether the other person is”, I say: in the case I'm considering I can't be said to <u>know</u> that I'm not lying, or let us say not saying the «↓un»truth, because the dilemma saying the truth or the untruth is in this case unknown to me. <del>Think of the fact</del> «Remember» that when I'm asked “what do you see <u>here</u>” I don't always ask myself: “Now shall I say the truth or not something else?” If you say “but surely if you «↓in fact» speak the truth then you did see something &amp; you saw what you said you saw” I answer: How can I know that I see what I say I see? Do I have a criterion or use one for the colour I see actually being red?</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 37r) (   )</b></p>	<p>eu tivesse que descrever o meu, e não o treino de B. Eu então teria também dito: “Eu reagi à pergunta pela...” e, em vez disso, não: “Quando fechei meus olhos vi uma imagem e a descrevi”. Se eu digo “eu vi uma imagem e a descrevi”, digo isso em oposição ao caso onde «no qual» eu dei uma descrição sem ver a imagem. (Eu posso ter mentido ou <u>não</u>.) Agora, nós poderíamos «↓naturalmente» também distinguir esses casos se B descreve uma imagem residual. Mas nós não queremos <del>distingui-los, mas só</del> considerar agora casos nos quais o mecanismo de mentir tenha algum papel. Porque, se você diz “eu sempre sei se estou mentindo, mas não se a outra pessoa está”, eu digo: no caso que estou considerando não se pode dizer que <u>sei</u> que não estou mentindo, ou permitir-se não dizer a «↓não-»verdade, porque o dilema de dizer a verdade ou a não-verdade é, neste caso, desconhecido para mim. <del>Pense no fato de que</del> «Lembre-se» de que quando sou perguntado “o que você vê <u>aqui</u>”, eu nunca me pergunto: “digo a verdade agora ou digo outra coisa?”. Se você disser “mas seguramente se você «↓de fato» fala a verdade, então você viu alguma coisa, e você viu o que disse que viu”, eu respondo: como posso saber que vi o que disse que vi? Eu tenho um critério, ou uso algum, para a cor que eu vejo realmente como vermelho?<sup>99</sup></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 37r) (   )</b></p>
<p>13) «↓We imagine that» The expression “I can't see what you see” has been given sense by explaining it to mean: “I can't see what you see being in a different position relative to the object we are looking at”, or “... having not as good eyes as you”, or “... having found as in ... that B sees something which we don't, thought we look at the same object.” etc. I can't see your afterimage might be explained to mean I can't see</p>	<p>13) «↓Nós imaginamos que» A expressão “eu não posso ver o que você vê” ganha sentido pela explicação do que ela significa: “eu não posso ver o que você vê, estando numa posição diferente, relativa ao objeto para o qual estamos olhando”, ou “...não tendo olhos tão bons quanto os seus”, ou “...havendo descoberto, tal como em..., que B vê alguma coisa que nós não vemos, mesmo que olhemos para o mesmo objeto” etc. Eu não</p>

<p>what you see if I close my eyes meaning when you say you see a red circle I see a yellow one.</p> <p>14) Identity of physical objects, of shapes, colours, dreams, toothache.</p> <p>15) (The <del>thing</del> «object» we see) The physical object &amp; its appearance. Form of expression: different views of the same physical object are different objects seen. We ask “What do you see” &amp; he can either answer “a chair”, or “this” (&amp; draw the particular view of the chair). So we are now inclined to say that each man sees a different object &amp; one which no other person sees, for even if they look at the same chair from the same spot it may appear different to them &amp; the objects before the other minds eye I can't look at.</p> <p>16) (I can't know whether he sees anything</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 37v) (   )</b></p>	<p>posso ver a sua imagem residual, pode ser explicado como se quisesse dizer eu não posso ver o que você pode, se fecho os meus olhos, significando que quando você diz que vê um círculo vermelho, eu vejo um amarelo.<sup>100</sup></p> <p>14) Identidade de objetos físicos, de formas, cores, sonhos, dor de dente.</p> <p>15) (A <del>coisa</del> «objeto» que vemos) O objeto físico e sua aparência. Forma de expressão: visões diferentes do mesmo objeto físico são diferentes objetos vistos. Nós perguntamos: “o que você está vendo?” e ele pode ou responder “uma cadeira”, ou “isto” (e desenhar a visão particular da cadeira). E, assim, nós estamos agora inclinados a dizer que cada homem vê um objeto diferente e um que nenhuma outra pessoa vê, porque mesmo que eles olhem para a mesma cadeira, a partir do mesmo ponto, ela pode parecer diferente para eles e os objetos, no olho das outras mentes, eu não posso olhar.</p> <p>16) (Eu não posso saber se ele vê, na verdade, alguma coisa</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 37v) (   )</b></p>
<p>at all or only behaves as I do when I see something.) There seems to be an undoubted assymetry in the use of the word “I «to» see” (&amp; all words relating to personal experience). One can «is inclined to» state this in the way that “I know when I see something by just seeing it, without hearing what I say or observing the rest of my behaviour whereas I know that he sees &amp; what he sees only by observing his behaviour, i.e. indirectly”.</p> <p>a) There is a mistake in this: “I know what I see because I see it”. What does it mean to know that.</p> <p>b) It is true to say that my reason for saying that I see is not the observation of my behaviour. But this is a grammatical proposition.</p> <p>c) It seems to be an imperfection that I can only know ..... But this is just the way we use the word ..... — Could we then ... if we could? Certainly.</p> <p>Does the person «Should we say that the person...» who has not learnt</p>	<p>ou apenas se comporta como eu quando vê algo.) Parece haver uma indubitável assimetria no uso da palavra “<del>eu</del> ver” (e todas as palavras relacionadas com a experiência pessoal). Pode-se «estamos inclinados a» atestar isso na maneira em que “eu sei quando vejo algo, apenas vendo, sem ouvir o que digo ou observando o resto do meu comportamento, enquanto que eu sei que ele vê e o que ele vê, somente pela observação do seu comportamento, isto é, indiretamente”.</p> <p>a) Existe um erro nisto: “eu sei o que vejo porque eu o vejo”. O que significa saber que?</p> <p>b) É verdadeiro dizer que minha razão para dizer que vejo não é a observação do meu comportamento. Mas isto é uma proposição gramatical.</p> <p>c) Parece ser uma imperfeição que eu só posso saber... Mas essa é só a maneira como nós usamos a palavra .... — Poderíamos, então, ... se pudéssemos? Certamente.</p> <p>A pessoa «Poderíamos dizer que a pessoa...» que não aprendeu «a»</p>

<p>«the» language know«s» that he sees red but can't express it? — Or should we say: “he knows what he sees but can't express it”? — So, besides seeing it, he also knows what he sees?</p> <p>Imagine we described a totally different experiment; say this, that I sting someone with a needle &amp; observe whether he cries out or not «makes a sound or not». Then surely it would interest us if the subject</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 38r)</b></p>	<p>linguagem sabe que ela vê o vermelho mas não pode expressá-lo? — Ou teríamos que dizer: “ela sabe o que vê mas não pode expressá-lo”? — Assim, além de ver, ela também sabe o que vê?</p> <p>Imagine se nós descrevêssemos um experimento totalmente diferente; digamos este: eu espeto alguém com uma agulha e observo se ele grita ou não «faz um som ou não». Então, seguramente, nos interessaria se o sujeito,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 38r)</b></p>
<p>whenever we «often when we» stung him saw, say, a red circle. And we would distinguish the case when he cried out &amp; saw a circle from the case when he cried out &amp; didn't see one.</p> <p>This case is quite straightforward &amp; there is no problem about it. «seems to be nothing problematic in it.»</p> <p>If I say ”I tell myself that I see red, I tell myself what I see” it seems that after having told myself I now know better what I see, am better acquainted with it, than before. (Now in a sense this may be so ...)</p> <p>“When he <del>said</del> asked me what colour I saw, I guessed what he <u>meant</u> «wanted wished to know» &amp; told him.”</p> <p>“It is not enough to distinguish between the cases in which B «or I» says that I see red &amp; do see red &amp; the case in which I say this but don't see red; but we must distinguish between the cases in which <del>I say I see red</del>, see red, say I see red &amp; mean to describe what I see &amp; the cases in which I don't mean this.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 38v) (   )</b></p>	<p>quando nós «sempre que nós» o espetamos, viu, digamos, um círculo vermelho. E nós distinguiríamos o caso em que ele gritou e viu um círculo, do caso em que ele gritou e não viu nenhum.</p> <p>Este caso é bem simples, e não há problema com ele. «parece não haver nada problemático nele.»</p> <p>Se eu digo “eu falo para mim mesmo que estou vendo vermelho, eu falo pra mim o que vejo”, parece que depois de ter falado pra mim, sei melhor agora o que vejo, estou mais familiarizado com isto do que antes. (Agora, num certo sentido isto pode ser assim...)</p> <p>“Quando ele disse perguntou que core u vi, eu adivinhei o que ele <u>quis dizer</u> «quis desejou saber» e lhe contei.”</p> <p>“Não é suficiente distinguir entre os casos em que B «ou eu» diz que eu vejo vermelho e realmente vejo vermelho e o caso no qual eu digo isto mas não vejo vermelho; mas nós temos que distinguir entre os casos nos quais <del>eu digo que vejo vermelho</del>, vejo vermelho, digo que vejo vermelho e significo para descrever o que vejo, e os casos em que não significo isso.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 38v) (   )</b></p>
<p>Consider the case in which I don't say what I see «in words» but by pointing to a sample. Here again I distinguish now between the cases in which I ‘just react by pointing’ &amp; the case in which I <u>see</u> &amp; point.</p>	<p>Considere o caso em que eu não digo o que vejo «em palavras», mas apontando para uma amostra. Aqui novamente eu distingo, agora, entre os casos em que eu ‘apenas reajo apontando’ e o caso em que vejo e aponto.</p>

Now suppose I asked: “how do I know that I see «& that I see red?»” I.e. “how do I know that «↓I do» what you call seeing «↓(& seeing red)»?” For we use the word ‘seeing’ & ‘red’ between us «in a game we» play with one another.

Don't you say: “~~We not~~ In order to be a description of our personal experience ~~it~~ «↓what we say» must not be just ~~the~~ «our» reaction but «↓must be» justified”? ~~by what I see?~~ But does the justification need another justification?

Suppose we play the game 2 & B ~~tells~~ calls out the word “red”. Suppose A «now» asks B: “do you only say ‘red’ or did you really see it?”.

“Surely there are two phenomena: one, «just» speaking, the other, seeing & speaking accordingly.

Answer: Certainly we speak of these two cases but we shall here have so show how

(MS 148, p. 39r) (|)

these expressions are used; or, in other words, how they are taught. For the mere fact that we possess a picture of them does not help us as we must describe ~~how~~ «in what way» this picture is used. More especially as we are inclined to assume a use different from the actual one.

We have therefore to explain under what conditions we say: “I say ‘red’ but don't see red” or “I say ‘red’ & see red”, or “I said ‘red’ but didn't see red” etc., etc..

Imagine that saying red was often followed by some agreeable event. We found that the child enjoyed that event & often instead of ‘green’ said ‘red’. We would use this reaction to play another language

Agora, suponha que eu pergunte: “como eu sei que vejo «e que eu vejo vermelho?»” Isto é, “como eu sei que «↓estou fazendo» o que você chama de ver «↓(e vendo vermelho)»?” Porque nós usamos a palavra ‘ver’ e ‘vermelho’ entre nós «num jogo que nós» jogamos um com o outro.

Você não diz: “~~Nós não~~ Para ser uma descrição da nossa experiência pessoal, ~~ela~~ «↓o que dizemos» não deve ser apenas a «nossa» reação, mas deve ser justificado”? ~~pelo que vejo?~~ Mas a justificação precisa de uma outra justificação?

Suponha que entremos no jogo 2 e B ~~conta~~ fala a palavra “vermelho”. Suponha que A «agora» pergunte a B: “você só diz ‘vermelho’ ou você realmente viu?”.

“Seguramente existem dois fenômenos: um, «apenas» falar, o outro, ver e falar conformemente.

Resposta: Com certeza nós falamos desses dois casos, mas assim só teremos mostrado aqui como

(MS 148, p. 39r) (|)

estas expressões são usadas, ou, em outras palavras, como elas são ensinadas. Pois o mero fato de que a gente possua uma imagem delas, não nos ajuda em como temos que descrever ~~como~~ «de que maneira» esta imagem é usada. Mais especificamente, como estamos inclinados a presumir um uso diferente do que o uso real.

Nós temos, portanto, que explicar sob que condições dizemos: “Eu digo ‘vermelho’, mas não vejo o vermelho”, ou “Eu digo ‘vermelho’ e vejo vermelho”, ou “Eu disse ‘vermelho’, mas não vi o vermelho”, etc etc..

Imagine que dizer vermelho seja sempre seguido de um evento agradável. Nós descobrimos que uma criança gostava desse evento, e, frequentemente, em vez de dizer ‘verde’, dizia ‘vermelho’. Nós

<p>game with the child. We would say “you cheat, its red”. Now again we are dependent upon the subsequent reaction of the child.</p> <p>Such games are actually played with children: Telling a person the untruth &amp; enjoying his surprise at finding out what really happened.</p> <p>But couldn't we imagine some kind of perversity in a child which made it say red when it saw green &amp; vice versa &amp; at the</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 39v) (   )</b></p>	<p>usaríamos essa reação para entrar em outro jogo de linguagem com a criança. Nós diríamos “você roubou, é vermelho”. E agora, de novo, estamos dependentes da reação subsequente da criança.</p> <p>Esses jogos são realmente jogados com crianças. Contar uma mentira para uma pessoa e divertir-se com a sua surpresa ao descobrir o que realmente aconteceu.</p> <p>Mas não poderíamos imaginar algum tipo de perversidade numa criança que a fez dizer vermelho quando viu verde e vice versa, e ao</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 39v) (   )</b></p>
<p>same time this not being discovered because it happened to see red «↓in these cases» when we say green? But if here we talk of perversity we could «might» also assume that we all were perverse. For how are we or B even to find out that he is perverse?</p> <p>The idea is, that he finds out (&amp; we do) when later on he learns how the word ‘perverse’ is used &amp; <del>now</del> «then» he remembers that he was that way all along.</p> <p>Imagine this case: The child looks at the lights, says the name of the right colour to himself in an aside &amp; then, loud, the wrong word. It chuckles while doing so. This is, one may say, a <u>rudimentary</u> form of cheating. One might even say: “This child is going to be a liar”. But if it had not said the aside but only imagined itself pointing to one colour on the chart &amp; then said the wrong word, — was this cheating too?</p> <p>Can a child cheat like a banker without the knowledge of the banker?</p> <p>“I can assure you that before when I said ‘I see red’ I saw black”.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 40r) (   )</b></p>	<p>mesmo tempo isso não sendo descoberto, porque ocorreu de ver vermelho «↓nesses casos» quando dizemos verde? Mas se aqui falamos de perversidade, nós deveríamos «poderíamos» também presumir que todos fomos perversos. Pois, como nós ou B, inclusive, podemos descobrir que ele é perverso?</p> <p>A ideia é de que ele descobre (e nós também) quando depois aprender como a palavra ‘perverso’ é usada e <del>agora</del> «então» ele se lembra que era desse jeito todo o tempo.</p> <p>Imagine este caso: a criança olha para as luzes, diz secretamente para si o nome da cor correta e então, em voz alta, a palavra errada. Solta um riso abafado enquanto faz isso. Isto é, alguém poderia dizer, uma forma <u>rudimentaria</u> de trapaça. Alguém poderia inclusive dizer: “Esta criança está se tornando mentirosa”. Mas se ela não tivesse feito essa confidência, mas somente imaginado a si mesma apontando para uma cor no quadro e então dito a palavra errada, — isso seria trapacear também?</p> <p>A criança pode trapacear como um banqueiro, sem o conhecimento de um banqueiro?</p> <p>“Eu posso lhe assegurar que antes, quando disse ‘vejo vermelho’, eu vi preto”.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 40r) (   )</b></p>
<p>“He tells us his private experience, that experience which nobody</p>	<p>“Ele nos conta a sua experiência privada, aquela experiência que</p>

but he knows anything about”.

”Surely his memory is worth more than our indirect criteria, as only he could know what he saw.”

But let us see; — We sometimes say outside philosophy such things as “of course only he knows how he feels” «or “I can't know what you feel”». Now how do we apply such a statement? Mostly it is an expression of helplessness like “I don't know what to do”. But this helplessness is not due to an unfortunate metaphysical fact, ‘the privacy of personal experience’, or it would worry us ~~the always~~ «constantly». Our expression is comparable to this: “What's done can't be undone!”.

We also say «↓to the Doctor» “Surely I must know whether I have pains or not!” How do we use this statement?

“All right if we can't talk in this way about someone else I can certainly say of myself that I either saw red

(MS 148, p. 40v) ( | )

at that time or didn't «had some other experience”». I may not remember now, but at the time I saw one thing or the other!” This is like saying “one of these two pictures must have fitted”. And my answer is not that «↓perhaps» neither of them fits but that I'm not yet clear about what ‘fitting’ in this case means.

Now is it the same case, are these different cases: A blind man sees everything just as we do but he acts as a blind man does & on the other hand he sees nothing & acts as a blind man does. At first sight we should say: here we have obviously two clearly different cases although we admit «↓that» we can't know which we have before us. I should say: We obviously use two different pictures which ~~one~~ «we» could describe like this: - .... But we use ~~both~~ «the» pictures in ~~such same~~ «a» way that the

ninguém, senão ele, sabe alguma coisa sobre ela”.

“Seguramente a sua memória vale mais do que os nossos critérios indiretos, pois somente ele pode saber o que viu.”

Mas vejamos; — Às vezes dizemos fora da filosofia coisas como “claro que só ele sabe o que sente” «ou “Eu não posso saber o que você sente”». Agora, como aplicamos um enunciado como esse? A maior parte das vezes é uma expressão de desamparo, como “Não sei o que fazer”. Mas este desamparo não é devido a um desafortunado fato metafísico, ‘a privacidade da experiência pessoal’, ou ele deveria nos preocupar ~~sempre~~ «constantemente». Nossa expressão é comparável a esta: “O que está feito não pode ser mais desfeito!”.

Nós também dizemos «↓para o médico»: “Com certeza eu devo saber se tenho dores ou não!” Como usamos esse enunciado?

