HF 033
– Filosofia da Cincia I
Ps-Graduao
– 8 crditos (4 horas-aula/semana) –
2 Semestre de 2015
Prof. Silvio Seno Chibeni
Departamento de Filosofia- IFCH - www.unicamp.br/~chibeni
Horrio:
Segundas-feiras das 14 s 18 h.
Local:
Sala 204 do Centro de Lgica, Epistemologia e Histria da Cincia (CLE. Fica em
frente ao Ciclo Bsico II).
Ementa: O
curso visa a apresentar e discutir os principais conceitos e argumentos
envolvidos na controvrsia acerca do realismo cientfico. Especial nfase
ser dada no exame das conexes dessa controvrsia com
algumas questes epistemolgicas mais amplas, assim
como sua insero no panorama histrico da cincia e filosofia modernas e
contemporneas.
Avaliao: A avaliao ser baseada em um trabalho de
final de curso, individualizado para cada aluno, em seminrios a serem
apresentados pelos alunos sobre os projetos para esse trabalho, e na
participao efetiva nas aulas. O trabalho dever ter a forma de um artigo
acadmico. Seu objeto dever ser a apresentao e anlise crtica de um (ou
mais) artigo ou livro referente ao problema do realismo cientfico, a ser
escolhido pelo aluno, sujeito s seguintes condies: 1. aprovao pelo
professor; 2. diferente para cada aluno; 3. excludos os artigos discutidos ao
longo do curso.
Bibliografia provisria:
(Complementaes e detalhes
ser oferecidos oportunamente. Evidentemente, apenas um subconjunto adequadamente
escolhido das seguintes obras ser objeto de anlise detalhada no curso.)
I. Artigos e livro de S. S. Chibeni:
Berkeley e o
papel das hipteses na filosofia
natural. Scientiae Studia. v. 8, n. 3, p.
389-419,
2010.
Explanations in microphysics: A response to van Fraassens argument. Principia, 12(1):
2008, pp. 49–71.
Afirmando o conseqente:
Uma defesa do realismo
cientfico (?!).
Scientiae Studia 4 (2): 221-249, 2006.
A Humean analysis of scientific realism. Ensaios
sobre Hume, Lvia Guimares (org.), Belo Horizonte,
Segrac Editora,
2005. Pp. 89-108
Quintons neglected argument for scientific realism. Journal for General Philosophy of
Science, 36 (2): 393-400, 2005.
Locke on the epistemological
status
of scientific laws. Principia, 9 (1-2): 19-41, 2005.
Realismo cientfico empirista? Principia, 1 (2): 255-69, 1997b.
Aspectos
da Descrio Fsica da Realidade. CLE, Unicamp, 1997a.
A inferncia abdutiva e o realismo cientfico.
Cadernos de Histria e Filosofia da
Cincia, Srie 3, 6 (1): 45-73,
1996.
Descartes e o realismo cientfico. Reflexo,
n. 57, pp. 35-53, 1993.
II. Outras referncias:
ACHINSTEIN, P. Inference to the best explanation:
Or, Who won the Mill-Whewell debate? Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science, 23, 2, p. 349-64, 1992.
ADAM, C. & TANNERY, P. (eds.) Oeuvres de Descartes. Paris, Vrin,
1971.
BOYD, R. The current status
of scientific realism. In: Leplin 1984, p.
4l-82.
CARRIER, M. What is wrong with
the miracle argument? Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Science, 22, 1, p. 23-36, 1991.
––––. What is right
with the miracle argument: Establishing a taxonomy of
natural kinds. Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Science, 24, 3, p. 391-409, 1993.
CARTWRIGHT, N. How the Laws of Physics Lie, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1983.
CLARCKE, S. P. & LYONS, T. D. (eds.), Recent
Themes in the Philosophy of Science, Scientific Realism and Common Sense. (Australasian
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 17.) Dordrecht,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
CHURCHLAND, P.M. & HOOKER, C.A. (eds.) Images of Science. Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1985.
CUSHING, J. T., DELANEY,
C.F. & GUTTING, G. M. (eds.) Science and Reality. Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science. Essays
in Honor of Ernan McMullin.
Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
DESCARTES, R. Les Princpios de
la Philosophie. In: Adam & Tannery 1971, Tomo IX‑2.
FEYERABEND, P. Science in a Free Society.
London, Verso, 1982. (1. ed.
NLB, 1978.)
ELLIS, B. What Science Aims to Do. In: CHURCHLAND
& HOOKER 1985, pp. 48-74.
ENNIS, R. H.
Enumerative induction and best explanation (Comments and criticism). The Journal of Philosophy,
65 (18): 523-29, 1968.
FINE,
A. The Natural Ontological Attitude. In: LEPLIN 1984, pp.
83-107. (reimpresso
em FINE 1986, cap. 7.)
––––. The
Shaky Game.
Einstein, Realism and the Quantum Theory. Chicago and London, University of
Chicago Press, 1986. (Caps. 6 a 9.)