“Tudo bem se não podemos falar dessa maneira sobre alguém, mas eu posso certamente dizer de mim mesmo que eu vi vermelho

(MS 148, p. 40v) ( | )

naquela hora ou não «tive outra experiência”». Eu posso não lembrar agora, mas na hora eu vi uma coisa ou a outra!” Isto é como dizer “uma dessas duas imagens deve ter cabido”. E a minha resposta não é que «↓talvez» nenhuma delas caiba, mas que ainda não é claro para mim o que ‘caber’ significa neste caso.

Agora, este é o mesmo caso ou são diferentes casos? Um cego vê tudo exatamente como nós, mas age como um cego e, por outro lado, ele não vê nada e age como um cego agiria. À primeira vista, diríamos: aqui obviamente nós temos dois casos claramente diferentes, mesmo que admitamos «↓que» não sabemos qual é o que temos diante de nós. Eu diria: Nós obviamente usamos duas imagens diferentes, que ~~alguém~~ «nós» poderíamos descrever assim: - ..... Mas nós usamos ~~ambas~~ «as»

two games ‘come to the same’.

By the way, would you say that he surely «certainly» knew that he was blind if he was so? Why do you feel more reluctant about this statement?

(MS 148, p. 41r) ( | )

“Surely he knew that he saw red but he couldn't say so!” — Does that mean “Surely he saw «knew that» the the colour which we call ‘red’ ...” — or would you say it means “he knew that he saw this colour (pointing to a red patch)”. But did he while he knew it point to this patch?

Use of: “He knows what colour he sees”. “I knew what colour I saw” etc.

“Nachdunkeln der Erinnerung” does this expression make sense & in what cases. And isn't on the other hand the picture which we use quite clear in all cases?

The case of old people usually having «getting» memories of the time in which they learnt to speak & underst& speech:

a) They say or paint that such & such things have happened although other records always contradict them

b) The memories agree with the records. Only in this case shall we say that they remember ....

Suppose they paint the scenes they

(MS 148, p. 41v) ( | )

say they remember & paint the faces very dark; — shall we say that they saw them that dark or that the colour had become darker in their memory?

imagens de ~~tal~~ mesma «uma» maneira que os dois jogos ‘vêm a ser o mesmo’.

A propósito, você diria que ele seguramente «certamente» sabia que era cego, se ele o era? Por que você se sente mais relutante acerca desse enunciado?

(MS 148, p. 41r) ( | )

“Seguramente ele sabia que viu vermelho, mas não podia dizer isso!” – Isso significa “Seguramente ele viu «sabia que» a cor que nós chamamos ‘vermelho’...” – ou você diria que isso significa “ele sabia que viu esta cor (apontando para uma mancha vermelha)”. Mas ele, enquanto o sabia, apontou para esta mancha?

Uso de: “Ele sabe que cor vê”, “Eu sabia que cor vi” etc.

“Escurecimento da memória” (IF § 56; TS213 § 42). Esta expressão faz sentido, e em que casos? E, por outro lado, não é a imagem que usamos muito claramente em todos os casos?

Caso de pessoas velhas que usualmente têm «buscam» memórias do tempo em que elas aprenderam a falar e compreender a linguagem:

a) Eles dizem, ou pintam, que tais e tais coisas aconteceram, embora outros registros sempre as contradigam.

b) As memórias concordam com os registros. Somente neste caso diremos que eles se lembram...

Suponha que eles pintem as cenas que eles

(MS 148, p. 41v) ( | )

dizem que se lembram, e pintam as faces muito escuras; — nós diremos então que eles as viram escuras daquele jeito, ou que a cor se tornou mais escura na sua memória?

How do we know what colour a person sees? By the sample he points to? And how do we know what relation the sample is «↓meant» to have to the original? Now are we to say “we never know ...”? Or had we better cut these “we never know...” «↓out» of our language & consider how as a matter of fact we are wont to use the word “to know”?

What if someone asked: “How do I know that what I call «↓seeing» red is «↓not» an entirely different experience every time & that I am not deluded into thinking that it is the same or nearly the same?” Here again the answer “I can’t know” & the subsequent removal of the question.

Is it ever true that when I call a colour ‘red’ I serve myself of memory?? «make use of memory?»

To use the memory of what happened

(MS 148, p. 42r) ( | )

when we were taught language is all right as long as we don't think that this memory teaches us something essentially private.

“A rod has one length or another how ever we find it out.” Here again the picture  $\mathbb{I} \mathbb{I}$

Though he can't say what it is he sees while he is learning No 1, he'll tell us afterwards what he saw”. We mix this case up with the one: “When his gag will have been removed he'll tell us what he saw”.

What does it mean ‘to tell someone what one sees’? Or (perhaps), ‘to show someone what one sees’?

When we say ‘he'll tell us what he saw’ we have an idea that then we'll know what he really saw in a direct way (“at least if he isn't lying”)

Como sabemos que cor uma pessoa vê? Pela amostra que ela aponta? E como sabemos que relação a amostra tem «↓pretende ter» com o original? Agora, nós temos que dizer “nunca sabemos...?” ou é melhor retirar esse “nunca sabemos...” da nossa linguagem e considerar como, de fato, estamos propensos a usar a palavra “saber”?

E se alguém perguntasse: “Como posso saber se o que chamo «↓estar vendo» vermelho «↓não» é uma experiência totalmente diferente a cada vez, e que não sou levado a pensar que ela é a mesma ou quase a mesma?” Aqui novamente a resposta “Não posso saber”, e a subsequente remoção da pergunta.

É sempre verdadeiro que quando chamo uma cor de ‘vermelho’ me sirvo da memória?? «faço uso da memória?»

Usar a memória do que aconteceu

(MS 148, p. 42r) ( | )

quando a linguagem nos foi ensinada está correto, na medida em que não pensemos que esta memória nos ensina alguma coisa essencialmente privada.

Um bastão tem uma extensão ou outra, de qualquer modo que o encontrarmos. Aqui novamente a imagem  $\mathbb{I} \mathbb{I}$

Mesmo que não possamos dizer o que ele vê enquanto aprende o No. 1, ele nos dirá depois o que viu”. Nós misturamos este caso com este outro: “Quando a mordaca for removida, ele nos dirá o que viu”.

O que quer dizer ‘dizer a alguém o que está vendo’? Ou (talvez) ‘mostrar a alguém o que está vendo’?

Quando dizemos ‘ele vai nos contar o que viu’, nós temos uma ideia de que então saberemos o que ele realmente viu de uma maneira direta

<p>“He is in a better position to say what he sees than we are.” — That depends. —</p> <p>If we say “he’ll tell us what he saw”, it is as though he would now make a</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 42v) (   )</b></p>	<p>(“pelo menos se ele não estiver mentindo”).</p> <p>“Ele está numa melhor posição para dizer o que está vendo do que nós.” — Isso depende. —</p> <p>Se dizemos “ele nos contará o que viu”, é como se ele agora fizesse um</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 42v) (   )</b></p>
<p>use of language which we had never taught him.</p> <p>It is as if now we got an <u>insight</u> into something which before we had only seen from the outside.</p> <p>Inside &amp; outside!</p> <p>“Our teaching «training» connects the word ‘red’ (or is meant to connect it) with a particular impression of his (a private impression, an impression in him). He then communicates this impression — indirectly, of course — through the medium of speech.”</p> <p>Where is <del>the</del> «our» idea of “direct &amp; indirect communication” taken from?</p> <p>How, if we said, «↓as we sometimes might be inclined»: “We can only hope that this — indirect way of communication really succeeds.”</p> <p>We «↓so long» see the facts about the usage of our words crookedly as «so» long as we are still tempted «↓here» to talk of direct &amp; indirect.</p> <p>As long as you use the picture indirect-direct in this case you can't trust yourself</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 43r) (   )</b></p>	<p>um uso da linguagem que nós nunca lhe ensinamos.</p> <p>É como se agora tivéssemos um <u>discernimento</u> de algo que antes só teríamos visto de fora.</p> <p>De dentro e de fora!</p> <p>“Nosso ensino «treinamento» conecta a palavra ‘vermelho’ (ou pretende conectá-la) com uma impressão particular dele (uma impressão privada , uma impressão nele). Ele então comunica esta impressão — indiretamente, claro — através do meio da linguagem.”</p> <p>De onde é tomada a «nossa» ideia de “comunicação direta e indireta”?</p> <p>É como se nós disséssemos «↓tal como algumas vezes podemos estar inclinados»: “Nós só podemos esperar que este — meio indireto de comunicação realmente dê certo.”</p> <p>Nós «↓até agora» vemos os fatos sobre o uso das nossas palavras de maneira torta, enquanto estivermos ainda tentados «↓aqui» a falar de direto e indireto.</p> <p>Enquanto você usa a imagem indireto-direto neste caso, não pode confiar em si mesmo</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 43r) (   )</b></p>

<p>about judging the grammatical situation rightly <u>otherwise</u>.</p> <p>Is telling what one sees <u>something like</u> turning one's inside out? And learning to say what one sees, learning to let others see inside us?</p> <p>“We teach him to make us see what he sees”. He seems in an indirect way to show us <u>the object</u> which he sees, the object which is before his mind's eye. ”We can't look at it, it is in him.”</p> <p>The idea of the private <u>object</u> of vision. Appearance, sense datum.</p> <p>The visual field. (Not to be confused with visual space.)</p> <p>Telling someone what one sees seems like showing him, if indirectly, the object which is before ones mind's eye.</p> <p>The idea of the object before one's mind's eye is <del>bound</del> <u>absolutely</u> «(firmly)» «(firmemente)» <u>ligada</u> «amarrada» up with the idea of a comparisson of such objects in different persons compared to which the comparison</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 43v)(   )</b></p>	<p>para julgar a situação gramatical como justamente o <u>contrário</u>.</p> <p>Dizer o que se vê é <u>alguma coisa como</u> se virar do avesso? E aprender a dizer o que se vê, é aprender a deixar os outros verem dentro da gente?</p> <p>“Nós o ensinamos a nos fazer ver o que ele vê”. Ele parece nos mostrar de uma maneira indireta <u>o objeto</u> que está vendo, o objeto que está diante do olho da sua mente. “Nós não podemos olhar para ele, está dentro dele.”</p> <p>A ideia do <u>objeto</u> privado da visão. Aparência, dado do sentido.</p> <p>O campo visual. (Não deve ser confundido com o espaço visual.)</p> <p>Dizer para alguém o que se vê, parece como mostrar-lhe, pelo menos indiretamente, o objeto que está diante do olho da mente.</p> <p>A ideia do objeto diante do olho da mente é <u>absolutamente</u> «(firmemente)» <u>ligada</u> «amarrada» com a ideia de uma comparação desses objetos em diferentes pessoas, comparado com a qual a comparação</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 43v)(   )</b></p>
<p>really used is «↓an» indirect one.</p> <p>Whence the idea of the privacy of sensedata?</p> <p>“But do you really wish to say that they are not private? That one person can see the picture before the other person's eye?”</p> <p>Surely «↓you wouldn't think that» <u>telling</u> someone what one sees is «could be» a more direct way of communicating than showing him by pointing to a sample!</p> <p>“He'll tell us later what it was he saw” means that we'll get to know in a</p>	<p>realmente usada é «↓uma» indireta.</p> <p>De onde a ideia da privacidade dos dados dos sentidos?</p> <p>“Mas você realmente quer dizer que eles não são privados? Que uma pessoa pode ver a imagem diante do olho da outra pessoa?”</p> <p>Seguramente «↓você não acha que» <u>contar</u> para alguém o que se está vendo é «poderia ser» um modo mais direto de comunicação do que mostrar-lhe apontando para uma amostra!</p> <p>“Ele vai nos contar depois o que foi que viu” significa que nós ficaremos</p>

<p>(comparatively) direct «↓&amp; a sure» way what he saw as opposed to the guesses we could make before.</p> <p>We don't realize that the answer he gives us now is only part of a game like No 1, only more complicated.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 44r)(   )</b></p>	<p>sabendo, de uma maneira (compatativamente) direta «↓e segura», o que ele viu, em oposição aos palpites que poderíamos fazer antes.</p> <p>Nós não pensamos que a resposta que ele nos dá agora é somente parte de um jogo como o No. 1, só que mais complicado.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 44r)(   )</b></p>
<p>We don't deny that he can remember having dreamt so &amp; so before he was born. Denying this to us would be like denying that he can <u>say</u> he remembers having dreamt so &amp; so before he was born.</p> <p>I.e. we don't deny that he can make this move but we say that the move alone or together with all the sensations feelings, etc. he might have while he is making it does not tell us what game it is a move of «to what game the move belongs».</p> <p>We might e.g. never try to connect up a statement of this sort with anything past (in another sense). We might treat it as an interesting phenomenon &amp; possibly connect it up with the persons in a Freudian way or on the other hand we may look for some phenomena in the brain of the embryo which might be called dreams, etc., etc.. Or we may just say: “old people are liable to say such things” &amp; leave it at that.</p> <p>Suppose now someone remembered that yesterday he called red ‘green’ &amp; vice versa but that this didn't appear as he also saw green what today he sees red &amp; vice versa. Now here is a case in which we might be inclined to say that we</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 44v)(   )</b></p>	<p>Nós não negamos que ele pode se lembrar de que teve um sonho assim e assim antes de nascer. Negar isso para nós seria como negar que ele pode <u>dizer</u> que se lembra de ter tido um sonho assim e assim antes de nascer.</p> <p>Isto é, nós não negamos que ele pode fazer esse movimento, mas dizemos que o movimento só, ou acompanhado de todas as sensações, sentimentos etc., que ele poderia ter tido enquanto o faz, não nos diz de que jogo o movimento é «a que jogo o movimento pertence».</p> <p>Nós podemos, por exemplo, nunca tentar conectar um enunciado deste tipo com qualquer coisa do passado (em outro sentido). Nós podemos tratá-lo como um fenômeno interessante, e possivelmente conectá-lo com as pessoas de uma maneira freudiana, ou, por outro lado, nós podemos procurar por outros fenômenos no cérebro do embrião que poderiam ser chamados de sonhos etc., etc.. Ou nós podemos somente dizer: “gente velha é capaz de dizer essas coisas”, e deixar por aí.</p> <p>Suponhamos que alguém se lembrasse agora de que ontem ele chamava o vermelho de ‘verde’ e vice versa, mas que isso não parecia, pois ele também via como verde o que hoje ele vê como vermelho e vice-versa. Bem, aqui está um caso no qual nós poderíamos estar inclinados a dizer que nós</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 44v)(   )</b></p>
<p>learn from him today something about the working of his mind yesterday, that yesterday we judged by the outside while today we are allowed to look at the inside of what happened. It is as though we looked back but now got a glance at something that was closed to us «covered</p>	<p>aprendemos dele hoje alguma coisa sobre o funcionamento da sua mente ontem, que ontem nós julgávamos pelo lado de fora, enquanto que hoje nos é permitido olhar para o lado de dentro do que aconteceu. É como se olhássemos para trás, mas agora tivéssemos uma vista de algo que estava</p>

<p>up» yesterday. (   )</p> <p>If I say what it is I see, how do I compare what I say with what I see in order to know whether I say the truth? (   )</p> <p>Lying about what I see, you might say, is knowing what I see &amp; saying something else. Supposing I said it just consists of saying to myself ‘this is red’ &amp; aloud ‘this is green’. (   )</p> <p>Compare lying &amp; telling the truth in the case of telling what colour you see with the case of describing a picture which you saw or telling the right number of things you had to count.</p> <p>Collating what you say &amp; what you see.</p> <p>Is there always a collating?</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 45r)</b></p>	<p>fechado «encoberto» ontem. (   )</p> <p>Se eu digo o que vejo, como comparo o que digo com o que vejo para saber se digo a verdade? (   )</p> <p>Mentir sobre o que vejo, você poderia dizer, é saber o que vejo e dizer outra coisa. Supondo que eu dizer isso apenas consistisse em dizer para mim ‘isto é vermelho’ e em voz alta ‘isto é verde’. (   )</p> <p>Compare mentir e contar a verdade no caso de contar que cor você vê com o caso de descrever uma imagem que você viu, ou contar o número certo de coisas que você tinha que contar.</p> <p>Cotejar o que você diz e o que você vê.</p> <p>Sempre há um cotejamento?</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>(MS 148, p. 45r)</b></p>
<p>Or could you call it giving a picture of the colour I see if I say the word red? Unless it be a picture by its connection with a sample. (   )</p> <p>But isn't it «↓giving» a picture if I point to a sample? (   )</p> <p>“What I show <u>reveals</u> what I see”; — in what sense does it do that? The idea is that now you can so to speak look inside me. Whereas I only reveal to you what I see in a game of revealing &amp; hiding which is altogether played with signs of one category “Direct-indirect”.</p> <p>We are thinking of a game in which there is an inside in the normal sense.</p> <p>  We must get clear about how the metaphor of revealing (outside &amp;</p>	<p>Ou você poderia chamar de dar uma imagem da cor que vejo, se digo a palavra vermelho? A menos que isso seja uma imagem pela sua conexão com uma amostra. (   )</p> <p>Mas isso não é «↓dar» uma imagem se eu aponto para uma amostra? (   )</p> <p>“O que mostro <u>revela</u> o que vejo”; — em que sentido isto faz aquilo? A ideia é que agora você pode, por dizer assim, olhar dentro de mim. Ao passo que eu somente revelo a você o que vejo num jogo de revelar e esconder que é completamente jogado com os sinais de uma categoria “direto-indireto”.</p> <p>Nós estamos pensando num jogo no qual há um lado de dentro no sentido normal.</p> <p>  Temos que esclarecer como a metáfora de revelar (lado de fora e lado</p>

<p>  inside) is actually applied by us; otherwise we shall be tempted to look   for an inside behind that which in our metaphor is the inside. (   )</p> <p>We are used to describing the case by mean of a picture which, say, (   )</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 45v)</b></p>	<p>  de dentro) é realmente aplicada por nós; do contrário estaremos tentados   a buscar um lado de dentro por detrás daquilo que em nossa metáfora é   o lado de dentro. (   )</p> <p>Estamos acostumados a descrever o caso por meio de uma imagem que, digamos, (   )</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 45v)</b></p>
<p>contains 3 steps. But «↓when we think about language» we forget how this picture is actually applied in practical cases. We then are often tempted to apply it as it wasn't originally meant &amp; are puzzled about a third step in the facts. (   )</p> <p>“I see a particular <u>sense datum</u> «image» «thing» &amp; say a particular thing”. This is all right if I realise the way in which I specify what I see &amp; what I say. (   )</p> <p>“If he had learnt to show me (or tell me) what he sees, he could now show me.” Certainly, — but what is it like to show me what he sees? It is pointing to something under particular circumstances. Or is it something else (don't be misled by the idea of indirectness)?</p> <p>You compare it with such a statement as: “if he had learnt to open up he could now open up &amp; show me what's inside «I could now see what's inside»”. I say yes, but remember what opening up in this case is like.</p> <p>But what about the criterium whether there is anything inside or not? Here we say “I know that there is something</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 46r)</b></p>	<p>contém 3 passos. Mas «↓quando pensamos sobre a linguagem» nós nos esquecemos como esta imagem é realmente aplicada nos casos práticos. Nós então estamos sempre tentados a aplicá-la tal como ela foi originalmente pensada, e ficamos intrigados acerca de um terceiro passo nos fatos. (   )</p> <p>“Eu estou vendo um <u>dado do sentido</u> «imagem» «coisa» particular e digo uma coisa particular”. Isto está correto se percebo o modo como especifico o que vejo e o que digo. (   )</p> <p>“Se ele tivesse aprendido a me mostrar (ou a dizer-me) o que vê, ele poderia agora me mostrar.” Certamente, — mas como é mostrar-me o que ele vê? É apontar para alguma coisa sob circunstâncias particulares. Ou é outra coisa (não se deixe enganar pela ideia de algo indireto)?</p> <p>Você pode comparar com um enunciado como: “Se ele tivesse aprendido a abrir, ele poderia agora abrir e me mostrar o que há dentro «eu poderia agora ver o que há dentro»”. Eu digo, sim, mas lembre-se o que é abrir neste caso.</p> <p>Mas e sobre o critério de se há alguma coisa dentro ou não? Aqui nós dizemos “Eu sei que há alguma coisa</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 148, p. 46r)</b></p>
<p>inside in <u>my</u> case. And this is how I know of the ‘inside’ at all first hand”. //And this is how I have first hand knowledge of the inside at</p>	<p>dentro no <u>meu</u> caso. E assim é como eu sei, na verdade, do ‘lado de dentro’ em primeira mão”. //E assim é como eu tenho um conhecimento</p>

all.”// “This is how I know about an inside & am led to suppose is in the other person too.” «Further we are not inclined to say that only hitherto we have not known the mind of an other person but that the idea of this knowlede is bound up with the idea of myself.»

“So if I say ‘he has toothache’ I am supposing that he has what I have if I have toothache.” Suppose I said: “If I say ‘I suppose he has toothache’ I am supposing that he has what I have if I have toothache”, — this would be like saying “If I say ‘this cushion is red’ I mean that it has the same colour which the sofa has if it is red”. But this wasn't what I intended «was meant» to say with the first sentence. I wished to say that talking about his toothache at all was based upon a supposition, a supposition which «↓by its very nature essence» could not be verified.

But if you look closer you will see that this is an entire misrepresentation of the use of the word ”toothache” ( | )

(MS 148, p. 46v)

em primeira mão do lado de dentro, na verdade.”// “Assim é como eu fico sabendo de um lado de dentro e sou levado a supor que está na outra pessoa também.” «Além do mais, nós não estamos inclinados a dizer que somente até aqui não conhecemos a mente de outra pessoa, mas que a ideia desse conhecimento está vinculada com a ideia de mim mesmo.»

“Assim, se eu digo ‘ele está com dor de dente’, estou supondo que ele tem o que eu teria se tivesse dor de dente.” Suponha que eu diga: “Se eu digo que ‘eu suponho que ele está com dor de dente’, estou supondo o que ele teria se eu tivesse dor de dente”, — isto seria como dizer “se digo que ‘esta almofada é vermelha’ eu quero dizer que ela tem a mesma cor que o sofá tem se ele for vermelho”. Mas isto não era o que «foi significado» eu pretendia dizer com a primeira sentença. O que quis dizer era que falar sobre a sua dor de dente, na verdade, era baseado numa suposição, uma suposição que «↓pela sua própria natureza essência» não poderia ser verificada.

Mas se você olhar mais de perto verá que esta é uma falsa representação completa do uso da palavra “dor de dente” ( | )

(MS 148, p. 46v)

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Can two people have the same afterimage?

Language game ‘Description of imaginings’ «the picture before ones mind's eye».

Can two persons have the same picture before their mind's eye.

In which case would we say that they had two images exactly alike but not identical?

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Duas pessoas podem ter a mesma imagem residual?

Jogo de linguagem ‘Descrição de imaginações’ «a imagem diante do olho da mente».

Duas pessoas podem ter a mesma imagem diante do seu olho da mente?


Em que caso diríamos que eles tinham duas imagens exatamente iguais mas não idênticas?

The fact that two ideas seem here inseparably bound up suggests to us that we are dealing with one idea only & not with two & that by a queer trick our language suggests a totally different structure of grammar than the one actually used. For we have the sentence that only I can know directly my experience & only indirectly the experience of the other person. Thus «language» suggests 4 possible combinations but rules out 2. It is as though I had used the 4 letters

(MS 148, p. 47r)

a b c d to denote two objects only but by my notation somehow suggesting that I am talking of 4.

It seems as though I wished to say that I «↓to me» L.W. something applied which does not apply to other people. That is, there seems to be an asymmetry.



I express things asymmetrically & could express them symmetrically; only then one would see what facts prompt us to the asymmetrical expressions.

I do this by spreading the «↓use of the» word I over all human bodies as opposed to L.W. alone.


I want to describe a situation in which I should not be tempted to say that I assumed or believed that the other had what I have. Or, in other

O fato de que duas ideias pareçam inseparavelmente vinculadas nos sugere que estamos lidando com uma ideia somente e não com duas, e por um estranho truque nossa linguagem sugere uma estrutura de gramática totalmente diferente do que a realmente usada. Pois nós temos a sentença de que só eu posso conhecer diretamente minha experiência, e só indiretamente a experiência da outra pessoa. Assim a «linguagem» sugere quatro combinações possíveis, mas elimina duas. É como se eu tivesse usado quatro letras

(MS 148, p. 47r)

a, b, c, d, para denotar dois objetos somente, mas, pela minha notação, sugerindo de algum modo que estou falando de quatro.

Parece como se eu quisesse dizer que «↓para mim» eu L.W., algo se aplicasse que não se aplica a outras pessoas. Isto é, parece haver uma assimetria.



Eu expresso coisas assimetricamente, e poderia expressá-las simetricamente; só então se poderia ver que fatos nos incitam para as expressões assimétricas.

Eu faço isso alastrando «↓o uso da» a palavra eu para todos os corpos humanos, em oposição a L.W. apenas.

Quero descrever uma situação na qual não seja tentado a dizer que presumi ou acreditei que o outro tinha o que eu tenho. Ou, em outras

words, a situation in which we would not [speak] of my consciousness & his consciousness. And in which the idea would not

(MS 148, p. 47v)

occur to us that we could only be conscious of our own consciousness.

The idea of the ego inhabiting a body to be abolished.

If what[ever] consciousness spreads over all human bodies then there wont be any temptation to use the word ‘ego’.

Let’s assume that hearing was done by no organ of the body we know of.

Let us imagine the following arrangement:

If it is absurd to say that I only know that I see but not that the others do, — isn’t this at any rate less absurd than to say the opposite?

Ist eine Philosophie undenkbar die das diametrale Gegenteil des Solipsismus ist?



palavras, uma situação na qual não [falássemos] de minha consciência e sua consciência. E na qual não nos ocorresse a ideia

(MS 148, p. 47v)

de que só poderíamos ser conscientes da nossa consciência.

A ideia do ego habitando um corpo a ser abolido.

Se qual[quer] consciência se alastra para todos os corpos humanos, então não haverá qualquer tentação de usar a palavra ‘ego’.

Vamos supor que ouvir não seja feito por nenhum órgão do corpo que conheçamos.

Vamos imaginar o seguinte arranjo:

Se for absurdo dizer que eu só sei que vejo, mas não que os outros também, — não é isto, de qualquer modo, menos absurdo do que dizer o oposto?

É impensável uma filosofia que seja o oposto diametral do solipsismo?




(MS 148, p. 48r)

The idea of the constituent of a fact: “Is my person (or a person) a constituent of the fact that I see or not”. This expresses a question concerning the symbolism just as if it were a question about nature.

“Es denkt”. Ist dieser Satz wahr & “ich denke” falsch?

Language game: I paint, for myself, what I see. The picture doesn't contain me.



A board game ~~exactly like~~, in fact chess, but the board has a square which must never be used. This may be misleading.

A board game in which only one man ~~plays with~~ is said to play, the other to ‘answer’.

What if the other person always correctly described what I saw, & imagined, would I not say he knows what I see? — “But what if he describes


(MS 148, p. 48v)

(MS 148, p. 48r)

A ideia do constituinte de um fato: “A minha pessoa (ou uma pessoa) é um constituinte do fato de que vejo ou não?”. Isto expressa uma pergunta a respeito do simbolismo tal como se fosse uma pergunta sobre a natureza.

“Isso pensa”. Essa proposição é verdadeira e “eu penso” falsa?

Jogo de linguagem: eu pinto para mim mesmo o que vejo. A figura não me contém.



Um jogo de tabuleiro ~~exatamente como~~, de fato xadrez, mas o tabuleiro tem um quadrado que nunca deve ser usado. Isto pode ser enganoso.

Um jogo de tabuleiro no qual somente um homem ~~joga com~~ diz-se jogar, o outro ‘responder’.

O que aconteceria se a outra pessoa sempre descrevesse corretamente o que vi, e imaginei, não diria que ele sabe o que vi? — “Mas e se ele descrever

(MS 148, p. 48v)

MS 149

it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't I say he was mistaken?" Why should I say this & not, rather, he has forgotten the meanings of his words.

"But after all only I can lastly decide whether what he said is right. We can't assume that he knows what I see & I don't !" We can also do this!

Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green? [Elaborate this]

"Surely if he ~~sees~~ «knows» anything he must know that he sees!" — It is true that the game of "showing «↓or telling» what one sees" is one of the most fundamental language games, which means that what we in ordinary life call using language mostly presupposes this game.

I can for what I see use the impersonal form of description, & the fact that I say "for what I see" doesn't say at all that after all this is only a disguised personal description! For I just expressed myself in our «English» ordinary form of expression.

(MS 149, p. 1)

Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger symmetrischer Körper, oder das Unregelmäßige was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn vor einer ~~Kant~~ Ecke aus sehe? Was soll ich hervorheben? Soll ich sagen er sei primär unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert darstellen, oder er sei primär regelmäßig aber unregelmäßig projiziert gesehen?

errado em alguma ocasião? Não devo eu dizer que ele estava equivocado?" Por que diria isto e não, antes, que ele esqueceu os significados das suas palavras?

"Mas, afinal de contas, só eu posso finalmente decidir se o que ele disse é certo. Nós não podemos presumir que ele sabe o que vejo e eu não!" Nós podemos também fazer isto!

Um homem pode duvidar se o que vê é vermelho ou verde? [Elaborar isto]

"Seguramente se ele ~~vê~~ «sabe» alguma coisa, deve saber que vê!" — É verdade que o jogo de "mostrar «↓ou contar» o que se vê" é um dos jogos de linguagem mais fundamentais, o que significa que o que nós, na vida ordinária, chamamos de usar a linguagem, pressupõe sobretudo este jogo.

Eu posso usar, para o que vejo, a forma de descrição impessoal, e o fato de que digo "para o que vejo" nada diz, afinal de contas, acerca de ser isto somente uma descrição pessoal dissimulada! Pois eu apenas me expressei na nossa forma ordinária de expressão «inglesa».

(MS 149, p. 1)

O cubo é um corpo simétrico extramamente regular, ou uma irregularidade se o vejo a partir ~~da borda~~ de um canto? Que devo enfatizar? Devo dizer que ele seria primariamente irregular, mas pode-se apresentá-lo por uma projeção irregular como algo regular, ou ele seria primariamente regular porém visto como uma projeção irregular?



What's the difference between me being angry & he being angry?

If I wish to write down my experiences the two experiences that I am angry & that he is angry are absolutely entirely different (although the words used to describe them are very similar. I might therefore naturally object to this way of expression.

(MS 149, p. 2)



Qual é a diferença entre eu estar zangado e ele estar zangado?

Se desejo anotar minhas experiências, as duas experiências, a de que estou zangado e ele está zangado, são absolutamente totalmente diferentes (mesmo que as palavras usadas para descrevê-las sejam muito similares. Eu poderia, portanto, objetar naturalmente este modo de expressão.

(MS 149, p. 2)

“Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten & 3 imaginäre.”

If I write down my own experiences nothing is more natural than to refer by ‘I’ only to my body «or L.W.'s body» as opposed to other bodies, but not to distinguish my toothache from his by the words I & he.

The usual game «↓played» with the word ‘toothache’ involves the distinction of bodies which have the toothache.

Does the solipsist «↓also» say that only he can play chess?

But he will say that behind the sentence ‘I see ...’ when «↓he says it &» it's true there st&s something which does not st& behind “he sees” or ‘I see’ when the other man says it.



“Um cubo tem 9 bordas reais e 3 imaginárias.”

Se anoto minhas próprias experiências, nada é mais natural do que referir-me com ‘eu’ somente ao meu corpo «ou o corpo de L.W. », em oposição a outros corpos, mas não distinguir minha dor de dente da dele pelas palavras eu e ele.

O jogo habitual «↓praticado» com a palavra ‘dor de dente’ envolve a distinção dos corpos que têm a dor de dente.

O solipicista «↓também» diz que só ele pode jogar xadrez?

Mas ele dirá que por detrás da sentença ‘eu vejo...’, «↓quando ele a diz e» é verdadeira, existe algo que não existe por detrás de “ele vê” ou “eu vejo” quando outro homem a diz.

<p>I'll start with a description of what 'I see' but in impersonal form.</p> <p>'Ich spreche' &amp; 'der Andere spricht' sind zwei</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 3)</b></p>	<p>Começarei com uma descrição do que 'eu vejo', mas de forma impessoal.</p> <p>'Eu falo' e 'o outro fala' são duas</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 3)</b></p>
<p>total verschiedene Erfahrungen.</p> <p>Ich sage "Es ist schön", dann sage ich "das habe <u>ich</u> gesprochen". Damit habe ich weder mir noch dem Andern <u>gesagt</u> wer es gesprochen hat. Ich habe es ihn gesagt.</p> <p>"Aber woher weiß ich daß <u>ich</u> gesprochen habe wenn nicht aus der eigentümlichen «motorischen» Erfahrung des Sprechens".</p> <p>Das Wort 'Ich' bezeichnet keine Person.</p> <p>Remember that, whatever the word 'I' means to you, to the other man it <u>shows</u> «drives his attention to» a human body &amp; is of no value otherwise</p>  <p>Hat es einen Sinn zu sagen, der Stern bleibt beim gleichen Punkt?</p>	<p>experiências totalmente diferentes.</p> <p>Eu digo "isso é legal", e então digo "<u>eu</u> falei isto". Com isso eu <u>disse</u>, nem para mim nem para os outros, quem falou. Eu disse a ele.</p> <p>"Mas de onde sei que <u>eu</u> falei senão da peculiar experiência «motora» da fala?"</p> <p>A palavra 'eu' não designa nenhuma pessoa.</p> <p>Lembre-se de que, para qualquer coisa que a palavra 'eu' signifique para você, para outro homem ela <u>mostra</u> «conduz a sua atenção para» um corpo humano, e não tem nenhum valor de outra forma.</p>  <p>Há algum sentido em dizer que a estrela fica no mesmo ponto?</p>

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 4)</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 4)</b></p>
<p>I could write, say, a book on physics in which every sentence starts with “I remember”.</p> <p>Could one say: Here the sentences are all directly backed by «↓real» experiences or by primary reality.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">We must be misled in a queer way!</p> <p>“Surely”, I want to say, “if I’m «↓to be really quite» frank I must say that I have something which nobody has”. — But who’s I? — Hell! I don’t express myself properly but there’s <u>something</u> you can’t deny that there is my personal experience &amp; that this in a most important sense <u>has no neighbour</u>. — But you don’t mean by that that it <u>happens</u> to be alone but that its grammatical position is that of having no neighbour.</p> <p>“But somehow our language doesn’t bring it out, that there is something unique namely real present experience, &amp; do you just wish to advise me to resign myself to that?”</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">[A philosophical book might be entitled</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 5)</b></p>	<p>Eu poderia escrever, digamos, um livro de física no qual toda sentença começasse com “eu me lembro”?</p> <p>Alguém poderia dizer: aqui as sentenças estão todas apoiadas diretamente por experiências «↓reais» ou pela realidade primária.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Nós devemos estar sendo enganados de uma maneira estranha!</p> <p>“Seguramente”, eu quero dizer, “se eu for «↓para ser realmente completamente» franco, devo dizer que tenho algo que ninguém tem”. — Mas quem é ‘eu’? — Droga! Eu não me expressei propriamente, mas há <u>algo</u>, que você não pode negar, que é a minha experiência pessoal, e que isto, no sentido mais importante, <u>não tem vizinhança</u>. — Mas você não quer dizer com isso que <u>ocorre</u> de ser sozinha, porém que a sua posição gramatical é a de não ter vizinhança.</p> <p>“Mas de algum modo a nossa linguagem não a apresenta, de que existe algo único, a saber, uma experiência presente real, e você agora deseja me aconselhar a renunciar a isso?”</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">[ Um livro filosófico deveria ser intitulado</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 5)</b></p>
<p>“the wonders of the jungle”.]</p> <p>(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel that we have to resign ourselves to something by using ordinary language!)</p> <p>How is it that the Ausprechung I might propose for those sentences which describe my personal experience does not really quite satisfy me?</p> <p>Partly because of what we call “imagining that the other person sees</p>	<p>“as maravilhas da selva”.]</p> <p>(É curioso que na vida ordinária nunca sentimos que temos que renunciar a alguma coisa por causa da linguagem ordinária!)</p> <p>Por que a expressão que proponho para as sentenças que descrevem minha experiência pessoal realmente não me satisfaz?</p> <p>Em parte por causa do que chamamos “imaginar o que a outra pessoa</p>

<p>(feels pain etc.)” D.h. wir sind geneigt dasselbe Bild für beide Vorgänge zu verwenden.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Now imagine this: as soon as ever he has learnt enough language to express it, he tells us that he saw blue when he said red in No. 1.</p> <p>This sounds as if then we really ought to be convinced that he saw blue etc.</p> <p>The person who paints his memories</p> <p>It reminds «↓one misleadingly» of : “as soon as ever</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 6)</b></p>	<p>vê (sente dor etc.)”.</p> <p>Isto é, nos sentimos inclinados a aplicar a mesma imagem a ambos os processos.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Agora, imagine isto: tão logo ele aprende bastante linguagem para poder expressar-se, ele nos diz que viu azul quando disse vermelho no No. 1</p> <p>Isto soa como se devêssemos ficar realmente convencidos de que ele viu azul etc.</p> <p>A pessoa que pinta suas memórias.</p> <p>Isso faz lembrar «↓lembrar-se equivocadamente» de: “tão logo</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 6)</b></p>
<p>he had learnt enough of their language the stranger informed his hosts of...”</p> <p>This hangs together with the idea that the child remembers before it says it does.</p> <p>Consider the case of the child drawing «painting» its memories. It has painted a blue light instead of a red one.</p> <p>Augustin, about expressing the wishes inside him.</p> <p>Why shouldn't we consider «↓the case» that the child learns to think &amp; always assume that it had a private language before it learnt ours.</p> <p>Only: What do we mean by <u>learning</u> the language? In what sense can we be said to teach the child the natural gesture-language? Or <u>can't</u> we teach him that?</p>	<p>ele aprendeu bastante a linguagem deles, o estrangeiro informou aos seus hospedeiros que...”</p> <p>Isto se vincula à ideia de que a criança se lembra de algo anterior a que ela possa dizê-lo.</p> <p>Considere o caso da criança desenhando «pintando» as suas memórias. Ela pintou em azul claro em vez de vermelho.</p> <p>Agostinho, sobre expressar os desejos dentro dele.</p> <p>Por que não consideramos «↓o caso de» que a criança aprende a pensar e sempre presume que ela tinha uma linguagem privada antes de aprender a nossa?</p> <p>Só uma coisa: o que queremos dizer com <u>aprender</u> a linguagem? Em que sentido podemos dizer que ensinamos à criança a linguagem de</p>

Can't the child learn to wish for an apple by learning to draw an apple?