––––. Unnatural
attitudes: Realist and instrumentalist attachments to science. Mind, 45, 378, p. 149-79,
1986b.
GHINS, M. Putnams no-miracle argument: A
critique. In: Clarke & Lyons, 2002, p. 121-138.
––––. Can Common Sense
Realism be Extended to Theoretical Physics? Logic
Journal of the IGPL (International Group for Philosophical Logic),
13, 1, p. 95-111, Jan. 2005. (http://jigpal.oxfordjournals.org/)
HACKING, I. Representing
and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
HARDIN, C. &
ROSENBERG, A. In
defense of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science 53,
p. 31-51, 1982.
HARMAN, G. Inference to
the best explanation. The
Philosophical Review, 74 (1):
88-95, 1965.
––––.
Enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation.
The Journal of
Philosophy, 65 (18): 529-33,
1968.
HEMPEL, C. G. Aspects of Scientific
Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York, The Free Press, 1965.
––––. Philosophy of
Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall,
1966.
HOOKER, C.A. Surface
Dazzle, Ghostly Depths: An Exposition and Critical
Evaluation of van Fraassens Vindication of Empiricism against Realism. In:
CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 153-196.
LAUDAN, L. A confutation of
convergent realism. In: Leplin 1984, p. 218-49. 1984a.
––––. Explaining the success of
science: Beyond epistemic realism and relativism. In: Cushing et al.
1984, p. 83-105. 1984b.
––––. Progress and its Problems. Berkeley and Los Angeles,
University of California Press, 1977.
––––. Science and
Values. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984c.
––––. Science and
Relativism. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990.
––––. Beyond
Positivism and Relativism, Oxford, Westview Press, 1996.
LAUDAN, L. & LEPLIN, J. Empirical
equivalence and underdetermination. The Journal of Philsophy, 88, 9,
p. 449-472, 1991.
LEPLIN, J. (ed.) Scientific Realism. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of
California Press, 1984.
¾¾. A Novel Defense of Scientific
Realism. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
LEWIS, P. Why the
pessimistic induction is a fallacy. Synthese, 129, p. 371-380, 2001.
LIPTON, P. Inference to the Best Explanation.
2nd. ed., London, Routledge,
2004.
LOPARIC, Z.
Andreas Osiander:
Prefcio ao De Revolutionibus
Orbium Coelestium de
Coprnico. Cadernos de Histria e
Filosofia da Cincia, 1: 44-6l,
1980.
MAXWELL, G. The Ontological Status
of Theoretical Entities. In: Feigl, H. &
Maxwell, G. (eds.) Scientific
Explanation, Space and Time. (M.S.P.S. vol. III.) Minneapolis, University
of Minnessota Press, 1962. Pp. 3-27.
MEEHL, P. The miracle argument for realism: An
important lesson to be learned by generalizing from Carriers counter-examples.
Studies in the History
and Philosophy of Science, 23, 2, p. 267-282, 1992.
MENNA, S. H. Metodologas
y Contextos. Crdoba (Argentina), Facultad de Filosofa y Humanidades,
Universidad Nacional de Crdoba, 2003.
MUSGRAVE,
A. Constuctive Empiricism versus Scientific Realism. The
Philosophical Quarterly 32(128):
262-271, 1982.
––––.
Realism versus Constructive Empiricism. In: CHURCHLAND
& HOOKER 1985, pp. 197-221.
NAGEL,
E. The Structure of
Science. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
NIINILUOTO, I. Critical Scientific Realism.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.
NORRIS, C. Ontology according to van Fraassen:
Some problems with constructive empiricism. Metaphilosophy, 28,
3, p. 196-218, 1997.
PEIRCE, C.S. Collected Papers, v. 5 e 6 (dois volumes em um). Ed. Charles Hartshorne. Cambridge, Mass., The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1934-1935.
POPPER, K. R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
5.ed., revised. London: Hutchinson 1968.
––––. Conjectures and Refutations. 4.ed., revised. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972a.
––––. Objective
Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972b.
PSILLOS, S. Scientific
Realism. How Science Tracks Truth, London and New York, Roudledge,
1999.
PUTNAM, H. What is mathematical truth. In:
Mathematics, Matter and Method. (Philosophical Papers, v.1.) Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1975.
––––. Meaning and the Moral Sciences.
Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
QUINTON, A. The Nature of Things. London, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1973.
SALMON, W. Scientific
Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1984.
SMART, J. J. C. Between Science and Philosophy. New York, Ramdom House, 1968.
THAGARD, P. R. The best explanation for theory choice. The Journal of Philosophy, 75 (2): 76-92, 1978.
VAN FRAASSEN, B.C. The Scientific Image. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1980.
––––.
To Save the Phenomena. In: LEPLIN 1984, pp. 250-259.
––––.
Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science. In:
CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 245-308.
––––. Laws and
Symmetry, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989.
––––. The Empirical Stance. New Haven,
Yale University Press, 2002.
WHEWELL, W. Textos diversos reunidos em Theory of Scietific Method,
R. E. Butts (ed.), Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1989.