(MS 149, p. 7)

gestos natural? Ou não podemos ensiná-la isso?

Não poderia a criança aprender a desejar uma maçã pelo aprendizado de como desenhar uma maçã?

(MS 149, p. 7)

Kreis & Elipse. Soll ich sagen: “er hat der Kreis gestern als Elipse gesehen, oder so stellt er den folgende Tag einen Kreis dar”.

[Sich daran erinnern das & das gedacht zu haben. “Ich erinnere mich nicht an ihn aber ich weiß «erinnere mich» dass er mir einer dümmlich Eindruck gemacht hat”]

“He mostly sees red where we see red”.

The normal use of the expression “he sees green where...” is this: We take it as the criterium for meaning the same by ‘red’ as ~~the other people~~ «we do», that «↓as a rule» he agrees with ~~them~~ «us» in giving the same names to the colours of objects as ~~they~~ «we» do. If then in a particular instant he says something is red when we should say that it's green we say that he sees it different from us.

Notice how in such a case we would behave. We should look for a cause of his differing judgement & if we had found one we should certainly be inclined to say he saw red when we saw green.

(MS 149, p. 8)

Círculo e elipse. Devo dizer: ele viu o círculo ontem como elipse, ou representou-o no dia seguinte como um círculo”.

[Lembrar-se de ter pensado isso e aquilo. “Não me lembro dele, mas sei «lembro-me» que ele me causou uma impressão estúpida”.]

“Ele vê vermelho na maior parte onde vemos vermelho”.

O uso normal da expressão “ele vê verde {vermelho} onde...” é este: nós o tomamos como critério para significar o mesmo com ‘vermelho’ o que ~~as outras pessoas~~ «nós significamos», que «↓via de regra» ele concorda ~~com eles~~ «conosco» ao dar os mesmos nomes às cores dos objetos que ~~eles~~ «nós». Se então, num instante particular, ele diz que é vermelho alguma coisa que nós diríamos que é verde, nós diremos que ele está vendo diferente de nós.

Veja como nos comportaríamos neste caso. Nós procuraríamos uma causa para a sua diferença de julgamento, e se tivémos encontrado uma estaríamos certamente inclinados a dizer que ele viu vermelho o que vemos como verde.

(MS 149, p. 8)

It is further clear that even before ever finding such a cause we might under circumstances be inclined to say this. But also that we can't give a strict rule for ....

~~Consider now this case: Someone says I remember «↓yesterday» having seen everything red green & vice versa.~~

Além do mais é claro que mesmo antes até de encontrar esta causa, poderíamos estar inclinados, sob certas circunstâncias, a dizer isto. Mas também que não podemos dar uma regra estrita para ....

~~Considere agora este caso: Alguém diz: eu me lembro «↓que ontem» de haver visto tudo o que é vermelho, verde, e vice versa.~~

Consider this case: someone says it's green «I can't understand» I see everything red ~~green~~ «blue» today & vice versa. We answer: it must look queer! He says it does & e.g. goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks & how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that he saw red what we saw green. And again we should say that we know that he means by the words blue & red what we do as he has always used them as we do.

On the other hand: Someone tells us today that yesterday he always saw everything red, blue & s.o... We say: But you called the glowing coal red you know & the sky blue. He answers: That was because I had also

**(MS 149, p. 9)**

changed the names. We say: But didn't it feel very queer & he says: No it seemed all perfectly ordinary «natural». Would we in this case too say: .....

Case of contradictory memory images. Tomorrow he remembers this, the day after tomorrow something else.

The whole trend, to show the expression “letting one look through his soul”, is «↓often» misleading.

Back to the example of the «or No 1» afterimages. We can say that these cases are not cases of «↓communication of» personal experience if there were no personal experience but only the ‘outward signs’.

Now I ask what are our criteria for there being or there having been a personal experience beside the expression? And here the answer seems to be that for the outsider //the other man// the criteria are indeed more outside expressions but that I myself know whether I have an experience

Considere este caso: alguém diz isto é verde. «Eu não consigo entender», estou vendo tudo o que é vermelho, ~~verde~~ «azul» hoje, e vice versa. Nós respondemos: deve ter uma aparência estranha! Ele diz que sim, e prossegue, por exemplo, dizendo como parece frio o carvão em brasa e como parece quente o céu (azul) claro. Penso que nós, sob esta ou similares circunstâncias, estaríamos inclinados a dizer que ele viu vermelho o que vemos verde. E, de novo, diríamos que sabemos que ele quer dizer, com as palavras azul e vermelho, o mesmo que nós, porque ele sempre as utiliza como nós o fazemos.

Por outro lado: Alguém nos diz hoje que ontem sempre viu tudo o que é vermelho, azul e assim por diante... Nós dizemos: Mas você chamava o carvão em brasa de vermelho, sabe, e o céu de azul. Ele responde: Isso foi porque eu havia também

**(MS 149, p. 9)**

trocado os nomes. Nós dizemos: Mas você não se sentiu estranho?, e ele diz: Não, me pareceu tudo perfeitamente comum «natural». Neste caso nós também dizemos: .....

Caso de imagens de memória contraditória: Amanhã ele se lembra disto, depois de amanhã, de outra coisa.

A tendência, como um todo, de mostrar a expressão “deixar ver a sua alma”, é «↓frequentemente» equivocada.

De volta ao exemplo das «ou No. 1» imagens residuais. Podemos dizer que esses casos não são de «↓comunicação de» experiência pessoal, se não houve a experiência pessoal mas só os ‘sinais externos’.

E agora eu pergunto quais são nossos critérios para haver ou ter havido uma experiência pessoal além da expressão? E aqui a resposta parece ser a de que, para quem está de fora //o outro homem//, os critérios são, na realidade, mais expressões externas, mas que eu mesmo

or not. In par-

(MS 149, p. 10)

ticular whether I see red or not.

But let me ask what is knowing that I see red like: I mean: look at something red 'know that it is red' & ask «observe //mark//» yourself what you're doing. Don't you mean seeing red & impressing it on your mind that you are doing so? But there are, I suppose, several things that you are doing: You probably say to yourself the word 'red' or 'this is red' or something of the sort, or perhaps glance from the red object to another red one which you're taking to be the paradigm of red & such like. On the other hand you just intently stare at the red thing.

In many «part» of their uses the words «expressions» 'visual image' & 'picture' run parallel but where they don't the analogy which does exists tends to delude us.

Taut.

The grammar of 'seeing red' connected to the expression of seeing red closer than one thinks.

“You talk as though one couldn't «can't» see a red patch ~~without~~ if one ~~doesn't~~ «can't» say

(MS 149, p. 11)

that one does; as if seeing something was saying that one sees it”. “Seeing something” of course doesn't mean the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of these expressions are closer related than it might appear to you.

We say a blind man doesn't see anything. But not only do we say so but he too says that he does not see. I don't mean “he agrees with us that

sei se tenho uma experiência ou não. Em par-

(MS 149, p. 10)

ticular, se estou vendo o vermelho ou não.

Mas deixe-me perguntar como é saber que estou vendo o vermelho: olhar para algo vermelho, 'sei que isto é vermelho', e perguntar «observar //marcar//» para si mesmo o que está fazendo. Você não quer dizer que ver o vermelho e imprimi-lo na sua mente é o que você está fazendo? Mas existem, eu suponho, muitas coisas que você pode estar fazendo: Você provavelmente diz para si mesmo a palavra 'vermelho' ou 'isto é vermelho', ou algo do tipo, ou talvez lança um olhar do objeto vermelho para outro vermelho, aquele que você toma como paradigma de vermelho e coisas semelhantes. Por outro lado, você só fixa o olhar atentamente para a coisa vermelha.

Em muitos «parte» dos seus usos, as palavras «expressões» 'imagem visual' e 'imagem' correm paralelas, mas onde não, a analogia que existe ali tende a nos iludir.

Taut{ologia}

A gramática de 'ver o vermelho' conectada com a expressão ver o vermelho é mais próxima do que se imagina.

“Você fala que uma pessoa não poderia «não pode» ver uma mancha vermelha ~~sem se não disser~~ «não pode» dizer

(MS 149, p. 11)

que o está fazendo; como se ver algo fosse dizer que se está vendo isso”. “Ver alguma coisa”, naturalmente não significa o mesmo que dizer que se está vendo algo, mas os sentidos dessas expressões estão mais proximamente relacionados do que pode parecer.

Nós dizemos que um cego não vê nada. Mas não somente dizemos isso, mas ele também diz que não vê. Eu não quero dizer “ele concorda

he does not see”, “he does not dispute it”, but rather, he too describes the facts in this way having learnt the same language as we have. Now whom do we call blind, what is our criterium for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if a «the» person behaves in that particular way we not only call him blind but teach him to call himself blind. And in this sense his behaviour also determines the meaning of blindness for him. But now you will say: “Surely blindness isn't ~~just~~ a behaviour; it's clear that a man can behave like a blind man & not be blind. Therefore ‘blindness’ means something different: this behaviour only helps him

(MS 149, p. 12)

to underst& what we mean by ‘blindness’. The outward circumstances are what both we & he know. Whenever he behaves in a certain way we say «↓that» he sees nothing & he notices that a certain private experience of his coincides with all these cases & thereby knows «so concludes» that we mean this experiences of his by saying that he sees nothing”.

The idea is that we teach a ~~man~~ «person» the meaning of expressions relating to personal experiences indirectly. — Such an indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. No) I ~~We~~ teach a child the names of colours & a game, say, of bringing objects of a certain colour ~~if~~ when the ‘name of the colour’ is called out. I ~~We~~ don't however teach him the colour names by pointing to a sample «↓which we both see //which both of us see// which I & he see» saying «↓e.g.» the word ‘red’. ~~but~~ Instead «we» let him look at a white wall sheet of paper through various «a pair of» spectacles which if we look through them make us see the paper red & we say the word ‘red’ whenever we put these spectacles on his nose. I have various spectacles each of which when we «I» look through it makes us «me» see the «↓white» paper in a different colour. These spectacles are also distinguished by their

(MS 149, p. 13)

conosco em que não vê”, “ele não discute isso”, mas, antes, ele também descreve os fatos desta maneira, porque aprendeu a mesma linguagem que nós. Agora, a quem chamamos cego, qual é o nosso critério para a cegueira? Um certo tipo de comportamento. E se uma «a» pessoa se comporta desse jeito, nós não somente a chamamos de cega, mas a ensinamos a chamar-se assim. E neste sentido o seu comportamento também determina o significado de cegueira para ela. Mas agora você dirá: “Seguramente a cegueira não é ~~apenas~~ um comportamento; é claro que um homem pode se comportar como um cego e não ser cego. Portanto ‘cegueira’ significa algo diferente: este comportamento somente o ajuda

(MS 149, p. 12)

a compreender o que queremos dizer com ‘cegueira’. As circunstâncias externas são o que nós e ele sabemos. Quando ele se comporta de uma certa maneira, nós dizemos «↓que» ele não está vendo nada, e ele nota que uma certa experiência privada dele coincide com todos esses casos, e, por meio disto, sabe «assim conclui» que nós damos significado a estas suas experiências dizendo que ele não está vendo nada”.

A ideia é que nós ensinamos a um{a} ~~homem~~ «pessoa» o significado de expressões que se relacionam indiretamente com experiências pessoais. — Este modo indireto de ensino, nós o podemos imaginar assim. No.) ~~Nós~~ ensino a uma criança os nomes das cores e um jogo, digamos, de trazer objetos de uma certa cor ~~se~~ quando o ‘nome da cor’ é chamado. ~~Nós~~ não o ensino, entretanto, os nomes das cores apontando para uma amostra «↓que ambos vemos //que os dois vemos// que eu e ele vemos », dizendo «↓por exemplo» a palavra ‘vermelho’. ~~mas~~ Em vez disso, «nós» o deixamos olhar para uma parede folha de papel branca através de vários «um par de» óculos que, se olhamos através deles, nos fazem ver o papel vermelho, e dizemos a palavra ‘vermelho’ sempre que colocamos esses óculos sobre o seu nariz. eu tenho vários óculos, cada um dos quais, quando ~~nós~~ «eu» olhamos {olho} através dele, ~~nos~~ «me» faz ver o papel «↓branco» de uma cor diferente. Estes óculos são também distinguidos pela sua

(MS 149, p. 13)

outside appearance the ~~red~~ one «↓that makes me see red» has ~~round~~ «circular» glasses ~~the green~~ «another» one elliptical ones etc. I now teach the child in this way that when I see it ~~looking through the~~ putting the ~~round~~ «circular» ones on his nose I say the word ‘red’, when the elliptical ones ‘green’ & so forth. This one might call teaching the child the «↓meanings of the» colour names in an indirect way because ~~†~~ one could here «in this case» say that I led the child to correlate the word red with something that I didn't see but hoped the child would see if it looked through the circular glasses. And this way is indirect as opposed to the direct way of pointing to a red object etc..

[Mindreading]

From this it should follow that we sometimes rightly sometimes wrongly teach a man to say that he is blind: For what if he saw all the time but nevertheless behaved «↓exactly» like a blind man? — Or should we say: “Nature wouldn't play such a trick on us!”.

We can see here that we don't quite

(MS 149, p. 14)

aparência externa. O ~~vermelho~~ «↓que me faz ver vermelho» tem lentes ~~redondas~~ «circulares», o «outro» tem elípticas etc. Eu agora ensino a criança deste modo: quando a vejo ~~olhando pelo~~ colocando o ~~redondo~~ «circular» no seu nariz, digo a palavra ‘vermelho’, quando for o elíptico, ‘verde’, e assim por diante. Isto poderia se chamar de ensinar à criança os «↓significados» dos nomes das cores de uma maneira indireta, porque ~~eu~~ se poderia aqui «neste caso» dizer que levei a criança a correlacionar a palavra vermelho com algo que não vejo, mas que espero que a criança veja se ela olhar através das lentes circulares. E este modo é indireto em oposição ao modo direto de apontar para um objeto vermelho etc..

[Leitura da mente]

Disso se seguiria que nós, às vezes corretamente, às vezes equivocadamente, ensinamos um homem a dizer que é cego: Pois o que aconteceria se ele estivesse vendo todo o tempo e, no entanto, se comportasse «↓exatamente» como um cego? — Ou teríamos que dizer: “A natureza não nos prega essas peças!”.

Podemos ver aqui que não

(MS 149, p. 14)

underste the real use of the word«expression» ”to see something” or ”to see nothing”.

And what is so misleading to us when we consider this use is the following: We say “Surely we can see something without ever saying or showing that we do & on the other hand we can say that we see so & so without seeing it, therefore seeing is one process & expressing that we see an other, & all they have to do with each other is that they sometimes coincide; they have the same connection as being red & being sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet, etc.”. Now this is obviously not quite true & not quite false. It seems we somehow that we look at the use of these words with some prejudice. It is clear that we «in our language» use the ~~expressions~~ «words» ‘seeing red’ in such a way that we can say “he «A» sees ... «red», but doesn't show it” on the other hand it is easy

compreendemos completamente o real uso da ~~palavra~~ expressão “ver alguma coisa” ou “não ver nada”.

E o que é tão enganoso para nós quando consideramos este uso é o seguinte: Nós dizemos “Seguramente podemos ver algo sem nunca dizer ou mostrar o que fazemos, e, por outro lado, podemos dizer que estamos vendo algo assim e assim, sem ver. Portanto, ver é um processo, e expressar o que vemos, outro, e tudo o que eles têm a ver um com o outro é que às vezes eles coincidem; eles têm a mesma conexão de ser vermelho e ser doce. Algumas vezes o que é vermelho, é doce etc.” Agora, obviamente isto não é completamente verdadeiro, nem completamente falso. Parece que, de algum modo, olhamos para o uso dessas palavras com algum preconceito. É claro que nós «na nossa linguagem» usamos as ~~expressões~~ «palavras» ‘vendo o vermelho’ de tal

<p>to see that we would have no use for these words if their application was severed from the criteria <del>which in</del> of behaviour, that is to say, to the language game which we play with these words it is, both, essential that the people who play it (<u>should</u>) behave in the particular way we call expressing «saying, showing» what</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 15)*</b></p>	<p>modo que podemos dizer “Ele «A» está vendo o ..... «vermelho», mas não o mostra”. Por outro lado, é fácil ver que não teríamos nenhum uso para estas palavras se a sua aplicação fosse separada dos critérios de comportamento. Ou seja, para o jogo de linguagem que praticamos com essas palavras, é tanto essencial que as pessoas que o praticam (<u>deveriam</u>) se comportar do modo particular que nós chamamos expressar «dizer, mostrar» o que</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 15)*</b></p>
<p>they see, &amp; also that they sometimes «under certain circumstances» they should «↓more or less or entirely» conceal what they see.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">Balance. The point of the game depends upon what <u>usually</u> happens.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">Point of a game</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">But doesn't then the word “seeing red” mean to me a particular process «certain (<u>private</u>) experience» or (mental) event «<u>fact</u> in the realm of primary experience» — which surely is utterly different from saying certain words?</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">How does he know that he sees «has the visual image» red i.e. how does he connect «↓the word» ‘red’ with ‘a particular colour’? In fact what does the expression ‘a particular colour’ here mean. What is the criterium for his connecting it «the word» always to the same colour «experience»? Is it not often just that he calls it red? *</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">In fact if he is to play a lang. game the possibility of this will depend upon his own &amp; the other people's reactions. <del>For</del> The game depends upon the agreement of these reactions i.e. they must <u>call</u> «describe» the same things ‘red’. *</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">“But if he speaks to himself surely this is different. For then he needn't consult other people's <u>reactions</u> &amp; <del>what he calls is just what</del> «he just gives the name» ‘red’ now «to» <u>the same colour as that</u> «to» which he <del>called</del> *</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 16)</b></p>	<p>eles estão vendo, quanto também que algumas vezes «sob certas circunstâncias» eles deveriam esconder «↓mais ou menos ou completamente» o que estão vendo.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">Estimativa. O ponto do jogo depende do que <u>geralmente</u> acontece.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">Ponto de um jogo.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">Mas então a frase “está vendo o vermelho” não significa para mim um processo particular «certa experiência (<u>privada</u>)» ou evento (mental) «<u>fato</u> no reino da experiência primária» — que com certeza é totalmente diferente de dizer certas palavras?</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">Como ele sabe que está vendo «tendo a imagem visual» o vermelho? Isto é, como ele conecta «↓a palavra» ‘vermelho’ com ‘uma cor particular’? De fato, o que a expressão ‘uma cor particular’ significa aqui? Qual é o critério para ele a conectar «a palavra» sempre com a mesma cor «experiência de»? Não é apenas por que ele sempre a chama de vermelho? *</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">De fato, se ele tem que praticar um jogo de ling{uagem}, a possibilidade disso irá depender da sua reação e a das outras pessoas. <del>Pois</del> O jogo depende do acordo entre essas reações, isto é, elas devem <u>chamar</u> «descrever» as mesmas coisas de ‘vermelho’. *</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">“Mas se ele fala consigo mesmo, certamente isto é diferente. Porque então ele não precisa consultar as reações das outras pessoas, e <del>o que ele chama é apenas o que</del> «ele apenas dá o nome de» ‘vermelho’ agora «para» <u>a mesma cor de que</u> «à» qual ele <del>chamava</del> *</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 16)</b></p>
<p>gave it on a previous occasion. «on previous occasions. «in previous</p>	<p>dava numa ocasião anterior «em ocasiões anteriores. «em casos</p>

cases.»» But how does he know that it is the same colour. Does he also recognize the sameness «↓of colour» as what he used to call sameness of colour & so on ad inf.? It is quite true he uses «connects», in agreement with ordinary use, the word 'red' & «↓the same colour» such that he would not say that he saw now the colour he had seen before that that colour is red but that what he sees now is not red etc. \*

It is quite true, he connects the word & the exp.. \*

But I could use language just for making entries in my diary & without even having learnt it I could have invented a name for the particular colour sensation say the name 'red' & then used this name to write down whenever I had that colour sensation. That means, you (would) play a private language game with yourself. But let's see, how are we to describe this game? Christening. (~~Still contradicting~~ «objecting») The words “‘seeing red’ means a part experience” are useless unless we can follow them up by: ‘namely this → (pointing)’. Or else they may say experience as opposed to phys. obj., but then this is grammar.

(MS 149, p. 17)

When you say “the expression ‘---’ means to you a certain private exp.” you are (indeed) supplementing this «↓statement» by imagining a «red» colour, «↓or» looking at a red object, ~~or such like~~ (which supply the ‘namely this’) but how do you ~~make~~ use «make use of» the expression & the experience you «↓thus» connect with it? For ~~how you say~~ what we call the meaning of the word lies in the game we play with it.

But it seems to me that I either see red or don't see red. Whether I say «express» it or not.

Picture we use here

anteriores.»» Mas como ele sabe que é a mesma cor?<sup>1</sup> Ele também reconhece a mesmidade «↓da cor» como o que ele costumava chamar de mesmidade da cor, e assim por diante ad inf{initum}? É bem verdade que ele usa «conecta», em concordância com o uso ordinário, a palavra ‘vermelho’ e «↓a mesma cor», de tal modo que ele não diria que viu agora a mesma cor que tinha visto antes, que essa cor é vermelho, mas que o que ele vê agora não é etc. \*

É bem verdade que ele conecta a palavra e a exp{eriência}.. \*

Mas eu poderia usar a linguagem apenas para fazer registros no meu diário, e, sem ter aprendido, poderia ter inventado um nome para a sensação de cor particular, digamos, o nome ‘vermelho’, e ter então usado este nome para anotar quando tivesse aquela sensação da cor. Quer dizer, você pratica(ria) um jogo de linguagem privado consigo mesmo. Mas vejamos como temos que descrever este jogo? Batismo. (~~Ainda contradizendo~~ «objetando») As palavras “‘vendo o vermelho’ significam uma experiência particular” são inúteis, a menos que possamos dar-lhes prosseguimento com: ‘a saber, isto → (apontando)’. Ou então elas podem querer dizer experiência em oposição a obj{eto} fís{ico}, mas então isto é gramatical.

(MS 149, p. 17)

Quando você diz “a expressão ‘---’ significa para você uma certa exp{eriência} privada.”, está (realmente) suplementando este «↓enunciado» pela imaginação de uma cor «vermelha», «↓ou» olhando para um objeto vermelho, ~~ou algo como~~ (que proporciona o ‘a saber: isto’), mas como você ~~faz~~ usa «faz uso da» expressão e da experiência que «↓assim» conecta com ela? Pois ~~como você diz~~ o que chamamos significado de uma palavra está no jogo que praticamos com ela.

Mas me parece que ou eu vejo o vermelho ou não o vejo. Mesmo que eu o diga «expresse» ou não.

Imagem que usamos aqui.

<sup>1</sup> Introduzir opacidade da referência, Frege etc.

<p>This picture not questioned but its application. Both cases of tautologies.</p> <p>“Surely seeing is one thing, &amp; showing that I see is another thing”. — This certainly is like saying “skipping is one thing &amp;</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 18)</b></p>	<p>Esta imagem não é questionada, mas a sua aplicação. Outros casos de tautologia.</p> <p>“Seguramente, ver é uma coisa, e mostrar que vejo é outra”. — Isto certamente é como dizer “pular é uma coisa e</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 18)</b></p>
<p>jumping another”. But <del>here</del> there is a suplement to this statement <del>&amp; we can say</del> “skipping is this (showing it) &amp; jumping this (showing it)”. Now how about this suplement in the first case? “Seeing «↓red» is this (showing it) &amp; showing that we see «↓red», this (showing it)” The point is just that there isn't a ‘showing that I see’ except showing that I see. “But can't I say: ‘seeing red is what I'm doing now’ (looking at something red)? And although in a sense the other man can't directly see «be aware of the activity» what I'm talking about, I certainly know what «↓<del>it is</del> it is that» I'm talking about. That is although for him I can't point directly to the my seeing red, for myself I can point to it, &amp; in this sense I can give an ostensive definition of the expression to myself.”</p> <p>← But an ostensive def. is not a «↓magic act of» <del>enjury</del>. If I explain to someone to use of ..... by..... Giving the o. d. simply consists in .....</p> <p>One might be inclined to say that castling was not just the act of .... But it is the game «↓of» which it is part....</p> <p><del>Then</del> «↓So what does» giving to myself the ostensive def. of red consist in? <del>I suppose we should say I suppose looking</del> «—Now how am I to describe it shall I say seeing red» &amp;</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 19)</b></p>	<p>saltar é outra”. Mas <del>aqui</del> há um suplemento para este enunciado e <del>nós podemos dizer</del> “pular é isto (mostrando) e saltar é isto (mostrando)”. Agora, e quanto a este suplemento no primeiro caso? “Ver «↓o vermelho» é isto (mostrando), e mostrar que nós vemos «↓o vermelho», isto (mostrando)”. O ponto é que justamente não há um ‘mostrar que estou vendo’, exceto mostrar que estou vendo. “Mas não posso dizer: ‘estar vendo o vermelho é o que estou fazendo agora’ (olhando para algo vermelho)? E mesmo que, num certo sentido, o outro homem não possa <u>ver</u> «estar ciente da atividade» diretamente aquilo sobre que falo, eu certamente sei sobre «↓<del>que é</del> o que» estou falando. Isto é, mesmo que eu não possa apontar para ele o meu estar vendo o vermelho, eu posso apontá-lo para mim mesmo, e, neste sentido, posso dar uma definição ostensiva da expressão para mim mesmo.”</p> <p>← Mas uma def{inição} ostensiva não é um «↓ato mágico <del>de</del> <del>enjuarção</del>. Se eu explico para alguém o uso de ..... como..... Dar uma d{efinição} o{stensiva} consiste em .....</p> <p>Alguém poderia estar inclinado a dizer que o roque não seria apenas o ato de ..... Mas é o jogo «↓do» qual é parte.....</p> <p><del>Mas</del> «↓Então, em que» consiste dar para mim mesmo a def{inição} ostensiva de vermelho? <del>Suponho que deveríamos dizer</del> <del>Suponho que olhar</del> « — Agora, como devo descrevê-lo? Direi: vendo o vermelho» e</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 19)</b></p>
<p>saying to myself that I do. «<del>this is red.</del>» «or ‘I see red.’» «The first</p>	<p>dizendo para mim mesmo o que faço? «<del>isto é vermelho.</del>» «ou ‘Estou</p>

vers. I don't like I assume that the others knows «have» the «very same private» impression which I am having» — Or is it “seeing a certain colour «↓sensation» & saying ‘I see red’”? The first (version) it seems «doesn't account for that fact» won't do as it isn't essential to us that when I «↓do for myself what call» ‘seeing red’ that should «↓necessarily» be what the others ~~understand~~ «mean» by seeing red. So I would rather leave it open what colour I am concentrating «↓my attention» on. But then how can I call it a colour? Isn't it just as uncertain that I mean by colour «↓what they mean» as that I mean by red what they mean & the same of course ~~holds for~~ «applies to» ‘seeing’ (for what «↓here» I mean by the word is not an activity of the human eye). (The second version is justified only if I wish to say that it does not matter here to which of the colours (say, red, green, blue, yellow) ~~he gives~~ «he assigns» the name ‘red’ & «so» ~~this means~~ we might have ~~describ~~ said “he sees a «↓some» colour, say, blue & says ‘I see red.’”.) \*

“But it's a blatant error to mix up ‘seeing red’ with showing that you see red! I know what seeing red is & I know what showing ... is.” Couldn't we say that knowing what showing ... is, is seeing

(MS 149, p. 20)

« Consider the prop.: He makes sure what it means to him by .... Would you say the word had meaning to him if it ‘meant something else’ every time? And what is the criterion of the same colour coming twice.» \*

showing now what is knowing what seeing is . \*

|| In knowing what seeing «↓red» is you seem to give yourself a

vendo o vermelho.’» «A primeira vers{ão}. Não gosto de: Suponho que os outros sabem «têm» «exatamente a mesma» impressão privada que eu tenho» — Ou seria “ver uma certa cor «↓sensação», e dizer ‘estou vendo o vermelho’”? Aparentemente a primeira (versão) «não dá conta do fato» não funcionará, na medida em que não é essencial para nós que, quando «↓faço para mim o que chamo de» ‘estar vendo o vermelho’, isso seja «↓necessariamente» o que outros ~~compreendem~~ «significam» com estar vendo o vermelho. Por isso o melhor seria deixar em aberto a cor na qual estou concentrando «↓minha atenção». Mas então como posso chamá-la como uma cor? Não seria exatamente tão incerto o que quero dizer com cor «↓o que eles querem dizer» quanto o que quero dizer com vermelho o que eles querem dizer? E o mesmo, naturalmente, ~~se mantém~~ «se aplica a» ‘estar vendo’ (pois o que eu quero dizer «↓aqui» com a palavra não é uma atividade do olho humano). (A segunda versão se justifica somente se desejo dizer que não importa aqui para qual das cores (digamos, vermelho, verde, azul, amarelo) ~~ele dá~~ «ele atribui» o nome ‘vermelho’, e «assim» ~~isto significa~~ nós poderíamos ter dito ~~descri-to~~ “ele está vendo uma «↓alguma» cor, digamos, azul, e diz ‘estou vendo o vermelho’”.) \*

“Mas é um erro flagrante misturar ‘vendo o vermelho’ com mostrar que você vê o vermelho! Eu sei o que é o estar vendo o vermelho, e eu sei o que o mostrar....é.” Não poderíamos dizer que saber o que mostrar .... é, é ver

(MS 149, p. 20)

« Considere a prop{osição}: ele assegurou o que isso significa para ele mediante.... Você diria que a palavra teria significado para ele se ela ‘significasse outra coisa’ toda vez? E qual é o critério para a mesma cor vir duas vezes?» \*

o mostrar? Agora, o que é saber o que se está vendo? \*

|| Em saber o que é ver «↓o vermelho», você parece dar a si mesmo

<p>   sample «you say to yourself ‘seeing red is this’» but you don't because     the usual criteria for the <u>sameness</u> of the sample don't apply. I can say I     call ‘red’ always the same colour or I whenever I explain red I point to     a sample of the same colour. *</p> <p>If we describe a game which he plays with himself is it relevant that  he should use the word red to the same colour in our sense or would we  also call it a lang. game if he used it anyhow. Then what is the criterium  for using it in the same way? Not «↓merely» the connection between  ‘same’, ‘colour’ &amp; ‘red’? *</p> <p>Which is the same colour as that I saw? Not the one to which I apply  the words ‘«↓this is» the same colour ’? *</p> <p>   “Let me see if I still know which of these colours is red? — «looking     about» Yes I know.” (Here I could have said “is called red”)*</p> <p>Making sure that you know what ‘seeing’ *</p> <p>&lt;&lt;So he can make sure in this private way «he did» of what it means  «by having a priv. sens.»!&gt;&gt; *</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 21)</b></p>	<p>   uma amostra «você diz para si mesmo ‘ver o vermelho é isto’», mas     não, porque o critério usual para a <u>mesmidade</u> da amostra não se     aplica. Eu posso dizer que chamo de ‘vermelho’ sempre a mesma cor,     ou eu, sempre que explico o vermelho, aponto para uma amostra da     mesma cor. *</p> <p>Se descrevemos um jogo que ele pratica consigo mesmo, é relevante  que ele deveria usar a palavra vermelho para a mesma cor no nosso  sentido, ou ainda chamaríamos de jogo de ling{uagem} se ele a usasse de  qualquer maneira? Então qual é o critério para usá-la da mesma maneira?  Não «↓meramente» a conexão entre ‘mesmo’, ‘cor’ e ‘vermelho’? *</p> <p>Qual é a mesma cor que eu vi? Não é aquela à qual aplico as  palavras ‘«↓esta é» a mesma cor’? *</p> <p>   “Deixe-me ver se ainda sei qual destas cores é o vermelho —     «olhando sobre» Sim, eu sei.” (Aqui eu poderia ter dito “chama-se     vermelho”)*</p> <p>Assegurar que você sabe o que ‘estar vendo’ *</p> <p>&lt;&lt;Então ele pode assegurar, desta maneira privada, «que ele fez» o  que isso significa «tendo uma sens{ação} priv{ada}!»&gt;&gt; *<sup>2</sup></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 21)</b></p>
<p>red’ means is good only if you can make use of this knowledge in a  future case. Now what if I see a colour again, can I say I made sure I  knew what ‘red’ was «meant» so now I shall know that I’ll recognize it  correctly? In what sense is having said the words ‘this is red’ before a  guarantee that I now see the same colour when I say again I see red. *</p>	<p>o vermelho’ significa é bom somente se você puder fazer uso desse  conhecimento num caso futuro. Agora, e se eu vir uma cor novamente,  posso dizer que assegurei que saberia o que era «significava» ‘vermelho’,  e assim agora saberei que ele será reconhecido corretamente? Em que  sentido, ao haver dito as palavras ‘isto é vermelho’ diante de uma  garantia, que agora vejo a mesma cor quando digo novamente estou  vendo o vermelho? *</p>

<sup>2</sup> Stern interpretou “t” como “toothache”.

We can indeed imagine a Robinson using a language for himself but then he must behave in a certain way or we shouldn't say that he plays lang. games with himself. \*

The grammar of '«↓private» sense data'.

Das Interessante ist nicht dass ich nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muss um zu wissen, dass ich Zahnschm. habe, sondern, dass mir mein Benehmen gar nichts sagt.

(MS 149, p. 22)

Nós podemos, na realidade, imaginar um Robinson usando uma linguagem consigo mesmo, mas então ele deve se comportar de uma certa maneira, ou não poderíamos dizer que ele pratica jogos de ling{uagem} consigo mesmo. \*

A gramática dos 'dados dos sentidos «↓privados»'.

O interessante não é que eu não devo cuidar do meu comportamento para saber se tenho dor de d{ente}, mas que meu comportamento não me diz nada.

(MS 149, p. 22)

"I sent him to the Doctor because he moans" is just as correct as "I sent him to the Dr because he has toothache".

"I moan because I have pain". — Are you sure that that's why you moan?

"But d. a. the nucleus of our language remains untouched whatever we might imagine our behaviour to be!" The nucleus is the word & «↓together with» it's meaning.

"'Toothache' is a word which I use in a game which I play with other people, but it has a private meaning to me."

"Christen toothache"

"Eu o mandei para o doutor porque ele gemia" é tão correto quanto "eu o enviei para o d{outor} porque ele estava com dor de dente".

"Eu gemia porque estava com dor". — Você tem certeza de que é porque estava com dor?

"Mas, dane-se, o núcleo da nossa linguagem permanece intocado não importa o que imaginemos sobre o nosso comportamento!" O núcleo é a palavra e «↓junto com» o seu significado.

"'Dor de dente' é uma palavra que uso num jogo que pratico com outras pessoas, mas tem um significado privado para mim."

"Batizar a dor de dente"

<p>Changing the meaning of a word. Meaning connected with the use of the ostens. def..</p> <p>In the use of the word meaning it is essen-</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 23)</b></p>	<p>Mudar o significado de uma palavra. Significado conectado com o uso da def{inição} ostens{iva}. *</p> <p>No uso da palavra significado é essen-</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 23)</b></p>
<p>tial that the same meaning is kept throughout a game. *</p> <p>Consider a game in which this isn't so. Would you call this sort of activity a game? *</p> <p>   “Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’ always the same private experience?”</p> <p>‘I recognize it as being the same’. And are you also recognizing the meaning of the word the same, so you can be sure that “recognizing it to be the same” now means the same to you which it did before? *</p> <p>“But «↓in» ostensively defining a word for myself I impress it's meaning on me so as not to forget it later on”. But how do you know that this helps. How do you know «↓later on» whether you remember it rightly or wrongly *</p> <p>Can you recognize something to be red which isn't red? *</p> <p>To be sure that so &amp; so is the case To know: Does ‘p’ follow from ‘I know p’?</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 24)</b></p>	<p>cial que o mesmo significado seja mantido no decurso de todo o jogo. *</p> <p>Considere um jogo em que isso não seja assim. Você chamaria este tipo de atividade de um jogo? *</p> <p>   “Você tem certeza de que chama de ‘dor de dente’ sempre a mesma experiência privada?”</p> <p>‘Eu o reconheço como sendo o mesmo’. E você está também reconhecendo o significado das palavras o mesmo, de tal modo que pode estar seguro de que “reconhecendo-o como o mesmo” agora significa para você o mesmo que significava antes? *</p> <p>“Mas, «↓ao» definir ostensivamente uma palavra para mim mesmo, imprimo o seu significado em mim e não a esqueço depois”. Mas como você sabe que isso ajuda? Como sabe «↓mais tarde» se a lembrou correta ou erradamente? *</p> <p>Você pode reconhecer algo como vermelho que não é vermelho? *</p> <p>Estar seguro de que isto e isto é o caso. Saber: ‘p’ se segue de ‘eu sei que p’?</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 24)</b></p>
<p>«The normal case of being sure, of a strong conviction.»</p> <p>Does it make sense to say, that what you see is green, &amp; you</p>	<p>«O caso normal de estar seguro, de uma forte convicção.»</p> <p>Faz sentido dizer que o que você vê é verde, e você o reconhece</p>

<p>recognize it to be red?</p> <p>“It seems to me to have sense” You are undoubtedly using a picture therefore it ‘seems to you to have sense’. But ask yourself what use you are making of that picture? We shall have to talk about sense &amp; nonsense later.</p> <p>What's the use here of being sure if it doesn't follow that it is so &amp; if your being sure is the only criterion there is for it being so? That means: This isn't at all a case of being sure, of conviction.</p> <p>The word ‘recognizing «↓as ...»’ is used where you can be wrong in recognizing. *</p> <p>— Sometimes these bodies change their weight &amp; then we look for the cause (of it) «↓of the change» &amp; find «↓, say,» that something's come off the body <del>or that the body has in some way</del> *</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 25)</b></p>	<p>como vermelho?</p> <p>“Parece-me que há sentido”. Você está, sem dúvida, usando uma imagem, portanto isso ‘lhe parece ter sentido’. Mas pergunte-se que uso você está fazendo dessa imagem. Nós teremos que falar sobre sentido e falta de sentido depois.</p> <p>Qual é o uso aqui de estar seguro, se não se segue de que isso é assim, e se o seu estar seguro é o único critério que há para que isso seja assim? Isso quer dizer: isto não é de modo algum um caso de estar seguro, de convicção. <sup>3</sup></p> <p>As palavras ‘reconhecendo «↓como ...»’ são usadas onde você pode estar errado no reconhecimento. *</p> <p>— Algumas vezes estes corpos mudam o seu peso, e então nós procuramos a causa (disso) «↓da mudança», e descobrimos «↓, digamos,» que alguma coisa vem de fora do corpo <del>ou de que o corpo de algum modo</del> *</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 25)</b></p>
<p>Sometimes however the weight «↓of a body» changes &amp; we can't account for it «the change at all». But we nevertheless don't say that weighing it had lost its point “because now the body really doesn't have any one weight”. Rather we say that the body had changed somehow that this was the cause of the change of weight but that hitherto we have not found this cause. That is, we will go on playing the game of weighing &amp; we try to find an explanation for the exceptional behaviour.</p>	<p>Algumas vezes, contudo, o peso «↓de um corpo» muda e não podemos sequer explicar «↓a mudança». Mas nós, entretanto, não dizemos que pesá-lo não adianta mais nada “porque agora o corpo não tem realmente qualquer peso”. Em vez disso dizemos que o corpo mudou de alguma forma, que isto foi a causa da mudança do peso, mas que até agora não descobrimos a sua causa. Isto é, continuaremos a praticar o jogo do peso e tentaremos descobrir uma explicação para o comportamento excepcional.</p>

<sup>3</sup> Esta sentença e a que foi aposta acima prefiguram as discussões de SC.

<p><del>Supposing however which way the rule «etc.» became the exception «rule» &amp; the exception «rule» «became» the rule «etc.».</del> We talk of «use the «↓form of» expression» “the weight of a «this» body” to designate something inherent in the body something which could only be diminished by destroying part of the body. The same body — the same weight. (And this is a gramm. prop.)</p> <p>Grocer.</p> <p>Supposing what in fact is the rule became the exception. Under certain peculiar circs. indeed a body <del>weighed</del> kept on weighing the same. Say iron in the presence of mercury. But a piece of cheese on the other hand though keeping its size, calories etc., weigh</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 26)</b></p>	<p><del>Supondo, contudo, de que modo a regra «etc.» tornou-se a exceção «regra» e a exceção «regra» «tornou-se» a regra «etc.».</del> Nós falamos de «usamos a «↓forma de» expressão» “o peso de um «deste» corpo” para designar alguma coisa inerente ao corpo, alguma coisa que só poderia ser reduzida destruindo parte do corpo. O mesmo corpo — o mesmo peso. (E isto é uma prop{osição} gram{atical}).</p> <p>Vendedor da mercearia.</p> <p>Supondo: o que de fato é a regra tornou-se a exceção. Sob certas circ{unstâncias} peculiares um corpo, na realidade, <u>mantém o mesmo peso</u>. Digamos, o ferro na presença do mercúrio. Mas uma peça de queijo, por outro lado, mesmo que mantenha o seu tamanho, calorias etc., pesa</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 26)</b></p>
<p>different weights at different times unaccountably. Would we still &lt;&lt;on the one hand it seems that if there wasn't the behaviour of it.&gt;&gt;</p> <p>“So &amp; so has excellent teeth, he never had to go to the dentist, never complained about toothache; but as toothache is a private experience we can't know whether he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life”.</p> <p>[[How does one assume such &amp; such to be the case?]] What is an assumption that e.g. ‘A has toothache’? Is it saying the words “A has t.”? Or doesn't it consist in doing something with these words?</p> <p>A game of assumption: .....</p> <p>Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming: a gesture.</p> <p>“But the point is just that we don't <u>assume</u> that <u>we</u> have t.. Therefore even if we have no ground to assuming that anyone else has t. we may</p>	<p>Incontavelmente de maneiras diferentes em tempos diferentes. Nós ainda...</p> <p>&lt;&lt;por outro lado, parece que se não houvesse o seu comportamento.&gt;&gt;</p> <p>“Fulano tem excelentes dentes, nunca teve que ir ao dentista, nunca se queixou de dor de dente; mas como dor de dente é uma experiência privada, não sabemos se ele não teve uma terrível dor de dente durante toda a sua vida”.</p> <p>[[Como se presume que tal e tal coisa é o caso?]] O que é uma presunção de que, por exemplo, ‘A está com dor de dente’? É dizer as palavras “A está com d{or de dente}”? Ou não consiste em fazer alguma coisa com estas palavras?</p> <p>Um jogo de presunção: .....</p> <p>Presumir: um estado mental. Presumir: um gesto.</p> <p>“Mas o ponto é justamente que não <u>presumimos</u> que <u>nós</u> temos d{or de dente}. Portanto, mesmo que não tivéssemos fundamento para</p>

nevertheless know that we have.” But would we in this case at all talk of a

(MS 149, p. 27)

presumir que alguém está com d{or de dente}, saberíamos, contudo, que nós estamos.” Mas neste caso não falaríamos em geral de um

(MS 149, p. 27)

(particular) behaviour as a symptom of pains? “Suppose no one knew pains except I, & I just invented a name ‘abracadabra’ for it!”

Showing his grief, — hiding his grief.

Certain behaviour «↓under cert. circumst.» we call showing our t. other behavior, hiding our t.. Now would we talk about this behaviour in this way if people didn't ordinarily behave in the way they do? Suppose I «↓& they» described my behaviour without such a word as pain, would the description be incomplete? The question is: do I consider it incomplete? If so I will distinguish between two cases of my behaviour & the others will say that I use two words alternately for my behaviour & thereby they will acknowledge that I have t..

“But can't he have t. without in any way showing it? And this shows that the word “t.” has a meaning entirely independent of a behavior connected with t..”

(MS 149, p. 28)

comportamento (particular) como um sintoma de dores? “Suponha que ninguém soubesse das dores exceto eu, e eu acabei de inventar um nome para ela: ‘abracadabra!’

Mostrando o seu pesar, — escondendo o seu pesar.

Certo comportamento «↓sob cert{as} circumst{âncias}» nós chamamos mostrar nossa d{or de dente}. Outro comportamento, esconder nossa d{or de dente}. Agora, falaríamos sobre este comportamento desta maneira se as pessoas ordinariamente não se comportassem da maneira como o fazem? Suponha que eu «↓e eles» descrevêssemos meu comportamento sem uma palavra como dor, essa descrição seria incompleta? A pergunta é: eu a considero incompleta? Se sim, distinguirei entre dois casos do meu comportamento, e os outros dirão que uso duas palavras alternadamente para o meu comportamento, e, por meio disso, reconhecerão que estou com d{or de dente}.

“Mas ele não pode ter d{or de dente} sem mostrá-la de algum modo? E isto mostra que a palavra “d{or de dente}” tem um significado inteiramente independente de um comportamento conectado com a d{or de dente}.”

(MS 149, p. 28)

~~We can't pl~~ The game which we play with the word ‘t.’ entirely depends upon there being a behaviour which we call the expression of t..

“We use ‘t.’ as the name of a personal experience”. — Well lets see how we use the word!

~~Nós não podemos pr~~ O jogo que praticamos com a palavra d{or de dente} depende inteiramente de existir um comportamento que chamamos expressão de d{or de dente}.

“Nós usamos d{or de dente} como nome de uma experiência pessoal”. — Bem, vamos ver como usamos a palavra!

<p>“But you know the sensation of t.! So you can give it a name, say, ‘t.’.”</p> <p>But what is it like to give a sensation a name? Say it is pronouncing the name while one has the sensation &amp; possibly concentrating on the sensation, — but what of it? Does this name thereby get magic powers? And why on earth do I call these sounds the ‘name’ of the sensation? I know what I do with the name of a man or of a number but have I by this act of ‘definition’ given the name a use?</p> <p>“I know what t. is”. But how do I know that I know it? Because something comes before my mind? But «And» how do I know that that is the right</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 29)</b></p>	<p>“Mas você conhece a sensação de d{or de dente}! Então você pode dar-lhe um nome, digamos, ‘d{or de dente}’.”</p> <p>Mas como é dar nome a uma sensação? Seria, digamos, pronunciar o nome enquanto se tem a sensação, e, possivelmente, concentrando-se na sensação, — mas e daí? Assim este nome ganha poderes mágicos? E por que será que chamo a estes sons o ‘nome’ da sensação? Eu sei o que faço com o nome de um homem ou de um número, mas dei, com este ato de ‘definição’, ao nome um uso?</p> <p>“Sei o que é d{or de dente}”. Mas como sei que sei isto? Porque algo vem diante da minha mente? Mas «E» como sei que aquela é a coisa</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>(MS 149, p. 29)</b></p>
<p>thing? Because I recognize it? But then it doesn't matter what <u>it is</u>, as long as I recognize it as t.! .....</p> <p>“But when you ask me “do you know what t. is” I answer yes after having brought before my mind a certain sensation.” But how is this <u>certain</u> sens. characterised? Only by that that it comes when you say the word ‘t. ’? Or that it comes &amp; you are in some way satisfied?</p> <p>“To give a sensation a name” means nothing unless I know already in what sort of a game this name is <del>going</del> to be used.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p>I've described certain behaviour by: ‘it is obvious that he was hiding</p>	<p>certa? Por que a reconheço? Mas então não importa o que <u>isto é</u>, contanto que a reconheça como d{or de dente}!.....</p> <p>“Mas quando você me pergunta “você sabe o que é d{or de dente}”, respondo que sim depois de haver trazido diante da minha mente uma certa sensação.” Mas como esta <u>certa</u> sens{ação} é caracterizada?<sup>4</sup> Somente por aquilo que vem quando você diz a palavra d{or de dente}? Ou que ela vem e você fica de certo modo satisfeito?</p> <p>“Dar um nome à sensação” nada significa, a não ser que eu já saiba em que tipo de jogo este nome <del>será</del> deve ser usado.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p>Descrevi certo comportamento com: ‘é óbvio que ele estava</p>

<sup>4</sup> Stern lê “sens.” como “sensória” e o final da palavra, separada pelo fim da linha, como “used”, que prefiro “rised”. Para este tradutor, portanto, a frase ficou assim: “como esta caracterização sensória é usada?” (PO, p. 241).

his pain' or: 'I think he was hiding his pain' or 'I don't know at all whether he was hiding pain'.

|| But can't I just assume with some degree of certainty that he has

(MS 149, p. 30)

escondendo a sua dor.' Ou: 'Acho que ele estava escondendo a sua dor.'  
Ou: 'Realmente não sei se ele estava escondendo a dor.'

|| Mas não posso apenas presumir com algum grau de certeza que ele  
|| está

(MS 149, p. 30)

<<to any part use of the word>>

|| pain although I have no reason whatever for it? I can say "I assume...",  
|| but if I sent them all to the doctor although they showed no sign of  
|| illness «pain», I should just be called mad.

That we try to account for something is due to the fact that we often can account for it. If I saw no regularity whatever I should not be inclined to assume «say» that there is one which I haven't as yet discovered. What usually happens makes me take this point of view. \*

The 'private definition' is not binding. \*

~~The role of~~ In our priv. lang. game we had, it seemed, given a name to an impression, — in order, of course, to use the name for this imp. in the future. The def., that is, should have determined on future occasions for what impr. to use the word 'red' «name» & for which not to use it. Now we said that on certain occ. ~~we were incl.~~ «↓after having given the def. we» did used the word on others ~~not~~ «we didn't»; but we ~~refused to~~ described these \*

(MS 149, p. 31)

<<para alguma parte uso da palavra>>

|| com dores mesmo que não tenha qualquer razão para isso? Posso dizer  
|| "Eu presumo...". Mas se eu os mandasse todos ao médico mesmo que  
|| eles não mostrassem sinais de doença «dor», eu deveria simplesmente  
|| ser chamado de louco.

Que a gente tente dar razões de alguma coisa é devido ao fato de que frequentemente damos razões para isto. Se não visse qualquer regularidade, não estaria inclinado a ~~super~~ «dizer» que existe uma que ainda não descobri até o momento. O que normalmente acontece me faz adotar este ponto de vista. \*

A 'definição privada' não é vinculante. \*

~~O papel da~~ No nosso jogo de ling{uagem} priv{ado} nós demos, aparentemente, um nome para uma impressão, — a fim de usar, naturalmente, o nome para esta imp{ressão} no futuro. Isto é, a def{inição} deveria ter determinado em ocasiões futuras para qual impr{essão} usar a palavra 'vermelho' «o nome» e para qual não usá-lo. Agora, nós dissemos que em certas oc{asiões} ~~estamos incl{inados}~~ «↓após haver dado a def{inição}, nós» usamos a palavra, em outras ~~não~~ «não usamos»; mas nós ~~nos recusamos a~~ descrevemos esta \*

	<b>(MS 149, p. 31)</b>

1. When someone starts to read a Wittgensteinian text, like NSD, without previous notice, it can happen a sudden feeling of being lost. The reader is unexpectedly caught in the middle of a dialogue she was not present from the beginning. It is pretty much like entering in the theatre well after the movie being started. The spectator has to figure out by herself what is going on. Maybe she will do it right, maybe not. Only time will give the answer and then she continues in her first hypothesis or reframes her whole general judgement. This is part of the game, and fortunately we have some keys in how to succeed in doing with it (cf. note 98, below). This is pretty much the kind of feeling we have when we are lost in an unknown big city. All this sensation is generated by Wittgenstein’s philosophical method, as can be read in PI § 123: “A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about’”, or in statements like “I must plunge into the water of doubt again and again” (RFB, p. 119).

Although Wittgenstein wrote philosophy in a dialogical style quite naturally, since he launched notes in a diary in the first place, he was expecting to draw from his manuscripts some systematic order and finally publish a book about his new way of thinking. But at a given point he admitted that he could not write differently, and the best he could do was to publish an album instead of a book (cf. PI’s preface). Wittgenstein wrote all his philosophy, except TLP, in a dialogical style. So the reader can find, now and then, different voices contending around some philosophical thesis. The dialogue will suddenly and unexpectedly finish with no solution whatever, but sometimes only a remark on how our questions can mislead us, sometimes no comment at all. But in the mentioned preface to the PI the author gave what we can consider to be a tip on how to read the “album”: “I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own” (p. x).

In the first dialogue found in NSD we see the theme of the separation between the sensation of fright and some correspondent experience, like starting something. This separation is viewed only when we philosophize, otherwise it would seem queer. Led by her speculation, the philosopher then tries to isolate and scrutinize some amorphous experience behind the expression of fright, making a difference between what we ordinarily try to express and what we can eventually think about it. In such cases it seems that we “give over the reins to language”. What is remarkable here is that our misleadings can happen due to the way we deal with language (cf. PI § 111).

A note about the translation of “feeling” and “Gefühl” into “sentimento”: The Portuguese word is almost devoid of the aceptions regarding the semantic field of the word “sensation”, which is not the case either in English or in German. In several passages in this text Wittgenstein takes some feeling within the aception of a sensation, but we do not have in Portuguese a better word to choose. So sometimes we will have the translation “sentimento”, but not disregarding the connotation of a sensation, and sometimes the word “sensação”, but not disregarding the connotations of a feeling.

2. And then several ordinary experiences like the dreamy voice, the far away look, become suddenly something less real than their real inner feeling, which will find, for the philosopher voice, its correct answer behind the meaning of the expression. We are probably having here an indication of an ineffable feeling expressed through vague physiognomy and ethereal sounds (more on ineffability on the notes 8, 10, 14, 33, 71, 73, 74, 78, 80, and 90).

3. The expression “there must be something else” is another course of action, it has nothing more to do with the expression of some feeling through a sentence. Just like if someone tried to separate the feeling which music gives from hearing music.
4. The reader find here another variation by which some purported private experience is examined. This is the application of the philosophical method proposed by Wittgenstein (PI § 122), in which determined point can be viewed alternatively from another perspective. The purpose is to create a perspicuous presentation of the conceptual connections, and so get a clear view of the use of our words. In this particular case the experiment consists in taking the expression “long, long ago” and replace it with another word with a sufficient number of syllables to see whether we can meet the same meaning. If so, the meaning of the expression would be the supposed inner object it refers, just like in a case where we could say “ball” and point to the referred object, or say “kud” and do the same.
5. Here another variation: two different Latin words “puella”, which is feminine, ends in an “a”, and means “girl”, and “poeta”, which is masculine, ends also in an “a”, and means “poet”. The question is how is it possible opposite feelings attached to the same letter? Is this an indication that there is an inner feeling object which makes the difference in the meanings? William James (1890) entertains similar concerns in his renowned book *The Principles of Psychology* (cf. chapter XVII, p. 582). Wittgenstein was probably remembering James.
6. Other voice intervenes stating a doubt on a presumed conclusion about the existence of an inner object of feeling: it asks if it is not the case that there are many ways to describe an event.
7. Now take the expression “making this gesture isn’t all”. What does this mean? Am I saying that there is a private experience which cannot be conveyed by the gesture? Or am I saying that a gesture can convey several different experiences, but not in the sense that there is one which is pure...? This voice can show the reader how high the waves of language can go (cf. PI § 194).
8. What appears in this voice is a sort of “what is it like” question, a problem that also emerged in the contemporary philosophy mainly through an article related to the consciousness problem, published by Thomas Nagel (1974, pp. 435-450). Such kind of question seems to send us immediately to the certainty of inner private experiences which differentiate us from the rest of the world. What this voice asks us is what is the special feeling someone have in hearing certain musical note in determinate situations. Could ordinary words speak about this particular feeling or is it something ineffable? But if it is ineffable, how could someone knows that? Is there thinking without language? We will soon return to these philosophical doubts about ineffability and the limits of language (cf. notes 2, 10, 14, 33, 71, 73, 74, 78, 80, and 90).
9. Now one voice give a name to an “impression”: it is called “blue”. What does it mean to give names to *impressions*? Is it the same as to give a name to a sense datum? Color exclusion (“red and green cannot be at the same place at the same time”) is a problem which obsessed Wittgenstein since his return to Cambridge in 1929 (see SLF). The difficulty at that particular moment was that it was not possible to make a correspondence name-object as was expected by the TLP with regard to colors (see the Preface to this translation). Now a phenomenalist voice tries to think of qualities as sense data, an alternative already imagined by Russell (1912) and Moore (1913). It was supposed that sense-data was an uncompromised way to verify empirical propositions. Was that so uncompromised? We will come back to the philosophy of color (cf. notes 19, 31, 42, 61, 62, 84, and 85 below).
10. As Wittgenstein said in PI’s preface, “The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made.” Here the question of the feeling attached to the “a” come back, and now there is a voice worried about the possibility of an exact description of the experience. In other words, if the feeling I feel is subjective, it is only mine, it is a *quale*, how can it be possibly described or even have an exact description? Is this a proof that there are ineffable experiences, something beyond language? It must be noted that “quale” is not a Wittgensteinian terminology. It was introduced in the contemporary philosophy in 1929 by the American pragmatist C. I. Lewis. Qualia, he explains,

are “recognizable qualitative characters of the given” (1929, p. 121). Although not Wittgensteinian, we will see how this contemporary concept is narrowly related to his discussions all over these lecture notes.

11. And now enters into the scenery the therapeutic voice. It is indicating by what method a philosophical problem will be treated, and it is in a different direction that the other voices were leading us into. For the therapeutic voice the philosophical problem is not properly qualia, but only to ask to oneself “what puzzles me about this matter”. Notice that the final question is underlined. It means that our therapeutic investigation has to find what puzzles us in that particular indicated case, and not what *in general* puzzles us as the first variant seems to be suggesting (cf. note 94, below).

12. Now the problem of sense datum is approached by its linguistic side, by the way of the question of how are impressions labeled. So, when someone gives to some impression a name like “blue”, is she in the act of labeling a sense datum? But to do that is also to engage in the act of setting conventions or inaugurating language. So we are apparently here in a sort of Augustinian picture of language, the same picture Wittgenstein adopted in TLP and put into question in PI §§ 1ff. Another problem which is being indicated here is the difference between a *thing* and an *impression*. Realism seems to be vanished in the second alternative. So what is being put into question is whether we are giving names to a “nothing”.

13. This new approach to the masculine and feminine “a” refers not only to the Latin words above mentioned but obviously to the picture of the two A’s beside the text. The purpose is to see how feelings can change when faced to different contexts, and how language is context sensitive. This reading hypothesis can be confirmed if we render the first annotation as “the eye and the wood” and not as “the eye and the world” as translated by David Stern (PO, p. 203). In a particular conversation with Stern, he told me that the mistake was caused by the bad condition of the manuscript film when he made his research. This annotation comes there in much smaller and effaced letters, and the German word “Wald” can be easily confused with “Welt”. As it is, it seems a posterior annotation referring to the A’s picture. Stern did not also put this picture into his translation. Notwithstanding, as this set is arranged someone can remember a German quote which says “Den Wald vor lauter Bäumen nicht sehen” (“Not seeing the wood behind the trees”), but this is only speculation. Anyway, everything seems to be indicating that language is context sensitive, and, if this is so, meaning could not be uniquely determined by inner ostension, as the Jamesian text seems to indicate (cf. note 5).

14. We came back to quale as a sort of special and determined experience. The voice says that it is possible to mention such experiences but the most essential cannot be described. So the ineffability problem remains: is it a property of qualia? We know that definition of qualia is still a very controversial question in contemporary philosophy. Alex Byrne, in describing a large dispute about color inverted spectrum, works with a definition of qualia as “properties of experience that type them in phenomenological respects” (cf. 2010). Daniel Dennett, while not denying a consensus that qualia are “properties of conscious experience”, by virtue of their vague and confusing philosophical character, and also dismissing their referential value, prefers to think of them as being special properties of a subject’s mental states that are ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness (1992, p. 47). Ned Block (2007), trying to defend the existence of qualia, does not think of them as “properties”, but as the less causally compromised understanding of an “ineffable feature of experience” (pp. 74, 82). This feature is physical, nonetheless, but just, as he says, an “extremely weak form of physicalism” (p. 80), in which “the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on physical states of the body” (p. 109, note 13). Fred Dretske (1995, p. 73) does not also think of qualia directly as property of experience, but as represented property of objects. Qualia are, for him, “the ways objects phenomenally appear or seem”. Quine (1956), more than a half century ago, dismissed philosophical rigour about predicating properties by saying that they are “creatures of darkness” (p. 180). For Wittgenstein an assumption of an object or an experience having “properties” would be a grammatical criterion (MS 110, p. 29), or a way of defining the essence of a thing (PI § 371).

15. What seems strange and problematic here, says the therapeutic voice, is to give a name to a particular impression. Would it be possible to have an impression without a name? One in which we are about to give a name but actually we can't? Or, speaking in the present day philosophy of mind vocabulary, would it be possible to give a name to a quale? Is it not a quale something ethereal, something which cannot really be denominated in language? A particular characteristic of qualia is that they are ineffable (see Dennett 1992, p. 47). So it is supposed we should give it a disguised name, like when we say that someone married a woman's wealth (cf. MS 156a, p. 30v).

16. Now the therapeutic voice is asking in what possible language game the sentence "I have an intangible impression" could be valid. Is it a referring game, purporting to be valid as a description of an inner experience? Does it refer, for example, to a quale to be investigated through introspection? In any case, "intangible" seems to be strange to ordinary rules of referring terms, contaminated by opacity, as if there were involved a sort of logical privacy, which is actually a contradiction in terms. (For a defense of logical privacy, see Taylor 1970, pp. 78-91).

17. There certainly exists a situation in which it is virtually impossible to say everything one wants to express. For example, what happens inside oneself, what particular feelings someone feels, the scent of a particular place. This is a possible language game. But not the same language game of a rest or residue which cannot be put into the bowl. The latter is a language game related to material things (in contrast to the mental realm), in which something really remains when not everything fit into the continent. But the former can be a language game in which to say that we have an impression which cannot be further described is enough to have a sentence completely understood. But could we say, by this sole motive, that mental language has rules of its own? No, we could not. What we have here are limits of certain language games.

18. The reader should note the textual variant "form of expression" jotted down after "idea". That is because, for Wittgenstein, more than an "idea", it is really a "form of expression" which plays hell with us. His investigations are directed to language, or to the grammatical illusions. In this sense, it is a form of expression which can be analogous between two different language games (cf. PI § 90).

19. We came back to the gesture and its inner feeling. This time the therapeutic voice is trying to argue that the language game of pointing out to a feeling is a different game from that which the gesture ordinarily takes part with a related feeling. In that case there would be a similarity with the game of drawing the attention to a particular color and not to the eventual physical object or shape in which the color subsists.

20. Now one voice cast into doubt the possibility of pointing to a color independent of its corresponding shape, or pointing to a sensation of pain independent of its corresponding object. What is being questioned is the discursive possibility regarding sensations, followed by a challenge to look at a color without its shape. Such challenges show that our language does not ordinarily separate colors from shapes or pains from pain-objects (cf. LSD, p. 293). Nothing of this can count against a grammar in which colors would be separated from shapes and pains from pain-objects. Someone could teach a born blind person what is red, as well as to a painless person what is a toothache (cf. RC, III § 168).

21. "Feeling of pastness" is an evocation of William James (1890, p. 605): "We shall see that we have a constant feeling *sui generis* of pastness, to which every one of our experiences in turn falls a prey. To think a thing as past is to think it amongst the objects or in the direction of the objects which at the present moment appear affected by this quality. This is the original of our notion of past time, upon which memory and history build their systems." In this way, James seems to have separated a feeling into which memory and history build their systems, and not, as ordinarily goes in language, a feeling associated with a memory. Is it possible to isolate a feeling of pastness? (cf. notes 56 and 88).

22. This voice tries to discover what would be the grammar of numbers, since we could not, according to a certain perspective in philosophy of mathematics, point to a number, nor draw attention to it. Frege, for example, conceived numbers as abstract objects, effectively defined as classes of classes with the same number of members through which it was possible to establish an one-to-one correlation. TLP rejected this view (§ 4.126) in

favor of a treatment of number as a formal concept expressed through formal series ordered by internal relations (§§ 6.02ff). But still here we are in the realm of abstractions. This is easy to see when we jump to another point of view where we actually could point to a number or draw attention to it (LSD, p. 309). This happens when we try to teach arithmetics to a child through examples showed in a blackboard or in a sheet of paper. According to this view, numbers are just techniques (cf. PI § 208).

23. Here we have a first proposal regarding taste: someone has the experience of taste and relates it to a name. This is pretty much like a thesis, not really how we use the word “*lemontaste*”, which can be very different across the cases.

24. BEE renders a mistaken version from the original manuscript: “And can I give a name to any one taste experience without giving the taste a common language? (...)” Not only eight words were omitted in rendering the sentence but “my own” became “any one”.

25. Someone could taste papaya, for example, without never know what was that. And she can taste it for the second time and remember of the taste. We should say that she has the experience but not a name for it. And she could also give a particular name for her experience, in case she was never taught. None of this means, naturally, a private logic in which a sensation is the meaning of the invented word. Rather, she reacts like anyone else who discovered a new taste. (cf. PI §§ 257, 258)

26. Through the image of employing a slave, the therapeutic voice shows a paradoxical situation in which memory of sensations operates in mind as if it was an autonomous and completely obedient human being living inside us. Our memory of sensations, according to supposed rules of private experience, should be independent of anyone else but, on the other hand, follow rules common to a community. Is such situation possible? How can we possibly justify a slave living inside us?

27. This is the first counter-argument: instead of a slave memory, rules of this language game should be comparable to the possibility of writing some word in a paper to remind a private experience. That is a possibility, as far as it is a foreseeable reaction to a new experience. Two and a half pages of unrelated drawings follow now in the manuscript, they are omitted here.

28. And this is the second counter-argument, the possibility of using a name directly related to the impression, and not a name whose meaning anyone could understand. Let us say, for example, the name “*quale*”, and for the particular sensation of red, we could say “*Rquale*” (cf. Byrne 2010). However, here the rule was that I could attach the subscript letter “*R*” to my private sensation of red, rather than the physical red, so to say. But, anyway, is there anything like a direct relation between a name and an impression? What are the criteria for that? What is being criticized here is the Cartesian privileged access to intuitions. In the classes Rhees noted down (LSD, p. 292): “To give a person a name I must give a scratch in *connexion* with conventions of its use.” (Cf. also PI §§ 244, 258, 260-261)

29. The therapeutic voice bring into the stage another mental experiment: my two hands going into the operations of buying, my right hand selling some good to my left hand. The purpose of such analogies is not to suggest that the situation is impossible to happen (something we do not know), but trying to imagine the thesis of a private name for a private sensation inside such a situation. So we would have public ruled behavior being followed in a private world, as if rules of trading could be learned privately. The same picture is recovered in PI § 268.

30. Feelings being transferred from one independent point of the mind to another are data used to favor a possible thesis for someone who defends the existence of private sensations not known by the subject. Freud, for example, devised such possibility inside the mind. In dreams, feelings repressed in the unconscious part of the mind show themselves in a condensed and displaced way through enigmatic images to the dreamer’s conscience. This natural transference in the mind is appropriated by the therapist in the psychoanalytical technique to facilitate the liberation of repressed content. As a functionalist, the mental state is constituted by Freud related to their role in causal relationships to other mental states.

31. Trying to find another criterion: we should have to write the name of a color with inks that match the same color sensation. What is being assumed by this voice is that no one can understand what we mean unless we could show our sensation. But, again, is this a criterion for meaning color names?
32. The problem Wittgenstein is trying to show is that it would not be possible to understand a game whose rules are known by only one person.
33. In this new hypothesis, interrupted so suddenly, the purpose is to create an economic and privileged language, with direct access to feelings. Which language would be that, what are their criteria? (cf. PI § 243)
34. The concept of toothache is the most remarkable exemplary of the phenomenological discussions of Wittgenstein. Already mentioned five pages above in this manuscript (p. 3r), it is now directly mobilized for the first time. But the history of the concept begins 5 to 6 years before, in 1929, in the apex of Wittgenstein's phenomenological phase (cf. MS 107, pp. 199, 216), and goes through 1944, in the late redaction of PI (cf. MS 124, p. 223). Here one voice is trying to make someone understand that she has a particular pain is her toothache, trying to separate the sensation from its representation.
35. It is pretty much like the introduction of a sample which was supposed to be the bearer of the name "pain". The criteria of ostension is now managed here, only that the sample cannot be seen (cf. LSD, p. 296)
36. What puzzles us seems to be an apparent criterion of ostension where there is none. This is a sort of "private ostension". But criteria of pain would be different if instead of pointing to a sample, pain was expressed with moanings or holding the painful spot. Now we would have a behavioural criterion.
37. The counter-argument is this: so what would we do whether, by any chance, we wanted to refer to the pain itself? To look for "toothache" as something independent of behaviour. So, would it be another grammar? (cf. LSD, p. 298)
38. To that the therapeutic voice asks how can someone know what pain is, i.e., do we actually learn a new name just because there was a sensation in the first place or was it the other way around?
39. Obviously it is not possible to say by gestures "I was not in pain but I acted as if I was", unless we are in a whole sign language. The point is: it seems that language has all that we need to refer, and there is nothing out of it. In particular, it seems there is no non-referring sensation. So why do we look for the bearer of the name as if it was the meaning of the sensational language? Is it not a craving for generality so common when we do philosophy? The drawing next below the paragraph seems to be someone speaking and gesturing.
40. The realist voice insists that moaning is not enough, the simulation case must also be able to be described.
41. The word "pain" has meaning when someone says "I have pain", but how? Is there something out there to give meaning to the word or has it meaning just by itself? It is as though the word had meaning completely independent of a context or a history of learning.
42. Change of subject, from pain to color, in order to make a comparison. How is the grammar of color? The meaning of "green" is associated with an action: to show a sample in the empirical world.
43. Comparison set, we come back to pain. The privileged access to our own pain is not part of the grammar of pain. Pain utterances prescind completely the accompaniment of a purported empirical sample. In that case, a certain behavior take the place of the sample.
44. The empiricist voice insists that, anyway, the privileged access remains. "Only I know my inner sensation". Is such a knowledge possible? What can count as knowledge? What are its evidences? How can one know that such knowledge is really a knowledge?
45. The exercise here is to show that we can also negate through asserting, and, if this is so, it is not necessary an object for the logical operation of negation. Negative sense is already given in language without any object.

46. Wittgenstein's method of philosophy depends entirely on a description of the case. Only in use the form of language can be caught. In LAP, p. 2, we can read: "If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words." Here we have in French the formula for the introduction of a conclusion regarding a case.
47. What is apparently being suggested by this voice is that there is always something hidden behind the reality. The parameter is the iceberg metaphor.
48. Now two pages of geometrical drawings and considerations in philosophy of mathematics written in English are being omitted here. Stern's translation omits the four paragraphs below in the sequence.
49. While the first sentence seems to have sense, the other almost reaches the ridiculous when we apply it to its similar cases. The language game of giving names to impressions is not the same of meaning the impressions.
50. The language game of pushing objects finds no application related to the ethereal.
51. Seven pages and drawings dealing with philosophy of mathematics all written in English are being omitted.
52. There is no doubt that the importance of this remark is in the possibility of comparison with ideas developed later, after the middle 40's, in the concepts of "aspect seeing" and "aspect change" (PPF, xi, §§ 11-364). For now, in 1934, what we see seems to be in accordance with the experience we had before in looking at images. Past experiences seem to help in our perception, or that perception seems to alter our sensations. So how could we have a sensational theory separated from perception? All these matters will be found in Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology from the middle to the late 40's.
53. Now it follows sixteen pages in philosophy of mathematics, almost all of them written in English.
54. This voice expresses the desire to have certainty about the other's pains, as if we would not have it yet. Actually, in the way this voice seems to be asking about certainty, as if there were a pain-object to be seen behind the pain expression, in the nervous system, for instance, so that we would be certain that pain was real, the quest seems to be doomed to failure. She is simply not seeing that certainty is already in language. We can surely have grammatical certainty regarding to the ordinary rules to express pain. To know that someone bleeding and moaning after being hit by a car is actually in terrible pain is rather an instinctive reaction. Normally we know this with certainty. The last manuscript Wittgenstein wrote in his life was about certainty and its corresponding philosophical counterpart, the doubt.
55. The closing quotation mark does not appear in the original manuscript.
56. Another bunch of questions raised by different voices about the grammar of feeling of pastness (cf. note 21, above). Description can capture everything essential to the grammar, and gestures do not seem to be out in some cases. "Grammar" always mean internal relations among the mental and the empirical (PPF, xi, § 247).
57. When do we have the grammar of feeling of pastness? When, for example, words like "a long time ago..." evoke a certain sort of characteristic feelings, a lot of memories, certain tone in the voice, everything which we ordinarily consider essential in this grammar. At other times, the same words do not evoke anything.
58. When we talk to ourselves we are probably using the same rules we use to talk to others, don't we? (cf. PI § 243).
59. Stern renders an almost unreadable manuscript word as "mir" (myself), while BEE renders it as "nur" (only). "Mir" or "myself" seems to be better interpretation in the context. And so the voice seems to be considering a case where we speak to ourselves with special private rules.

60. The therapeutic voice tries one possible interpretation of the soliloquy confession “I talk to myself”, as a very plausible and really common situation, according to which a soliloquy follows the same rules of normal conversation, only that the interlocutor is missing. It is remarkable that Wittgenstein added a posterior attenuation of a would-be theory of soliloquy with the apposition of the adverb “generally”. (For the “notion of informing myself”, cf. PO, p. 303; also PI § 243.)

61. Now we have an extension of the soliloquy to a case of color experience. In such a case, would one giving some new piece of information to oneself? Some people in philosophy seem to be inclined to conclude this, completely forgetting that normal rules of conversation include the interlocutor. Here we reach a borderline case where the rules of soliloquy does not seem to have sense, and also where subjective experience of color seems to be undermined by criteria of knowledge that do not apply to subjectivity.

62. We are discussing now the grammar of giving information.

63. It is ridiculous to imagine giving myself information about an object that I already know. In that case, give information presuppose lack of knowledge.

64. How to give a name to a private experience? How can we give some special label in order to distinguish my subjective experience from others? Here we will try another variation which consists in the analogy of putting a hat in someone’s head in order to discover whether it is a proper way to give names to subjective experiences. If there were something like a special pain that I feel, for example, should it be as public visible as a hat in a head? So, by the question, the therapeutic voice tries to show us that we are treating a sensation like an ordinary visible object. Although we can use names to label visible objects, like “the man with the green hat over there!”, it does necessarily mean that it works in the same way when we deal with private sensations.

65. Consider indirect information. I do not know yet what my new inner experience is, and I agree that it is not possible to put a hat on it. Is it possible, however, to put a hat indirectly? This is possibly what Ned Block (2007), following Shoemaker (1994a; 1994b) at this point, is trying to do when he admits that qualia are, at the same time, ineffable and behaviorally indistinguishable (i.e., follows the “principle of normality”), but has representational content (phenomenal properties) not captured in public language: “when one looks at a ripe tomato, one’s experience represents the tomato as having two distinct kinds of colorrelevant properties, as being red and as having a certain “phenomenal property”. If your spectrum is inverted with respect to mine, and we are looking at different items with complementary colors (e.g. you a red thing, me a green thing), our experiences represent those items as having the same phenomenal property and as having different colors. (...) the other kind of representational content (the kind that represents phenomenal properties) is not expressible in public language” (p. 84). But we could, nevertheless, always ask if this manoeuvre does not make it look as if there were a direct way, although distorted, of putting the hat on an inner experience.

66. This is a case where an ordinary expression becomes a philosophical thesis and suddenly acquires a character of deepness. But that I cannot have someone’s pain is only part of the grammar of the word “pain”. Nothing that could not be completely different in another imaginary tribe. And again nothing which actually is in need to be solved through a metapsychology. The difficulty here only appears when we think philosophically.

67. Stern (PO, pp. 208-209) reads “mir” in the manuscript, and so renders “It seems to me...”, and BEE reads “uns” and, accordingly, renders “It seems to us”. I’m adopting the latter interpretation.

68. By this framing the sentence “I feel his pains” could not be false, since it is not a description, but only nonsense. But if it is nonsense because of the nature of pain, we should feel that it is assymmetric. As a result, language continues to be essentially a nonsense mirror of sensations. The message is clearly addressed to the TLP.

69. More or less intangible impressions is a typical way of expression of a 17<sup>th</sup> century empiricist. So ideas which are further away in time and space are naturally less vivid and weaker than any other which is more actual (cf. LSD, p. 344). But we actually have more difficulty in communicating some experiences than others, so the language of intangibility seems to get sense from such experiences. But “intangibility” was artificially introduced by the excuse of the difficulty of describing some experiences (cf. LSD, p. 327).

70. In order to get the grammar of intangibility of impressions we have to ask about the use of the expression “difficult to describe”.

71. What are the criteria by which we say that some experience is impossible to describe? It seems possible to use ineffability as a criterion for the limit of language. But in such case a criterion could be used in very different ways.

72. Now one of voice raises a criticism about in what sense can be said that we can have indescribable experiences, would they be too complex or too subtle to be described? It would be present in aesthetics experiences, in a vision of God?

73. Now privileged access to inner experience is being used a justification for knowledge. But is this an acceptable knowledge criterion?

74. Ineffability can lead us into thinking of a separation between experience and its description. In that way it was no longer a criterion for limits of language, but a property of certain mental states. So, a philosopher can realize that, although qualia make no difference at all to the physical world, they have, nonetheless, decisive role in selfknowledge, at least as an epiphenomenon (cf. Jackson 1982, pp. 127-136).

75. It is easy to see that a separation between subjective experience and its description leads to a Cartesian idea of privileged access to one’s own mental content.

76. This is the same dualism language/world tried in a case of an ostensible object.

77. The dualism tried again, now separating the word “toothache” and its inner experience.

78. What is at stake here is again the conflation between ineffable private experience and the grammar of knowledge. What does knowledge of my private sensations mean? Does it seem right to call “knowledge” an experience that I cannot describe? Ineffable experiences cannot be used normally as evidences of correctness, so what give us the right to call such relation a “knowledge”? Notwithstanding, some philosophers think that it is possible in some way. Ned Block (2007, pp. 73-115) advocates that qualia, although ineffable, can be proved to exist. Or, in other words, that although not fully captured in language, we can *know* they exist. According to him “...the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on physical states of the body” (p. 109, note 13). The rationale is that if they are epiphenomena, even if they are not theoretically representable, we can detect them physiologically or through a thought experiment like Wittgenstein’s intra-subjective inverted spectrum scenario. Another view that favors a special knowledge can be found in the so-called “knowledge argument” (Jackson 1982, pp. 127–136). Proposed as a thought experiment, it runs as follows: “Mary the colour scientist knows all the physical facts about colour, including every *physical* fact about the experience of colour in other people, from the behavior a particular colour is likely to elicit to the specific sequence of neurological firings that register that a colour has been seen. However, she has been confined from birth to a room that is black and white, and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor. When she is allowed to leave the room, it must be admitted that she learns something about the colour red the first time she sees it — specifically, she learns what it is like to see that colour.” (p. 130). Fred, another Jackson’s character, can see colors that the rest of mankind cannot yet see (pp. 128-130.) But, without dismissing the argument’s feasibility, we can also suspect that criteria of what we normally call “knowledge” are being twisted here (cf. PI §§ 246-247.)

79. Let us suppose that it makes sense, and this is what this voice is proposing now, to say that there is an experience that I know better or more accurately than anyone else. The first thing that is being assumed here, according to the reply given by the therapeutic voice, is that there is an

experience that both the interlocutor and I know well, but some particularity in there that only I know (just like “Fred” in Jackson’s knowledge argument – note 78). So, now we can see how far the boundary of the grammar of knowledge of an experience goes. Entertaining the supposition of some intricacies of experiences that I know better, a paradigm is established. And so, it cannot be otherwise anymore. The picture of a glimmering, which no one can accurately describe, although each one of us has some experience of seeing it, is the paradigm here. But the glimmering itself is a borderline case, since it only makes sense to say that there was a glimmering, as far as knowledge is concerned, but not asking to describe that glimmering. Description of a glimmering is another language game of which knowledge in general is not a part. It could be at most *my* knowledge of that glimmering, but that is all.

80. This is a research of the grammatical puzzle. Sometimes does make sense to say that a glimmering is better described by a painted picture than by words. But given this case what right do we have to say that a picture is worth a thousand words? Is it always that? (cf. PI § 280).

81. Here is another research into the grammatical puzzle. Trying to describe more exactly a color spot with the help of numbers was Wittgenstein’s own project in 1929, through the supposed “primary language” or the language of sense data (cf. SRL). This search was abandoned by the beginnings of 1930 (cf. MS 107, p. 205), when Wittgenstein eventually realized that ordinary language was already complete. Grammatical propositions are the fabric of ordinary language as well as grammatical illusions have their origin in an alienation from it (PI § 116; cf. note 85).

82. The temptation here is to make the private experience to take the description’s place: “Our craving is to make the grammar of sense datum similar to the grammar of the physical body. That is why the term ‘sense datum’ was introduced – it being the ‘private object’ corresponding to the ‘public object’” (LSD, p. 357).

83. In fact, the mixing here is between two accounts of an experience, two different language games.

84. This illusion was naturally brought about by the conflation between different language games. The question here is that the criteria of what can count as an experience in the grammar of descriptions are not the same of what can count as an experience in the grammar of subjective feelings.

85. Did our description produce a picture in the other? Probably yes, it did. Can we know whether this picture is the same as ours? Definitely, we cannot. “The substitution of ‘identical’ for ‘the same’ (for example) is another typical expedient in philosophy” (PI § 254). Subjective pictures do not count as possible players in the language game of “identity” managed here. And this is not particularly because the word “same” does not have any sense in similar cases, as we can see when we use it to entertain a mere probability. So, the problem does not seem to be now the comparison between private experiences in different people, but in what cases, and how, criteria of identity can be applied. In some circumstances we can say two circles are entirely the same: in the way they look, for example; but not when viewed from microscopic perspective, or from the point of view of the place they are located, or how they were drawn, the material employed to do them, etc. So, criteria of identity can vary across different games. In TLP § 2.161 we learn that there is identity between the picture (language) and the pictured (world). This is logical identity. It was precisely this logical identity that Wittgenstein found faulty when he tried to use sense data as a verification principle (MS 105, pp. 120, 122; MS 107, p. 143). It happened that logical multiplicity, a necessary tool for comparison between language and world (TLP § 4.04), was not the same in cases where gradations had to be accounted for (colors, tonalities, extensions; cf. SRL, pp. 31ss.). After having spent some time trying to find in a “primary language” a system in which we could reach to truth decisions when numbers had to enter in the calculus, Wittgenstein realized that everything was already decided when we examine ordinary language in its employments (cf. note 81). Logical necessities were deployed in grammar, as well as criteria for sameness and differences. But rules of language could only be described through their uses. So, “the same” can only be in our minds in some cases (PI § 140), or can be different according to their criteria of use (PI § 62), and sometimes we do not even know whether the same is really the same (PI § 215). The fact is

that from the time when identity were clear solely on the symbolism, and not in ordinary language (TLP § 3.323), to the moment when autonomy of grammar became the center of Wittgenstein's philosophical concerns, the role of language and its use changed a great deal in his philosophy.

86. Our visual image is not felt as something in us, like a pain in the eye. But there is no physical reason properly to do this difference, but the way we normally split the continuous (cf. PI § 47). We should produce a mess if we start to think that visual images and pains belong to the same kind of mental state.

87. As we can see from LSD (p. 339), the talking of "if-sensation" comes from James (1890). Wittgenstein evokes a Jamesian concept found in the chapter IX of Principles of Psychology (1890), "The Stream of Thought". James developed there the idea of shades of feelings to which we do not usually pay much attention. So, we should say "a feeling of *if*, a feeling of *but*, and a feeling of *by*, quite as readily as we say a feeling of *blue* or a feeling of *cold*" (pp. 245-246). Wittgenstein became vividly impressed with the Jamesian idea of a finer distinction among sensations in 1932 (cf. MS 114, p. 39; TS 213, p. 42r; BT, p. 32). But now he is concerned with another question, namely a grammatical confusion between material and mental worlds in which the comparison between such subtle sensations and more concrete ones seems to be based. That is why he talks here of "table-sensation". We must observe how strange is to say that "table" is remarkably heavier than "blue" or "cold" (examples actually brought up by James in his book). The purpose of Wittgenstein's analogy is to bring about such strangeness in our assumptions. While we can have almost no difficulty in giving a description of what is the table-sensation like, either through some picture or by gestures, any of these could be of no help to do the same with the if-sensation. The conclusion is that it seems to be something wrong in placing a private feeling in comparison with a concrete object sensation. Rules are clearly not the same.

88. "Feeling of pastness" also comes from William James (cf. notes 21, 87). The analogy of wrist was created with the purpose to show how strange can be the idea of "feeling of pastness" turned into a psychological concept. This kind of analogies always have the role to call our attention to the way we use language. In PI § 286, for instance, a doubt was created regarding to where one feels the pain, whether in oneself as a whole or in a part of our body, like our hand. In PI § 361, by its turn, the question was addressed in order to know which part of the chair is responsible for its thinking.

89. We are now caught by surprise with a numeration which begins by the number 6 (!). It is difficult to discover where are the first five items. But, anyway, it is part of the game of reading an album that sometimes we catch the conversation when it already began sometime ago. So, we have to accommodate ourselves as comfortable as possible and try to get in. In the manuscript pages there is no solution of continuity, everything is there so natural as any turn of a page. Actually the page need not be even turned, because this numeration appears in the right-hand, or the recto side, of the next page, and the anterior remark ends in the left-hand, or the verso side, of the prior page.

90. As far as we can understand, it is a discussion about what can count as evidence in a testimony given by someone who died in a room after the training. Of course, all of this depends always on conventionally arranged criteria of "evidence", and, through such criteria the limits of language are showed, what can possibly or not possibly be said.

91. Conducting his grammatical investigations, Wittgenstein imagined possibilities as in a modal logic. Actually, the modal logic tradition is as old as propositional logic. Both are in Aristotle philosophy and were discussed all along the centuries. And as propositional logic, modal logic was also renewed in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as an extension of propositional logic as well as with the introduction of special symbols. As we can see, Wittgenstein mentioned logical modalities at the same time modal logic was being reintroduced in contemporary philosophy (Cf. Lewis, C.I. & Langford, C. H. 1932).

92. This is a rare case in Wittgenstein's writings where an anonymous voice acquires a name. Such dialogue was perhaps entertained with Moore.

93. Consequent with his method, Wittgenstein imagines his modal logic as a form of the case, not as a universal and traditional logic the voice (Moore?) was probably assuming it was.

94. Wittgenstein make use of several tools during his investigations, not only concepts like grammar, language games, connections, rules are employed as instruments, but he could have even invented a sort of modal logic. But all this solely with the purpose to enlight what happened, not of creating a philosophical doctrine. It is not around syntax and semantics that his worries are properly being directed. His remembrance of Nicod is contemporary to another remark in MS 115, p. 81: “When I describe determined simple language games it does not happen that I describe real processes of the constituted language, which would lead only to injustices (Nicod and Russell.)” If Wittgenstein did not want to be unfair, like Nicod and Russell seem to him they were, what is he then doing with his descriptions? Take a look at PI § 131: “For we can avoid unfairness or vacuity in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison – as a sort of yardstick; not as a preconception to which reality *must* correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)” His logical descriptions are nothing more than try to find a way out of dogmatism, a new method to do the same thing he was already intending to do with the TLP: philosophically stop doing philosophy. If sense data brought him back to philosophical concerns, he is now using a vaccine, made of the same linguistic material of the language of sense data (grammar), to cure his illness. (cf. note 11)

95. This inversion in the numeration seems to be a posterior addition introduced between the 9 and the 10. The topics 11 and 10 discusses the meaning of losing the point of a language game.

96. The rationale here seems to be of showing how our conclusions can vary according to the case we choose, no matter how sound and correct they are.

97. Our head would be whirling if we are under the impression that our interlocutor seems not to be clear enough about what can count as criteria for evidence of an accident. Sense seems to be gone, and we do not know any more what were the real reasonings on the game. The next step would be to realize that her language game was similar to ours, but effectively not the same.

98. All the above hypothesis was a prelude to introduce the main question: how can we know whether a sentence has a point? How can we recognize which language game is the case? It is a methodological question. The therapeutic voice has another tool: family resemblance can show what was the case. That is why Wittgenstein is always trying a new analogy, a new example, and his later philosophy finally consists in a whole album of thinking variations, through which we can see internal connections in a perspicuous presentation of purported cases (PI § 122). So, coming back to the 11<sup>th</sup> topic placed before in the manuscript, one lost point can make sense in another perspicuous presentation (under other circumstances).

99. William James (1890) speaks of after-images as if they were empirical proofs in psychology: “The phenomena of 'summation of stimuli' in the nervous system prove that each stimulus leaves some latent activity behind it which only gradually passes away. (...) Psychological proof of the same fact is afforded by those 'after-images' which we perceive when a sensorial stimulus is gone.” (pp. 634-635). This seems not to be a concern until we change the focus on the experiment: “...what if I had had to describe my own, not B's, training?” Through this subtle change of focus a lot of disorders are introduced in the empiricist certainties about private entities. The first problem is that it is impossible to know, regarding private experience, if the subject is lying or not. But we can, for the sake of argument, maintain that lying is not a possibility anymore. So there would be apparently no dilemma because, “saying the truth or the untruth is in this case [would be] unknown to me”. The possibility of considering to say the truth (or lying) would be completely absent. But, in that case, the reason for the verificationist criteria would be vanished. There would be no point for that. For what is the point of applying a criterion to know whether the color that I actually see is red?

100. And so the verificationist criterion would be reduced to a confrontation between subjective experiences: “You say you see a red circle, I say I see a yellow one”. It would vanish any description taken as a criterion for the verification of after-images.

## References

Wittgenstein’s published works:

BB	The Blue and Brown Books
BEE	Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition
BT	The Big Typescript: TS 213
CV	Culture and Value
LAP	Lectures on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs
LSD	The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience
MS	Wittgenstein's manuscript in von Wright's catalogue
NB	Notebooks 1914-1918
NSD	Notes for Lectures on Private Experience and Sense Data
PI	Philosophical Investigations
PO	Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951
PPF	Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment
PR	Philosophical Remarks
RC	Remarks on Colour
RFB	Remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough
SRL	Some Remarks on Logical Form
TLP	Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
TS	Wittgenstein's typescript in von Wright's catalogue
VW	The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle
WVC	Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle

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